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ABSTRACT 
 
Healthcare managers have a responsibility for the standard of their services and patient care 
delivered. Their work is thought to be essential in achieving and improving high quality care and 
patient safety. However, little is empirically known about their role in this. This thesis investigates 
acute care managerial work and impact in the context of quality of care and patient safety. It draws 
upon power and work-activity group theories and literature from other industries to guide 
investigation and elucidate findings. The introductory Chapters (Chapters 1-3) provide the 
background context of quality of care and patient safety, relevant management theory, and 
literature on the role of acute care managers in quality and safety. A systematic literature review in 
Chapter 4 illustrates a case for empirical research on this topic and suggests areas for further 
investigation. Chapters 5 and 6 report a case study investigation of the senior manager’s dimensions 
of involvement in a quality and safety improvement collaborative. These Chapters present self-
reports of 17 Chief Executive Officers and 18 Medical Directors across 20 NHS hospitals on their 
actions and contributions to the UK Safer Patients Initiative (SPI). From this, a model of five principle 
dimensions of involvement emerged. Corroborating this model, Chapter 7 reports the staff 
perspective of their senior managements’ role in SPI, comprising interviews with 36 staff also 
involved in the SPI programme across the 20 hospitals.  
 
To explore the work of the acute care middle manager in quality and patient safety, 36 interviews 
with general managers, service and divisional managers across two NHS Trusts and two specialities 
reveal their relevant training/learning, demands, choices and constraints (Chapter 8). This informed 
two follow up surveys that further quantified the interview findings and explored theoretical power 
and role constructs. The first survey presents the views of 100 middle managers from 10 NHS Trusts 
on their quality and safety-related time, learning, activities, power and impact (Chapter 9). The 
second survey reports 60 clinical staff views on the same items, illustrating some divergence on 
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critical constructs (Chapter 10). The thesis closes with a final Chapter (Chapter 11) comprising a 
summary of the key findings per Chapter and the overarching themes from the thesis. 
Methodological limitations/strengths, wider implications for managers and policy makers, and future 
research are considered. The Chapter ends with concluding remarks on the critical work performed 
by acute care managers across organisational levels for the daily preservation of quality and patient 
safety and its improvement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The UK National Health Service (NHS) is presently in a state of flux. The national economic downturn 
and change in government are two drivers responsible for instability and planned changes in 
organisational structures, funding and commissioning. Coinciding with the start of the work for this 
thesis, after 13 years of Labour government rule, a coalition formed by the Conservative party and 
the Liberal Democrat party acted on a burgeoning heated debate concerning the efficiency of NHS 
managers and their large numbers. Since the early 1970s, the number of managers in the NHS has 
been steadily climbing.[1] The Griffith’s management review (1983) was responsible for continued 
increase after he noted: “In short if Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the 
corridors of the NHS today she would almost certainly be searching for the people in charge.”[2] With 
the rise of managers along came a rise in negative attitudes towards them. Common accusations are 
that they are  resistant to change and inefficient,[3] arguably contributing to the dissipation of the 
once strongly-held concepts of managerialism.  The coalition has responded by  introducing 
unprecedented reforms to significantly reduce the number of managers by 45% and transfer part of 
their control to other healthcare professionals.[4] A backlash to the proposals set out the risks of the 
loss of experienced managers and dangers of undervaluing managers’ duties that ensure high quality 
care.[5] Cementing their potential to influence, recent high profile hospital failings in quality care 
and patient safety have been attributed to management.[6, 7] Experts agree that the healthcare 
manager plays a significant part in quality and safety.[8, 9] However details of what that part should 
be or is presently are not featured in the empirical literature. A better understanding of what 
managers actually do for quality of care and patient safety can in turn illuminate both their actual 
and potential contributions towards maintaining and improving care and help consider the impact of 
the policy plans soon to come into effect.  
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Furthermore, the host of applicable management theory alongside research contributions from 
managing safety in other industries presently remains dormant in healthcare. The deficiency of 
theoretical underpinnings to facilitate the understanding and improvement of patient safety and 
quality healthcare has been duly noted,[10, 11] but disregarded despite repeated suggestions that 
valuable insight can be gained in improving safety in healthcare from the experience of accident 
prevention and learning in other industries.[12]  
 
This thesis intends to address the highly current topic of acute care managerial work within the 
uncharted context of quality of care and patient safety, drawing on power theory and work activity 
group theory alongside literature from other industries to guide investigation and elucidate findings. 
The work activity theories will help to unravel the practical side of what managers do, as well as 
offer insight into why they do it. Examining power constructs will additionally highlight how the 
managers can influence quality and safety. The research aims to study both routine daily quality of 
care and quality improvement across the organisational tiers: senior/Board-level management and 
mid-level management. This will provide more information on managers’ work in varying contexts of 
quality and safety and identify similarities and differences relevant to better inform those in 
different positions. This will provide a broader exploration in response to the overarching thesis 
research question: ‘what is the role of acute care managers in quality of care and patient safety?  
 
To open this thesis, introduction of the background literature is split into three main parts: an 
introduction to the field of management, work-activity and power theories; an introduction on the 
context of quality and safety in healthcare; and an introduction on (predominantly non-empirical) 
literature on the acute care managers’ role in quality and safety. These are followed by a systematic 
review of the empirical literature on the acute care managers’ role in quality and safety. 
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CHAPTER 1 - THEORIES OF MANAGEMENT WORK AND INFLUENCE 
 
 “To manage is to forecast and plan, to organise, to command, to coordinate and to control”.[13] 
 
Since Fayol’s definition of management, a step away from ‘command’ has been made in favour of 
‘motivation’, ‘participation’ and ‘leadership’.  However, today their remains a difficulty in providing a 
definition that is not entirely generic. Moreover, the term ‘management’ has been clouded as well as 
contributed to by a wide breadth of research on different organisational topics by a series of 
established management experts. These management thinkers have been scattered throughout the 
past decades,[14-16] providing the foundations for current work on management processes within 
the organisations.[17, 18]  
 
1.1 Schools of management theory 
There are a variety of different schools of thought on management and on a manager’s job. They all 
attempt to offer theoretical frameworks for the study of management. Categories of management 
schools have been created in an effort to collate a number of views of different theorists, split by 
their fundamental view of how organisations and the people within them work. Referred to as ‘The 
Management Theory Jungle’,[19] there is an extensive body of concepts on management. Here the 
aim is to describe a few of the various schools that have both had most impact on the field of 
management and are most relevant to this thesis. Table 1 presents the schools of management and 
their focus. 
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MANAGEMENT SCHOOL SCHOOL FOCUS 
CLASSICAL SCHOOL 
(1880s onwards) 
Scientific 
Management 
 
More efficient management of organisations and their 
workers 
Administrative 
Management 
 
Bureaucratic 
Management 
BEHAVIORAL SCHOOL 
(1930s onwards) 
Human 
Relations 
Management 
A perspective engaging in the understanding of worker 
and organisational behaviour 
SYSTEMS SCHOOL 
(1950s onwards) 
Views the organisation as a system comprised of inter-
dependent components. 
CONTINGENCY SCHOOL 
(1960s onwards) 
Favours the situation as a determinant of effectiveness 
and related actions relevant to the task. 
WORK-ACTIVITY SCHOOL 
(1970s onwards) 
Focused on describing observable activities and roles 
CRITICAL SCHOOL 
(1980s onwards) 
Critiques and offers alternatives to conventional 
management theories. Addresses gaps from previous 
theory, e.g. political, power and social relations and 
meanings of management 
Table 1 Schools of management 
 
The Classical School is divided by ‘Scientific Management’, ‘Administrative Management’ and 
‘Bureaucratic Management’. Scientific Management suggested that approaches to management and 
managerial decision making is about science not ‘rule of thumb’.  This comprises of specific roles for 
workers, a focus on tasks and time taken, and economic incentives in accordance with output.[20] 
Taylor believed workers to be motivated by monetary gain and incapable of anything other than 
following instructions.  In contrast to the scientific focus of management, Henri Fayol (1949) 
proposed the important managerial function, ‘to forecast and plan, to organize, to command, to 
coordinate, and control’ and offered the concept of ‘command and control’. In so doing, Fayol 
determined a ‘functional’ approach to management. He focused on the processes and activities of 
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management and 14 principles of management.[13] Similarly, Gulick offered the following seven 
managerial responsibilities:  planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and 
budgeting.[21] Leading on from Administrative Management, Bureaucratic Management arose from 
a focus on accountability, hierarchy, rules, regulations and records. Weber made the distinction 
between authority and power, the first time a classical theorist had taken power of managers into 
consideration. He hones in on one of his three proposed types of legitimate authority, gained from 
the position that the manager takes within the organisation. Due to the rigid processes, bureaucratic 
control has been described as unyielding and wasteful.[22, 23]  
 
Attempts to address the classical approaches disregard of the employee led to the worker’s rights 
movement.[24]  The belief was that productivity is improved by considering the individuals at work 
and good team work. Under the banner of the Behavioural school of thought emerged further study 
akin to the worker’s rights principles.[25-27] Mayo’s studies have been reported to have empirically 
illustrated the limitations of Taylor’s scientific management concepts, because his studies found that 
participant workers’ both varied their work and had much freedom from management, without 
harm to productivity. This led to the Human Relations movement. Building on Mayo’s findings and 
most far removed from classical management’s universal ‘one fits all’ notion, Contingency theory 
favours the situation or structure as a determinant of effectiveness and proposing task-relevant 
actions,[28] with evidence of success in a decentralised setting with greater sub-system 
specialisation.[29] Finally, the system approach to management is based on the assumption that an 
organisation is a system that is comprised of a number of inter-dependent components (inputs, 
processes and outputs).[30]   
 
 
24 
 
1.2 Critique of approaches to management 
Scientific management has offered the field a systematic approach, consistency in standards, 
incentives, increase in productivity and efficiency, and an opportunity to achieve large economies of 
scale.[31-33] However, weaknesses of its approach are extensive. Firstly, the theory assumes that 
workers are motivated solely by economic needs, disregarding their social needs, such as 
recognition, personal development, well-being and potential contributions to decision-making 
processes. This focus on incentivised load or frequency of output can also compromise the quality of 
the work and has the potential to alienate and ‘de-skill’ the workers. [34, 35]  Monotonous tasks 
could reduce a worker’s initiative and lower job satisfaction, particularly important considering job 
satisfaction has been positively correlated with workers’ higher performance.[36] Although the 
behavioural and human relations movement try to address this, by opposing Classical Management 
to the extreme they appear to have ignored certain agreeable principles of its approach, such as 
economic motivation, instead over-emphasising symbolic gesture and involvement in decision 
making. On both accounts, certain situations may arise where neither is feasible.  
 
Collective doubt by theorists on the managerial activities of command and, to a lesser extent 
planning, led them to a different view of management work, such as communication and 
facilitation.[17] The potential bias of disregarding an entire theory due to a singular flaw has been 
noted,[19] however administrative theory on the whole has produced little,[37] with limited impact 
on practice.[38] Additional criticisms are of its inflexible mode that does not apply to times of 
instability. Indeed, all the classical theories suffer from a fundamental flaw of the ‘one size fits all’ 
concept. The critics stress that management approaches should be context-dependent.[39, 40] Yet 
the Contingency theory remains static rather than adaptable,[41] and contingencies often change, so 
companies would need to continuously change to fit them. Most importantly to academics, it is a 
theory that is difficult to empirically verify and does not offer a sufficient knowledge base for 
managers. Whilst the Systems Approach has improved the manager’s understanding and awareness 
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of inter-dependences, it offers little in the way of technique and advice on managerial actions.[42] 
This criticism can be attributed to all the aforementioned theory and is addressed by the work-
activity school. 
 
1.3 Work-activity school 
Mintzberg (1973) criticised all earlier theoretical contributions as lacking in any findings that 
resemble what managers actually do at work.[43] He particularly disapproved of the functional 
approach by Fayol and others and argued that ideas of ‘planning, organizing, leading, and 
controlling’ did not capture the true nature of managerial work, which he often deemed as 
disordered and chaotic. Indeed, in taking a ‘managerial role approach’, Mintzberg exposed 
managerial work as prone to fragmentation, brevity and variety, additionally observing the lack of 
pattern associated with managers work constantly jumping from one task to another, mostly 
reactive, fast-paced and through verbal communications.[43] He stated that a “synthesis of these 
findings paints an interesting picture, one as different from Fayol’s classical view as a cubist abstract 
is from a Renaissance painting”.[44] His observations were supported by earlier work illustrating 
that the managers worked undisturbed for only 23 minutes at a time and only twelve times in 25 
days.[45] Stewart similarly found manager’s work to be continuously interrupted,[46] but later 
recognised that this was not true of all managers’ work.[47] 
 
Mintzberg’s (1973) influential work exploring the nature of manager’s work, proposed ten roles 
pertaining to managers.[43] These managerial roles are presented in Table 2, divided into three 
encapsulating roles: Interpersonal, informational and decisional roles. 
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Interpersonal roles Informational roles Decisional roles 
 Figurehead (symbolic 
& ceremonial)  
 
 Leader (motivating 
and fostering work 
environment) 
 
 Liaison (liaising with 
internal & external 
contacts for 
information) 
 Monitor (collecting 
information internal & 
external to organisation) 
 
 Disseminator 
(communicating factual 
info to staff) 
 
 Spokesman (representing 
organisation on 
performance & policies to 
outsiders) 
 Entrepreneur (initiating change to 
improve performance)  
 
 Disturbance handler (taking 
corrective action to cope with 
adverse situations/operational 
breakdowns) 
 
 Resource allocator (allocating 
human & financial resources) 
 
 Negotiator (negotiating with other 
organisations or staff) 
Table 2 Mintzberg’s managerial work roles (1973)[43] p.92  
 
 
Replication of Mintzberg’s work a decade on proclaimed ‘Mintzberg was right!’ [48] Kurke & Aldrich 
(1983) found very little deviations from the findings found by Mintzberg (e.g. 54% of hospital 
managers’ activities took less than 9 minutes) and deviations that were found were explained 
through contingency factors. Whether these differences should have been explained away or 
whether Mintzberg’s theory was validated however has been questioned.[49] Other replication 
studies have found some overlap between the 10 roles, although these studies still concurred with 
the majority of the roles outlined.[50] Against Mintzberg’s roles, Gowler & Legge (1983) assert that 
managers manage verbally by using rhetoric to establish power.[51] The theorists offer the 
viewpoint of the oral tradition of management, detailing methods such as story-telling and 
consultation. In this way, managers define their own way of work, own meanings and their own 
rationality.[52] Along similar lines, Kotter’s (1982) empirical study of ‘what effective general 
managers really do’ painted a picture of the successful general manager as someone that informally 
builds networks. According to the study findings, effective general managers spend most of their 
time with others, discussing a breadth of topics and asking many questions. Their discussions involve 
much non work-related banter and joking that they themselves regarded as a waste of time. In such 
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time-wasting activities, they rarely give orders and similarly in other conversations often attempt to 
influence others rather than telling others what to do. Often their work was a reaction to others’ 
initiatives, not on the official agenda, and consisted of a great deal of networking.[53]  
 
Rosemary Stewart was also among the theorists focusing early on upon the activities of the manager 
to find out what they actually do. Stewart (1982) put forward a model for understanding managerial 
behaviour and jobs. This consisted of three factors that affected managerial roles: the demands of 
the job (e.g. bureaucratic procedures that cannot be ignored); its constraints (e.g. resource 
limitations); and choices available (e.g. choice to change area of work).[54]   
 
In a review of the literature on managerial roles, Hales (1986) summed up manager’s work as 
responsive to circumstances, contingent upon a number of factors and often self-defined, further 
detailing a list similar to that of Mintzberg’s.[55] These conclusions provided a basis to critique 
earlier mentioned work on defining generic roles for managers, Hales particularly criticised such 
work for not taking into account unobservable functions and why managers behave as they do. 
Others at the time agreed that earlier work does not tell us about which are the essential 
management functions,[56] and has not taken into consideration culture [57, 58] or politics of 
managers’ behaviour.[59] Hales later further developed his critical perspective after another review 
over a decade on, turning towards an explanation of the environment steering what managers do, 
e.g. available resources.[60] 
 
Perhaps the most relevant and consistent critique of the earlier findings by Mintzberg and Stewart is 
simply that managerial work has changed over time.[49, 61] Tengblad (2006) recreated Mintzberg’s 
original observation study 30 years on, revealing some support for and some divergence from 
Mintzberg’s findings, but ultimately concluding that managerial work has not changed 
dramatically.[49] Unlike Mintzberg’s findings, greater workload and emphasis of information activity 
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was found (Mintzberg presented that managers receive more information than they impart). 
Tengblad also found a contact pattern more focused on subordinates in group-settings and 
surprisingly did not find fragmentation of time or preoccupation with administrative work to the 
same extent as that defined by Mintzberg. However eight of Mintzberg’s 13 propositions were 
supported, including fast-pace work, verbal correspondence and little time spent with their seniors, 
the remaining propositions were somewhat supported, with the exception of only two that clearly 
do not receive support within the findings.[49] Aside from Tengblad, it is recognised that rival 
theories to that of Mintzberg on managerial work are very few.[62] Mintzberg later presented ‘a 
model of managerial work’ (see Figure 2), in order to take into consideration the complexity and 
interactional relationships associated with managers roles.[62][63] However, this has yet to be 
validated by others, therefore I argue that my prospective studies should use the original study that 
has been independently and globally supported. 
 
 
Figure 2 A model of managing by Mintzberg (2009)[62] p.48 
Reprinted with permission of the publisher.  From Managing, copyright© 2009 by Mintzberg, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., San 
Francisco, CA.  All rights reserved. www.bkconnection.com 
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1.4 Critical school 
Further critique of the aforementioned management theories have formed a school and study of 
their own: ‘Critical Management Studies’ (CMS).[39, 64] Originated from the book of critical 
management studies written by Alvesson and Willmott,[39] CMS continues to develop, taking 
onboard principles from a host of different genres. Willmott (1987) unambiguously lays out his own 
critique and propositions on the most popular management theories. He argues that they omit the 
interactive nature of management and the organisation, including organisational factors that both 
affect and are affected by managerial actions.[59] He argues that, within the management 
approaches, not only are the functions of the manager separated from the environmental and 
organisational context in which they work, they are apolitical. Willmott confronts the standard 
distinction between technical and political facets of managers’ work. He believes that political 
elements are incorrectly perceived as contrary to certified order. One of Willmott’s points of 
contention was in the division of organisational and individual managerial behavioural dimensions 
and the requirement for an understanding of managers’ actions and strategies mediated and shaped 
by a wider 'system of power and authority'. For example, whilst Mintzberg identified four 
contingencies (the environmental, job, person and situational), Willmott argues that his concepts 
discounts the ‘relational’ nature of managers’ work and removes possible exploration of the political 
processes and rational for managerial work. Additionally, Willmott points out that the 
unacknowledged interactive effects of the observer-observed relationship is rarely considered, 
which may misrepresent the accuracy of study findings on managers’ work. He calls for a better 
transparency of the biases that this relationship may cause. While Willmott acknowledges positive 
aspects of the work-activity theories, as an alternative, he endorses an updated theory of 
structuration by Giddens.[65, 66] This presents the concept that structure has the additional 
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function of mediating strategic conduct and recognises that managerial work acts as “a medium and 
outcome of the structural properties of a social system”.  
 
1.5 Implications for healthcare management and research  
The work-activity group contributors have offered both practical and theoretical proposals to explain 
managerial work. Their theories have yet to be applied to the work of acute care management 
within the context of quality of care. Both healthcare management and patient safety improvement 
have been criticised for not learning from management studies.[67, 68]  Employing the conceptual 
reasoning from the work-activity theorists will offer a useful foundation to base interpretations of 
what acute care managers do for quality of care. Mintzberg’s roles will help group the different 
types of activities that managers currently undertake and Stewart’s framework will allow for greater 
understanding of why certain activities are carried out more than others, distinguishing between 
demands and choices made and related barriers. Furthermore, their research findings that imply 
that managers work in a fragmented way hold great implications for patient safety if found true 
within the acute care manager’s work on this.  The work activity group also offers more relevant 
models than the other mainstream management theories, particularly as we are interested in what 
manager’s work actually entails and aim to offer a greater pragmatic understanding to managers and 
policy makers on their work. The practicability that the work-activity group offers over the other 
theories and the lack of an appropriate framework at the exploratory level by the critical school 
propositions further justifies their approach as relevant for my research. Consequently, this thesis 
intends to take the work-activity approach. In respect to the criticisms of the approach, before we 
can attempt to understand why managers act out certain roles, we need to first investigate what 
these roles are within acute care. However, taking into consideration the critical school critique, 
further investigation into managers’ use of power will also be explored. This will help to answer how 
managers can influence quality and safety and highlight potential limits or possibilities of their 
contribution and impact. 
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1.6 Power frameworks 
"Power is the ability of A to get B to do something he or she would otherwise not do”.[69] 
 
With regards to managerial influence, power has been described as the ability to affect outcomes 
and get things done.[70] In line with Weber’s findings on power linked with authority and rule, 
perception and use of social power in the workplace have been found to be factors relating to 
managers’ effectiveness.[71] The 16th century, offered some first key principles of power that still 
remain; including the principle of relative power (one is only powerful if another is powerless), 
instrumental power (the use of others’ power and influence through their compliance) and 
interpersonal influence versus power by authority.[72]  Since then power as a concept has had much 
research interest, investigated across many contexts, across the political arena, community theory, 
and the social elite.[73-75] Within the workplace there is an established link between leadership and 
power across the field. One of the most distinguished frameworks for social power and influence 
surfaced in the late 1950s by French and Raven who defined five bases of power (see Table 3).[76]  
 
                                                                    Five Bases of Power 
Positional/Legitimate Power  Power owed to position of authority held in the organisation. 
Referent Power  Power owed to charm and interpersonal skills (e.g. a manager 
may have little credibility to discuss safety but their ability to 
build relationships leads to acceptance of appeals). 
Expert Power Power owed to expertise or skill in the area needed by the 
organisation/individuals. 
Reward Power Power owed to the authority to bestow rewards (e.g. 
promotions, increase pay, time off). 
Coercive Power  Power owed to ability to withhold rewards.  
Table 3 French and Raven’s (1959) Five bases of power[76]  
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This theory states that person A requires person B to recognise a quality in A which would motivate 
B to change in the way A requests. Moreover, A must draw upon the bases adept to the situation, 
otherwise they may lose their power. This could translate to inferences for the type of power that 
should be used to improve quality, change safety systems, improve staff engagement in initiatives 
and to be a leader of safety. Years on, French and Ravens constructs have had few variations,[77] 
‘position power’ base has particularly gained support and use within the literature and related 
theory.[78, 79] With some authors sold on to this power base, Kotter had to clarify that legitimate 
power is not the only source of power as some literature insinuates.[79] There is also unanimous 
agreement of separating power and authority, with authority, viewed as a legitimate power.[69] The 
framework has been most applied to the topic of leadership, which is most relevant to the present 
subject of study. Others have written on power, but have not proposed frameworks to empirically 
examine managers’ power.[80] Consequently, I will use French and Raven’s social power theory to 
examine how managers influence quality and safety. This will enable us to understand the power 
bases that managers have in relation to their work on quality and explain how and why managers 
influence the way that they do. Criticisms of their theory is that it is one-dimensional and that it 
negates context and the importance of resource control, ie. those in control of resources have 
automatic power. The thesis studies will avoid these limitations, as they will only include those that 
have resource control (managers) and will relate the power bases to the specific context of quality of 
care. 
 
1.7 Management in healthcare 
The Roy Griffith’s management review (1983) resulted in a radical change of hospital structures in 
the UK, including an introduction of middle management and a Board that uses comparative 
performance indicators. Today, organisational management structures in hospitals greatly vary, the 
bigger the hospital, the more complex the structure. Most relevant to present research, they differ 
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in their number of management organisational levels, in the number of units that managers are 
responsible for and in their managers’ job titles. For example, a general manager in one hospital may 
monitor several departments and have three levels of managers below them, whilst the same 
position in another hospital, might be called a Divisional manager with fewer staff to manage. 
However, across all hospitals there is a clear distinction between senior managers and the middle 
managers who report up to them. Figure 3 presents an example organisational structure of an NHS 
Trust. 
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Figure 3 An example of an NHS Trust organisational hierarchy[81] 
 
Senior management are at the top of the organisational hierarchy chart and hold Trust-wide 
responsibilities and practices;[82] and middle managers are in the middle of the organisational 
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hierarchy chart and have one or more managers reporting to them.[43, 83] Managers who are at the 
first level of the organisational hierarchy and have no managers reporting to them are often referred 
to as frontline management (e.g. ward managers). Among other objectives, the Board must ensure 
that the hospital is making money and providing adequate services across all of their organisations’ 
departments, as well as hiring senior managerial staff and reporting to external governmental 
bodies. The next tiers down are directly responsible for their units’ standards, staff and 
development. At both senior and middle management levels, their vital responsibility is to underpin 
their maintenance and development of standards and adequate services for the safety and quality of 
care received by patients. Managing people, resources, systems and processes across the hospital 
holds truly great implications for their impact on quality and safety and raises the long overdue 
question – what are hospital managers doing in quality and safety? This question is pertinent now 
more than ever because of the extensive changes currently occurring in NHS Management to cut 
costs and raise efficiency and is simultaneously affected by ongoing developments, restructuring and 
changes in the NHS and generally within the manager’s role.[84] At this juncture, I turn to literature 
on management in healthcare to present the work, background and potential of managers in this 
setting.  
 
1.8 Managerial work in healthcare and parallels with management work in 
other industries 
 
The work and contributions of healthcare managers are unclear and under-researched.[85] 
Mintzberg (2002) replicated his earlier study on the work of managers through observations of 
seven managers within the healthcare setting. He concluded that there were disconnections at all 
levels of management, especially between clinical operations and general management. He 
highlights that the healthcare context is predominantly about networking and shared managerial 
responsibilities.[86] Because Mintzberg looked at a modest sample of managers across different 
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organisational levels, generalisations are difficult. A more recent study borrowed Mintzberg’s 
structured observational study design to further explore what healthcare managers at the ‘lower’ 
levels do.[87] The authors observed ten ‘first line’ and ‘second line’ level managers across healthcare 
settings in 17 hospitals. Findings showed that the managers mostly spent short amounts of time (less 
than 9 minutes) on tasks, that the most common type of activities undertaken were information-
related, and that they spent almost half of their time in meetings, in addition to corridor or cafeteria 
discussions and other informal meetings. Only a very small amount of time was spent on strategic 
work, with the majority of time spent on administration. Other articles on the work of frontline 
management in healthcare similarly portray the nature of clinical managers work as fast-paced and 
pressurised, involving a mixture of unanticipated meetings, admin, HR, and clinical work.[88] 
Checkland et al’s recent review and studies of primary care middle managers similarly found their 
work to be “messy, fragmented and largely accomplished in meetings.”[89] There is a glaring overlap 
between the type of work carried out by managers in healthcare settings and in the industry setting. 
Reoccurring characteristics shared include the brevity of tasks combined with a high workload and 
juggling of tasks, alongside the important actions of networking and people management. The 
implications for patient safety are interesting if not concerning, yet work related to patient safety or 
quality of care may reveal an entirely different approach, perhaps one more similar to those who 
found that management work nowadays does not follow all of these characteristics.[49] Either way, 
the type, nature and time spent on activities are worthy of examination when considering the 
healthcare manager’s work on quality and safety.  
 
A large ethnographic research project that examined the work of middle and junior managers across 
different organisations in healthcare, highlighted the pressure related to financial budgets and 
difficulties faced due to frequent organisational change. The managers’ focus seemed to be around 
operational management and service improvement and whilst the managers reported patient care 
as a priority, the topic did not appear at the forefront of their meetings.[85] The authors implied that 
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managers may act as mediators between clinicians and policy from above, in line with similar 
descriptions of middle management.[90]   
 
Most of the literature however draws on the senior levels of healthcare management; very little is 
known about the role of middle management in healthcare.[91] A few have pioneered research on 
middle management in the UK NHS.[91-93] Currie identified the influence that NHS middle 
managers have in business planning,[91] and their contribution to strategic change, over and above 
merely implementing senior manager’s instruction.[94] Other authors also suggest that healthcare 
mid-level managers have a role in strategic change and involvement in organisational strategic 
initiatives.[92, 95] Although a sizeable survey study showed no positive relationship between middle 
manager reports of participation in strategy decisions and hospital efficiency in terms of cost.[96] 
However, Embertson highlights that middle management contribution to strategic formulation has 
been undervalued and that these managers are key agents of change within healthcare 
organisations through their acts of innovation, communication, therapy and as a stabiliser.[3] 
Similarly, the middle manager has been described as an agent of change for healthcare 
organisational culture,[97] adding value to patient care.[91]  However, much research has dismissed 
middle management as a contender to change healthcare from the inside, instead suggesting that 
they lack contribution to their organisation and hinder its efficiency.[3, 94, 98]  
 
Similarly, within the literature on middle managers outside of healthcare, there is also a depiction of 
middle managers as inefficient.[91] More recently however, there have been more positive 
proposals indicating the value of middle management. Firstly, articles have suggested middle 
managers as entrepreneurs and essential for innovative growth.[99] Huy (2001) proposes that 
middle managers are indeed agents of change for the organisation's culture, through 
entrepreneurial ideas, appreciation of employee needs at a time of change, maintaining continuity 
and change, and leveraging informal networks.[83] Huy states that because middle managers have 
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worked their way up the ladder they hold far deeper networks than senior managers. This may also 
hold true for clinical middle managers that were once doctors or nurses before taking the step to 
management, but would unlikely be the case for those that are non-clinical managers. This would be 
an interesting question to ask of future empirical data.   
 
On the whole, there are many parallels between management work in healthcare and other settings, 
however limitations of drawing comparisons exist. Flin and Yule’s (2004) review of industry literature 
on leadership safety that aimed to draw out lessons learned for the medical setting, highlighted 
difficulties in learning from the literature in industry, because most of the research on this topic is 
from the energy or manufacturing sectors, with safety referring to staff safety rather than patient 
safety.[100] Within the healthcare setting, managers interact with patients far less than with their 
staff, which raises queries about whether parallels can be drawn and which management actions 
may influence patients. On the other hand, we have noted that there has been links established 
between management, staff safety attitudes and patient safety.[101, 102] Healthcare managers may 
then have a more indirect influence on patient safety, through the impact that they have on staff 
attitudes and behaviours.  
 
It is also difficult to draw conclusions from the literature on healthcare managers’ daily work 
because more is written on the healthcare managers’ role within organisational change than in 
relation to status quo, or on competencies and skills rather than actual work.[103-107] Although 
some articles examining healthcare executives’ competencies have identified helpful areas of focus 
for managers, comprising more strategy, innovation, and resourcefulness in developing research 
alliances, executing research operations, and enhancing performance at all levels.[104, 106] Early 
research found that acute care middle managers rated importance of most work roles and skills 
higher than they rated their competency to execute them.[108] More recent research has found 
similar barriers of peer-perceived competency and skills.[109] This has implications on their quality-
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related performance, but specific investigation into managers’ competencies, knowledge and 
training for quality and safety is required.  
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CHAPTER 2 - QUALITY AND SAFETY IN HEALTHCARE  
 
This chapter presents the context of the managerial work within this thesis: quality of care and 
patient safety. It defines quality and safety and describes their emergence and importance, along 
with theory surrounding safety, and implications for management involvement in patient safety 
 
2.1  Definition of quality and safety 
 
Noted early on as “a remarkably difficult notion to define”,[110] broad definitions of quality have 
been widely used and accepted in the past: "Doing the right thing right, right away".[111] Since then 
more attempts have been made to define the broad concept more precisely. In 1990, Donabedian 
laid out seven attributes of health care that define its quality.[112] Based on these attributes, the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined quality in healthcare as possessing the following dimensions: 
safe, effective, patient-centred, timely, efficient and equitable.[8] Close variations of this definition 
are used in the UK, the Darzi NHS Next Stage Review characterised high quality simply as “clinically 
effective, personal and safe”.[113]  Across all variations, the safety of patients is one dimension of 
quality of care. IOM regards patient safety as “indistinguishable from the delivery of quality health 
care.”[114]  They have defined patient safety simply as “the prevention of harm to patients.”[114] 
and “freedom from accidental injury”.[12] The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Patient 
Safety Network (AHRQ PSN) revised this definition to “freedom from accidental or preventable 
injuries produced by medical care.”[115] In accordance with the literature, this thesis uses the term 
quality of care to encapsulate patient safety and combines these terms together.   
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2.2  Emergence and importance of patient safety  
Experts in the field of patient safety describe the rapid growth of the paradigm as a response to the 
realisation that hospitals were not safe for patients.[116-118]  Two leading reports have been 
credited with highlighting the negative impact of medical errors and successfully raising the profile 
of patient safety to policy makers. In the US, this was the IOM report ‘To Err is Human’ and in the UK, 
‘An Organisation with a Memory’ (OWAM). The OWAM report emphasised the prevalence of 
medical errors in the NHS, the importance of detecting and recording errors and, perhaps most 
importantly, that organisations must learn from their mistakes.[119] The IOM report detailed a 
substantial annual number of preventable deaths (44,000-98,000) in US hospitals caused by medical 
errors.[12]. Other medical retrospective record review studies have similarly provided figures 
demonstrating that a significant proportion of patients are harmed directly from the care that they 
receive whilst at hospital in developed countries [120-123]. In the UK, Vincent et al found over 10% 
of the 1014 patient records reviewed in acute hospitals had noted an adverse event. Half of these 
events were deemed preventable and a third of them led to moderate or greater impairment.[121]. 
A global review of patient safety research commissioned by the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
World Alliance for Patient Safety summarised that there is an unacceptable level of harm and 
suffering that is very often avoidable,[124] with another systematic review finding that the median 
incidence of hospital adverse events was 9.2% and concluding that one in ten patients are affected 
by an adverse event, a significant number of which were again considered to be preventable.[125]  
 
2.3  Emergence and recommendations for quality  
A year and a half after the ‘To Err is Human’ report, the IOM produced a more in-depth report 
entitled ‘Crossing the quality chasm: a new health system for the 21st century’.[8] This report 
offered detailed recommendations for high quality care delivery. These are outlined in Figure 4, 
based on the concise user manual of the report written by Donald Berwick.[126]  
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Figure 4 Quality domains to address according to the Quality Chasm report[8, 126]  
 
 
Key messages are that the patient experience is the true indicator for quality, that there is a 
hierarchical impact of the healthcare environment and healthcare organisations on microsystems of 
care and eventually on patient experience. Finally, the ultimate message of both IOM reports is that 
it is the systems that are at fault and all attempts should be made to move away from clinician-
blame and towards redesign. 
 
The system approach and IOM messages have been taken onboard in quality improvement 
strategies. Quality improvement (QI) is made up of two components: change and method.[127] QI 
principles, tools and techniques are largely based on organisational and change approaches 
developed in industry, such as Total Quality Management (TQM) or Continuous Quality 
Improvement (CQI).(O’Neill et al, 2011) Common tools include: Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA) cycles; 
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Lean; Six Sigma; root cause analysis; trigger tool and scientific evaluative measures such as Statistical 
Process Control (SPC) or time series. Often QI takes the form of defined programs or collaboratives 
that systematically and formally introduce continuous improvement methods intended to be 
sustained beyond the intervention period. Such programs are continually applied with varying levels 
of success in different settings across the full spectrum of healthcare: in intensive care,[128] mental 
health,[129], surgery [130] and primary care [131]. More background on quality improvement 
initiatives and evaluation of their impact is provided in Chapter 5. 
  
2.4  Understanding safety  
In healthcare and in other industries, occupational accidents are viewed either from the 
aforementioned systems perspective or from the person perspective.[132-134] Those in the systems 
camp blame incidents on the conditions in place (e.g. inadequate equipment) and often argue that 
accidents represent a failure in the management systems.[135, 136] James Reason (1997, 2000) 
introduced the ‘Swiss cheese model of organisational accidents’, depicting that an alignment of 
‘latent failures’ (dormant system problems) combined with ‘active errors’ (individual mistakes, slips, 
lapses and violations) could lead to harmful outcomes in any system regardless of the organisation’s 
high standards or safe history.[132, 137] Reason and others believe that senior managers are often 
responsible for these latent failures. Workplace safety catastrophes have provided real-life evidence 
for such claims, both in the UK (the Piper Alpha Oil Rig Explosion, capsize of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise, the Clapham Junction rail crash) and elsewhere (the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
nuclear plant accidents). In these safety disasters, management latent failures were held largely 
responsible by independent inquiries.[138, 139] Examples of failures include managers prioritising 
productivity over safety, insufficient design of facilities and mistakes in personnel management.  
Verdicts call for managers to address system failures and create a cultural environment of safety. 
The well-established theories of safety culture and climate have drawn sizeable and significant links 
with the actions of managers. Experts on the topic have stated that "managerial variables have 
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emerged as a primary determinant of safety climate in empirical research."[140]  Two reviews in 
2000 revealed that a managerial role appeared in 72% of studies with safety climate scales [141] and 
as the most frequent dimension in safety culture measures.[142] Safety culture is a sub-set of 
organizational culture [143] reflecting attitudes, perceptions and common values held and shared by 
workers in relation to safety.[144, 145] Safety climate is a variable “snapshot” of safety culture.[141, 
146] In a review of the literature, Zohar distinguished certain organisational factors that together 
constitute the safety climate, which affect differing accident rates in organisations. Factors 
pertaining to companies with lower accident rates included: high management commitment to 
safety; high priority assigned to safety; and more emphasis on safety training. Other Organisational 
factors were: open and frequent communication between workers and management through 
regular safety inspections; orderly control of environment, embracing good use of safety equipment; 
and a stable workforce.[147] Zohar (2003) later established that the most influential factor in 
achieving positive safety programmes was management commitment to safety.[148] Manifestations 
of which were described to include work-related training, assignment of high ranking safety officials 
and committee members, and applying safety principles in job design. Management commitment 
has since been validated by a wide number of studies across a host of work settings.[140, 149]  
 
Industry-led research has further offered insight into particular areas of commitment and other 
valuable management safety-related actions. O’ Dea and Flin (2003) reviewed the literature on the 
role of managerial leadership in determining organisational safety outcomes. Predominantly aimed 
at mid-level managers, recommended actions were: 1) commitment to structural and procedural 
safety systems and to the development of the safety programme (e,g. clear safety policies and 
thorough investigations of accidents and near misses) 2) Manager-worker interaction and frequent 
communication, especially in safety-related tasks; 3) Demonstrating that safety takes priority over 
production goals; and 4) a decentralised approach to safety management, such as engaging staff 
with structured safety activities.[150] 
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2.5  Implications for management involvement in patient safety  
In considering the concepts pertaining to safety and their strong links to management involvement, 
we continue to wonder where exactly managers might get involved in the safety of patients. Here I 
explore the cited Swiss cheese model, safety culture and industry research, in relation to patient 
safety in healthcare. 
 
Vincent et al (1998) applied Reason’s Swiss cheese model to the healthcare setting and 
conceptualised ‘seven levels of safety’ illustrating classifications of potential factors that may 
contribute to the cause of medical error.[151]      Table 4 presents their framework of contributory 
factors influencing clinical practice.[152]  
 
Factor Types Contributory Influencing Factor 
Patient Factors 
Condition (complexity and seriousness) 
Language and communication 
Personality and social factors 
Task and Technology Factors 
Task design and clarity of structure 
Availability and use of protocols 
Availability and accuracy of test results 
Decision-making aids 
Individual (staff) Factors 
Knowledge and skills 
Competence 
Physical and mental health 
Team Factors 
Verbal communication 
Written communication 
Supervision and seeking help 
Team leadership 
Work Environmental Factors 
Staffing levels and skills mix 
Workload and shift patterns 
Design, availability and maintenance of equipment 
Administrative and managerial support 
Physical environment 
Organizational and Management Factors 
Financial resources and constraints  
Organizational structure 
Policy, standards and goals 
Safety culture and priorities 
Institutional Factors 
Economic and regulatory context 
National health service executive 
Links with external organizations 
     Table 4 Framework of contributory factors influencing clinical practice [152] p.150 
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If for a moment we consider the potential contribution of managers to these areas of influence on 
safety within clinical practice, we can quite confidently rule out any managerial influence on patient 
factors and on some institutional factors such as economic context, as it is clear that managers in 
healthcare do not have any control over these aspects. However, in addition to those explicitly 
pinpointed as management-related factors within the framework, the majority of the remaining 
contributory factors appear to be within the scope of healthcare managers’ work. Take for example 
the work environmental factors, articles have referred to the manager’s responsibility for staffing 
numbers, shifts and ensuring skill mix,[153] and at the same time they are held accountable for the 
physical environment within which clinicians practice and patients are cared for. Managers are the 
most likely to handle procurement of equipment and are undoubtedly responsible for 
administration, which links to certain task and technology contributors such as availability and 
accuracy of test results and use of protocols. Task design is another activity that has long been 
included within the job specification of managers, ingrained from accepted principles from classical 
management. Even individual staff factors may be influenced by managers, as guidelines state that 
managers are in charge of training to maintain knowledge, skills and competency of clinical 
staff,[154] and much research has shown a link between manager behaviour and staff well-being 
and performance.[155, 156] Leading teams has also been referenced as a necessary competency of 
the healthcare manager and as a task that they are often involved in.[157] We can therefore infer 
that there are potential roles for management in patient safety that span the contributory factors 
influencing safety in the clinical setting, further suggesting a number of different ways in which 
managers could potentially affect patient safety. 
 
Additionally, the reports on patient safety catastrophes within healthcare equally expose 
management failures as ultimately responsible for errors made and poor care.[6, 158] Management 
were held primarily responsible for the multiple failings at a hospital in Mid Staffordshire that 
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resulted in neglect of patient care and deaths of up to an estimated 1,200 patients more than would 
be expected during the same period in a similar type of hospital.[7] Conclusions from the 
independent inquiry revealed the following key managerial mistakes: a corporate focus on process 
rather than outcome, failure to listen to complaints, insufficient resource provision, lack of staff 
support, e.g. appraisal, supervision and professional development and generally far-removed from 
operational issues.[6, 159] 
 
Much of these issues can be classified as safety culture issues, particularly linked with management 
commitment. Whilst there is not as much research on patient safety culture,[160] just as the 
mentioned studies of work safety culture, Feng et al (2011) empirically demonstrated a statistically 
significant association between management safety commitment and the culture of patient safety, 
additionally finding that management commitment was a predictor of patient safety culture.[161] 
Suggested actions include managers prioritising patient safety in the distribution of resources and 
planning for the long-term to develop patient safety.[160] However, a full investigation of such 
factors remains for patient safety in healthcare.  
 
Finally, a similar review to that by O’Dea and Flin of industry literature on leadership and safety has 
intended to draw on potential applications to healthcare and summarised some predominant 
leadership behaviours for safety in consideration of the healthcare context.[100] For supervisors, 
activities referred to were: monitoring and reinforcing workers’ safe behaviours, being supportive of 
safety initiatives, participating in workforce safety activities, encouraging employee involvement in 
safety initiatives. For middle managers, examples were: becoming involved in safety initiatives, 
emphasising safety over productivity, adopting a decentralised style, relaying the corporate vision 
for safety to supervisors. For senior managers: ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements, 
demonstrating visible and consistent commitment to safety, providing resources for a 
comprehensive safety programme, showing concern for people, encouraging participatory styles in 
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middle managers and supervisors, giving time for safety. Again, empirical investigation of the 
proposed application into healthcare is needed, along with more emphasis on management work 
explicitly associated to patient safety. 
 
Collectively, the message on the potential for managers in healthcare to both contribute towards 
patient safety, and to fail it, is apparent. Studies on latent failures regarding patient safety imply that 
managers are responsible for errors but their research does not explicitly expose which areas of 
error causation managers affect.[162, 163] To investigate further, I next refer to the literature that 
centres on the role of managers in quality and safety in acute care. 
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CHAPTER 3 - ROLE OF MANAGERS IN QUALITY AND PATIENT SAFETY IN 
ACUTE CARE  
 
Management in healthcare have a legal obligation to ensure a high quality of patient care and to 
strive to improve care. This is enforced by national regulatory bodies, such as the UK Department of 
Health and US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.[164, 165] Healthcare managers hold a 
prime position that allows them to mandate policy, systems, procedures and organisational climates. 
Consequentially, many have argued that it is evident that healthcare managers possess an important 
and obvious role in quality of care and patient safety and that it is considered to be one of the 
highest priorities of healthcare managers.[166-168] The first in a list of core management standards 
identified by the Department of Health’s code of conduct for NHS managers is that of making the 
care and safety of patients the manager’s first concern.[154] In line with this, there have been 
countless calls for Boards to take responsibility for quality and safety outcomes.[8, 169] One article 
warned hospital leaders of the dangers of following in the path of bankers falling into recession, 
constrained by their lack of risk awareness and reluctance to take responsibility.[170] To add to the 
momentum, are the high profile publicity of acute care management failures affecting quality and 
safety within the media,[158, 159] in addition to strong instruction at the governmental level. The 
Darzi review declares that quality improvement within the NHS requires a stronger role for 
management, with enhanced focus on “leadership for quality” and that quality should be 
demonstrated as the responsibility of clinicians and managers throughout the system.[113] 
 
Beyond healthcare, we have seen that there exists evidence of managerial impact on workplace 
safety.[171-174] Within the literature on healthcare, there are non-empirical articles providing 
helpful propositions and descriptions on managerial attitudes and efforts to improve quality and 
safety. This literature, made up of opinion articles, editorials and single participant experiences, 
collectively presents healthcare management as essential to quality and safety routine and 
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improvement. Within the articles are an array of recommendations for actions that hospital 
managers should take to improve the quality of patient care delivery in their organisation. This can 
be divided into those on senior management/Board and middle and frontline management. In 
accordance with the aim of this thesis, the following sections narrow the focus to literature on acute 
care. These sections predominantly present the non-empirical data and are descriptive, empirical 
work is further examined in the systematic review. 
 
3.1 Senior management work activities in quality and safety in acute 
care  
 
The US National Quality Forum (2005) highlighted that hospital Boards were not delivering on their 
responsibility for improving quality of care, suggesting that responsibilities and methods of how 
Boards can improve quality are not well defined.[175] Despite the Forum’s guidance for managers, 
there continues to be a struggle to perform manager-led quality oversight functions.[176] Recent 
studies still indicate that the duties of Board level management are often ambiguous [164, 177, 178]  
 
The non-empirical literature on senior managerial work activities related to quality and safety in 
acute care presents some detailed proposals.  Conway (2008) proposed six actions that Boards 
should carry out for quality improvement and harm reduction in hospitals[179] and Gautam (2005) 
recommends strategies for senior hospital management to lead the drive on quality.[180] Goeschel 
et al advocate key governance practices for quality improvement and patient safety,[164] and 
McGinn and Dave created an acronym ‘PROBE’ to summarise recommendations for Board members 
who want to improve quality in their hospitals.[181] These proposals are presented in Table 5, much 
of which overlap with some key recommendations outlined recently by a guidance report from the 
UK Department of Health’s National Quality Board[182] and Monitor’s quality governance 
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framework.[183] They agree that quality should drive Trust strategy and risk awareness, that the 
Board should have the relevant leadership, skills and knowledge to deliver on the quality agenda, 
promote a quality culture, have clear roles and responsibilities; as well as tools to identify risks, 
ensure engagement of stakeholders and that robust quality information is analysed, used and 
challenged. Others suggest how managers can influence hospital safety culture, through 
development of a reporting culture, providing a transparent response to patient safety incidents, 
and conveying clear goals on safety.[184-186]  
 
Conway (2008) Gautam (2005) 
Mcgin and Dave  
(2007) 
Caldwell (2008) 
 
Goeschel (2010) 
 
Set an explicit and 
public aim and 
commitment to reduce 
harm and improve 
quality 
Enhance own 
knowledge on legal 
responsibilities for 
quality and quality 
indicators through 
trustee orientation and 
continued education 
(P)personal 
accountability of 
the CEO 
Include Board role in 
establishing the quality 
agenda, goals,  quality 
oversight and 
accountability in the 
Board quality 
committee's charter 
Boards should have 
a separate quality 
and patient safety 
committee  
Get data and stories 
and review progress as 
a first agenda item at 
all Board meetings 
Provide financial 
support; to participate 
visibly in quality 
activities, create a 
strategic plan and 
appropriate quality 
standards 
(R) recruitment 
and retention of 
good clinical staff 
Invest time to examine 
and direct quality 
strategies in core 
services and clinical and 
operations 
effectiveness 
Annual review of 
plans for quality and 
patient safety, 
aligned with 
national, regional, 
and institutional 
targets 
Establish and monitor 
system measures and a 
small group of 
transparent measures 
of patient safety to be 
continually updated 
Incorporate ‘Board 
activism’, that is to 
actively get involved in 
quality (e.g. to question 
quality reports) 
(O) outliers on 
quality need to be 
assessed 
Strengthen and 
examine the 
overarching quality 
strategy and structure 
as part of the annual 
hospital quality 
infrastructure 
assessment.  
Set the format 
and use of the annual 
assessment and 
have quality experts 
oversee 
implementation of 
improvement action 
plans. 
Identify measurable, 
indicators for 
quality, aligned with 
strategic goals and 
hospital services 
 
Change the 
culture/environment 
and policies to one that 
is respectful, fair, and 
person-centred 
Define the Board’s role 
and requirements (e.g. 
write a statement of 
purpose) 
(B) Budgets 
should be 
invested in quality 
and safety 
Update the strategic 
approach to quality to 
include regular goals  
and milestone 
measures. Graphic 
display of goals should 
enable easy 
comparisons 
Partake in 
continuous 
education on quality 
and patient safety  
 
Develop Board’s 
capabilities and learn 
Increase dialogue with 
doctors 
(E) Expectations 
for quality stated 
Assign a Board member 
to participate in the 
Quarterly review of 
quality and safety 
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from other successful 
Boards how to work as 
a team (with Boards 
and clinicians) to 
reduce harm 
organization's 
quality report at 
meetings with clinical  
staff and quality 
professionals 
performance against 
the indicators 
Establish executive 
accountability by 
overseeing a plan that 
aims to reduce harm 
and associating 
executive team 
accountability on 
quality improvement 
targets. 
Discuss medical staff 
reforms (e.g. 
integration of medical 
staff and hospital 
committees) 
  
Auditing 
mechanisms and 
listening to patient 
stories  
 
Create a quality 
management 
department 
  
Compensation for 
the CEO on 
measurable 
achievements on 
quality and safety 
 
Institute high-quality 
standards; and institute 
a quality audit process; 
and be prepared to lead 
on quality improvement 
   
Table 5 Recommendations for senior managerial work activities to lead and improve quality[164, 179-181, 
187] 
 
 
Experience across 250 NHS organisations showed the importance of the Board facilitating a culture 
for change, empowering staff and committing to clinical governance in order to sustain quality and 
safety.[188] The authors propose that commitment must be translated into strategic priorities and 
lessons must be learnt from audits.  Others have also called for the Board to carry out more 
measurement related tasks,[187, 189] and have identified and described the benefits of senior 
managers walking around the hospitals speaking with others on quality and safety issues.[190-192] 
 
A few academics have taken up the challenge to investigate such proposals through scientific study, 
and have equally found that long term planning and strategic aims are used by the Board,[193-195], 
that  they are involved in culture-related actions,[196-199] and identified the importance of 
commitment and engagement of quality improvement (QI).[200-202] More detail on the research 
studies will be presented as part of the systematic review of the empirical literature.  
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The research findings appear to align somewhat with the roles assumed and recommended in the 
general literature, of which top management commitment is mentioned the most.[168] Referring to 
the role of healthcare CEO and Board members in patient safety, Clarke et al (2007) identify the 
presence of management commitment as a system responsibility. They also agreed that senior 
management have to maintain a continuous culture of safety associated with high standards and 
little tolerance of unsafe behaviour. Additional recommendations are for a safety systems blame 
perspective rather than an individual blame ethos and provision of information to monitor the safety 
systems.[203]  
 
In addition to activities suggested, the commentary literature appear unanimous in their assumption 
that acute care senior managers’ play a role in quality and safety and quality improvement,[204] This 
is also true for research-based articles that have investigated organisational factors associated with 
quality and safety concluding that senior managers serve an important part.[205, 206] As Mycek 
(2001) implies, in order for the organisation to have the right culture and direction, it is up to the 
Board to set the tone, through activities such as introducing a strict safety plan and regularly 
monitoring it.[207] The fact that such organisational change may only happen from the decisions at 
the top might explain why most of the literature on this topic is written in relation to senior 
management and the Board.[208]  
 
3.2 Middle management work activities in quality and safety in acute 
care  
Fewer have attempted to consider the roles of middle managers in quality and safety.[90, 209, 210] 
A recent article has proposed a theory that sees middle managers as influential in healthcare 
innovation implementation, through selling, diffusing and synthesizing information on innovation 
implementation and mediating strategy and daily implementation activities.[90] Earlier work agrees 
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with the vision of the middle manager as a mediator within the organisation,[211] and has even 
been included in a definition of what a middle manager is.[92] The Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (IHI) go even further in stating that middle management act as a “crucial bridge” 
between senior leadership and frontline care.[209] They propose that in order for middle managers 
to improve safety, they need to translate strategic-level goals that can be executed at their level, 
engage staff within quality and safety initiatives, focus on improving specific care processes, and 
ensure that the processes are in place for efforts to be sustained. Another opinion piece on the 
healthcare middle manager suggests similar managerial roles for supporting quality improvement as 
a: communicator (e.g. translating strategy to operation), coordinator (e.g. bringing people and ideas 
together), campaigner (e.g. engaging staff), and as a conflict manager (e.g. balancing tensions 
between continuity and change).[212] An empirical study found that the majority of nurse managers 
collect and feed back clinical incident information.[213] 
 
Endorsement of work for middle managers to improve quality of care include the promotion of the 
use of evidence-based approaches to care,[93, 214] also cited as a method to improve managerial 
poor practice.[215] Despite this, the literature indicates that managers are slow to use this 
approach,[216, 217] and further examination is also needed to clarify the present day use of 
evidence-base practice by middle managers within the acute care setting.  
 
Aside from the limited literature on this topic, a further restriction of the literature on middle 
management is the disparity of participants included within the articles on middle management, for 
example some include hybrid managers (professional-managers).[218] This is due to the difficulty in 
defining middle management recognised as problematic by many.[89, 212, 219, 220]  
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3.3 Management impact on quality and safety in acute care 
Very few studies have shown impact of managers’ activities or role on quality and safety in acute 
care. Parker et al (1999) found a significant link between senior managers’ commitment and a higher 
degree of QI implementation.[221] Weiner authored two studies showing senior management 
impact on measures of clinical involvement in CQI/TQM,[222, 223] and on increased Board 
leadership for quality.[224] Others found links between senior managers’ safety organising and 
patient safety in hospital nursing units,[225] and significant associations between better quality and 
safety outcomes/processes of care and management engagement,[195] establishing goals to 
improve care and managers involvement in setting the quality agenda[201] The extent of managerial 
control was another factor related to quality outcomes, a study found the wider the span of control 
that the managers had, the lower the patient satisfaction.[226] However, all of these studies focus 
on higher levels of management alone, more examination of the impact on quality and safety from 
other levels of management is called for. West et al (2002) included a cross-section of management 
levels within their study finding links between acute care hospital patient mortality and human 
resources management practices related to more sophisticated staff appraisals and training and 
higher percentages spent on teamwork.[227] The difficulties with this research was that the 
mortality variable materialised from different time points and the sample size varied across analysis, 
reaching quite a low sample size of 21 for some analyses. McKinsey and company also carried out a 
piece of research showing that hospitals with higher management-practice scores also had better 
clinical outcomes, including higher patient satisfaction and lower mortality rates from emergency 
heart attacks. Key factors found to help managers were autonomy and competition and certain 
organisational factors were found to increase management scores, such as more clinically qualified 
managers, a larger hospital, and a private rather than non-for-profit hospital.[228] Unfortunately, 
the majority of these are beyond the acute care manager’s control and these factors are more 
relevant to the context in which the manager’s role is conducted rather than the manager’s own 
practices.  
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3.4 Management contextual factors in quality and safety in acute 
care 
A number of circumstances shape the role of the NHS middle manager,[229] and much of the 
relevant literature has centred on these ‘contextual’ factors, which are variables outside of the 
manager’s actual role but that may affect it greatly. Such literature particularly focuses on challenges 
or barriers to management involvement in quality along with the negative consequences of 
ineffective leadership on quality improvement rather than considering actions that managers 
presently take on quality and safety.[230, 231] A reoccurring factor is with regards to management 
knowledge or training, conveying that managers should have a good understanding of patient safety, 
CQI techniques, evidence-based guidelines, clinical outcomes and similar data in order to improve 
systems of care.[180, 193, 232]  Other suggestions are a mixture of organisational and individual 
factors, such as having a strong annual hospital quality infrastructure assessment, adequate time to 
discuss quality, an appropriate Board committee quality charter,[187] and active partnerships with 
other NHS bodies.[188] Evidence additionally points out the importance of an appropriate 
organisational structure for QI teams,[88] and officially recognised performance expectations of 
senior management.[195, 233, 234]  
 
Research related to the thesis’ framework of interest, ie. power and influence, reveals how 
manager’s individual power use or style can be a contributing factor to their quality and safety 
performance. A study that surveyed middle managers social power in influencing compliance with 
quality policies showed that staff responded best to reward and legitimate power and least to expert 
power.[235] Interestingly managers themselves were most responsive to expert and informational 
power and least to reward and legitimate power. The authors concluded that across both groups, 
coercive and referent power were relatively ineffective bases of power. Similar investigation of how 
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acute care managers influence quality and patient safety would be valuable. According to the 
literature clinicians may have a greater influence than middle managers on quality and on other 
organisational factors. Dopson and Fitzgerald suggested that general managers have less influence 
compared with their clinical counterparts, especially doctors,[210] and Ashmos showed that 
clinician’s strategic decision had more sway over cost than those made by middle managers.[96] One 
would be forgiven for thinking that this may be due to the lack of managers’ clinical knowledge, yet 
suggestions are that clinical managers are also uncertain of their authority.[236]  If true, this 
suggests that there may be other social influences at work. For example, Griffith’s review 
emphasised the need for better managerial position power,[2] but this position power may not be 
necessarily accepted by clinicians, some arguing that the doctors failed to accept managerial 
legitimacy.[237] A recent study showed that hospital managers perceived doctors to have higher 
professional status and power, while the doctors believed the managers to have higher power but 
lower status.[238] In addition to ascertaining how managers influence, differences between clinical 
and non-clinical managers may also enrich our understanding on the subject of management power 
in relation to quality of care. Another study implies that an ambiguity of managerial authority and 
role may have potential negative effects on the manager-doctor relationship and in turn on quality 
of care.[178] The aggravated relationship with clinicians has been described as hampering managers’ 
efforts and contributions,[83, 239] and such hidden authority may have big implications for the 
amount of influence or particular type of power that managers hold and again would be of value to 
elucidate through reports from managers and their staff. Other experts in the field of management 
suggest similar barriers for acute care managers, such as limitations in their service planning for 
safety by certain organisational factors beyond their control,[240] and findings that NHS middle 
managers’ strategic contributions are restricted by professional bureaucracy and legitimacy that 
hinders their freedom to contribute.[241] 
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Most pertinent to the thesis’ research, Currie investigated modern matrons that were introduced 
with the specific aim to better prevent healthcare acquired infection (HCAI) and revealed that the 
influence that they hold in this role is hindered by their position within the professional hierarchy, 
thereby leaving them without the influence that they need over other healthcare professionals in 
their drive to reduce HCAI.[218] Whilst this is highly relevant to my aim of exploring managerial 
power for patient safety, Currie’s findings on ‘hybrid’ professional-managers may not be 
generalisable to most mid-level nurse managers or matrons, because modern matrons work around 
rather than inside the nurse manager’s hierarchies and were introduced with patient safety 
improvement in mind. It would be interesting to explore what power traditional middle managers 
hold in related to their position within the hospital.  
 
This Chapter has given us a broad understanding of the literature on the work of managers in quality 
and safety. A systematic review hones in on the empirical evidence on this topic. 
 
3.5 Rationale and research questions 
3.5.1 Rationale  
There is limited theoretical study of management work in the healthcare setting and even less in the 
context of quality and safety. The empirical base is weak and lacks a deep understanding of power 
and the work activities that are performed by acute care managers. At a time of financial crisis, 
management redundancies and calls for managers to ensure and improve quality and safety, it is 
imperative that we have some insight into what their work in quality and safety presently involves 
and how managers can contribute to the safety and quality of care. A systematic review will aim to 
uncover how many empirical articles have been written on this topic and what they reveal about 
managerial work in quality and safety. As the healthcare sector is diverse, the scope of this thesis will 
be bound by the acute-care setting but will include managers across the organisational tiers. 
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Examining managers from different organisational levels and from separate organisational positions 
(i.e. Chief Executive Officers and Medical Directors at the senior level; and Divisional, General and 
Service Managers etc at the middle management level) will permit comparisons and result in more 
specified guidance to the majority of managers in acute care. Research on the lower levels of 
management work in healthcare is noticeably scarce; the existing literature on middle management 
work in healthcare particularly raises some interesting questions in which we can draw on theories 
to explore in more depth, such as whether their unique position within the hierarchy plays a part in 
their influence on quality and safety or whether there are distinguishable differences between 
clinical and non-clinical managers.  
 
Studies will investigate primary functions within: a) the generic quality and safety routine 
maintenance or improvement of service practices and b) quality and safety improvement 
interventions and collaboratives. The rationale for investigating both routine work and work 
bounded by an intervention is to provide more depth and situational variation by identifying the two 
circumstances where quality and safety work would be conducted, i.e. when intending to improve 
specific quality outcomes, and more generally on a regular basis.  Figure 5 depicts simply the design 
plan that provides an overview across management and routine and improvement.  
 
 
 
Figure 5 PhD research design overview 
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Responding to the need for healthcare research to learn from other disciplines and theory, the work 
activity theoretical approach will assist to illuminate the specific work activities and roles that acute 
care managers find themselves in with regards to quality and safety. To answer critics, and to further 
explore why managers behave as they do and how they may influence, the concept of power will 
help to frame study designs and analyses.   
 
The research on management work inside and outside of healthcare presents some concerning 
implications if found similar in work on quality of care. The nature and time spent on such activities 
will establish whether this is the case. Alongside the manager’s actions, I will explore potential 
impact on quality outcomes together with contextual factors that may reduce or enhance this 
impact. 
 
3.5.2 Research Questions 
 
Overarching research question: 
 What role do acute care managers have that may impact on quality of care and patient 
safety and its improvement? 
Specific research questions: 
 What roles do acute care managers at different levels play in quality and safety? And what is 
their time spent on this? 
 What routine work activities do acute care middle managers’ carry out related to quality and 
safety?    
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 What work activities do acute care senior managers carry out for a quality and safety 
improvement initiative? 
 What is the perceived potential impact and influence (e.g. power) of acute care managers’ 
quality and safety activities?  
 Are and how are acute care managers engaged in quality and safety and its improvement? 
 What role do contextual factors (e.g. constraints and choices) play in the acute care 
managers’ quality and safety activities?  
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CHAPTER 4 - A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF ACUTE CARE 
MANAGERS IN QUALITY AND PATIENT SAFETY  
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
We have seen that within the literature on healthcare, there are commentary articles providing 
insightful suggestions and information on managerial quality and safety attitudes and actions that 
they should take for its improvement.[179, 180] Due perhaps to the broad nature of the topic, 
empirical studies exploring these propositions are likely to be a methodological challenge, although 
a systematic review of empirical studies on this subject is notably absent. Ovretveit’s (2009) 
thorough literature review on leading improvement in healthcare concentrated on ‘leaders’ not 
managers alone, on quality improvement, not quality and safety generally, and on both commentary 
and empirical evidence, pooled together as a narrative, rather than a systematic review. He and 
other researchers have highlighted the limited empirical research on the acute care manager’s role 
in quality of care, patient safety and quality improvement.[67, 100, 204, 242] In consideration of the 
literature focus on the difficulties of this role and the negative results of poor leadership on quality 
improvement rather than considering actions that managers presently undertake on quality and 
safety,[230, 231] this systematic literature review aims to identify empirical literature pertaining to 
the role of acute care managers in quality of care and patient safety and its improvement. My 
definition of ‘role’ comprises of managerial activities, time spent and active engagement in quality 
and safety and its improvement. Whilst the primary research question is on the role, I take into 
consideration the contextual factors surrounding this role and its impact or importance as 
highlighted by the included studies.  
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4.1.1 Review research question: 
 
 What is the role of acute care managers in quality and safety and its improvement? 
 
4.1.2 Specific review research questions:  
 
 What work activities do acute care managers carry out for quality and safety and its 
improvement? 
 How much time is spent by acute care managers on quality of care and patient safety and its 
improvement? 
 Are and how are acute care managers engaged in quality and safety and its improvement? 
 What impact or perceived importance does the role of the acute care manager have on 
quality and safety and its improvement? 
 What role do contextual factors play in the acute care managers’ role and impact on quality 
and safety and its improvement? 
 What roles do acute care managers at different levels play in quality and safety and its 
improvement? 
 What type of study designs are used on this topic?  
 What is the quality of the studies on this topic? 
 
 
4.2  Methods 
4.2.1 Design 
There are two main types of literature review widely accepted: the narrative review and the 
systematic review. Narrative reviews take a more conceptual consideration of the literature with less 
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methodical rigidity apportioned to its search. Because of this, narrative reviews are not replicable 
and do not provide a transparent presentation of numbers and patterns of findings that are offered 
by systematic reviews. Systematic reviews follow a strict protocol of clear aims, explicit search 
strategy, detailed inclusion/exclusion criteria, standardised study quality assessment and a 
systematic presentation/synthesis of studies that provide quick comparison.[243-245] In view of 
this, the systematic review is often asserted as the most robust form of literature review.[246] 
Historically, systematic reviews have focused on reviewing Randomised Control Trials (RCT) or clear 
intervention-outcome studies, however researchers have recently affirmed the place of qualitative 
literature in systematic reviews [247] and long established that healthcare research particularly 
benefits from this type of intense review structure.[248]  This is important because, at the present 
time, there is a lack of consensus on the most appropriate type of review for topics that are not 
intervention-outcomes based. It was decided that the present topic on managerial activities would 
particularly benefit from a rigorous systematic approach to its review to contrast the present 
anecdotal nature of much of its literature and to help clarify how much of the literature is scientific 
study alongside a transparent presentation of reoccurring findings. 
 
4.2.2 Concepts and definitions 
Quality of care and patient safety were defined on the basis of widely accepted definitions from the 
Institute of Medicine that defined quality in healthcare as safe, effective, patient-centred, timely, 
efficient and equitable,[8] with ‘safe’ being defined as “freedom from accidental or preventable 
injuries produced by medical care.”[115] In addition to this, literature was searched for all terms 
associated with quality and patient safety to produce an all encompassing operationalised approach. 
Cost of care was excluded in the definition of quality, as it detracts from a focus on the delivered 
quality of care for the patient. A manager was defined as any employee within the organisation that 
manages staff and is likely to hold managerial responsibilities such as budget responsibilities and 
staff training. Therefore, all levels of managers including Boards of managers, were included in this 
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review with the exception of clinical frontline employees, e.g. doctors or nurses, who may have 
taken on further managerial responsibilities alongside their work but do not have a primary official 
role as a manager, or those that have specifically taken on a role for quality of care, e.g. the modern 
matron. Distinction between senior, middle and frontline management were as follows: senior 
management are at the top of the organisational hierarchy chart and hold Trust-wide responsibilities 
and practices;[82] middle managers are in the middle of the organisational hierarchy chart and have 
one or more managers reporting to them;[43] frontline managers are defined as managers at the 
first level of the organisational hierarchy chart who have frontline employees reporting to them.  
Board members are included under the title of senior management. 
 
Acute care was defined as settings that provide short-term medical care especially for serious acute 
disease or trauma, usually secondary and tertiary hospitals. ‘Role’ was defined as managerial 
behaviours, activities, acts of engagement, and their time spent on quality and safety. The focus is 
on actual roles that ‘do/did’ occur rather than those recommended that ‘should/could’ occur. 
 
This review only sought literature that was explicitly examining the acute care managerial role 
(behaviours/activities, engagement, and time spent) on quality and safety. To avoid reducing the 
richness of the included research and to consider the managers role within its context, other factors 
are presented within this review. Therefore, at the inclusion stage of the review process, we have 
excluded articles that have investigated, for example, managers’ knowledge of quality, yet if 
managerial knowledge (or other contextual factors or impact/importance on quality and safety) is 
mentioned as a key finding within the included articles, it is duly presented within this paper.  
 
66 
 
4.2.3 Search Strategy 
Literature was reviewed between 1983 (01.01.83) and 2010 (01.11.10). The start date was based on 
the introduction of NHS hospital management after the Griffiths report and other similar 
movements in other countries at that time.[2] Eligible articles were those that described or tested 
managerial roles pertaining to quality and safety in the acute care setting. A large part of the search 
strategy was based on guidance by Tanon et al (2010) who outlined the most efficient search 
strategies for systematic reviews in patient safety within three databases: EMBASE, MEDLINE and 
CINAHL.[249]  They developed strategies to balance sensitivity, specificity and precision to capture 
as many relevant studies as possible on the topic area. Using their search to find papers indexed on 
patient safety within the relevant databases offers a validated protocol to choose optimal terms. 
CINAHL was considered less relevant for our search on managers.  Instead, Health Management 
Information Consortium (HMIC) and PSYCHINFO were considered more relevant to the overall topic.  
A search was carried out on these four databases: MEDLINE, PSYCHINFO, EMBASE, HMIC. The search 
strategy involved three facets (i.Management; ii.Quality; iii.Acute Care Setting) and five steps. A 
facet on role/activities was not included in the search strategy, as it would have significantly reduced 
the sensitivity of the search and inevitably increased the number of relevant articles missed by the 
search.     
 
Multiple iterations and combinations of all search terms were tested to achieve the best level of 
specificity and sensitivity. For example, the terms ‘senior’ and ‘management’ separately identified a 
great number of articles on elderly care and on management as a process, e.g. critical care 
management rather than on managers. Therefore, ‘senior management’ had to appear as one term. 
In addition to the key terms, Medical Subject Headings (MeSH®) terms were used. MeSH terms are 
identified by the National Library of Medicine's controlled vocabulary thesaurus. They comprise of a 
hierarchical structure of terms officially allocated to each paper in their database. These MeSH terms 
were ‘exploded’ to ensure that all of the subheadings under the umbrella MESH term were included 
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in the search. This greatly increased the number of papers identified by the search. All databases 
require slightly different MeSH terms, therefore four variations of the search strategies were used. 
Please see Table 6 for Medline search strategy and Appendix 1 for all search strategy and terms 
used. One reviewer (AP) identified the terms which were discussed with a second reviewer (AR) until 
apparent synonyms of the terms were exhausted. Additional limits placed on the search strategy 
restricted study subjects to human and, for practical reasons only, the language to English. The 
search strategy identified 15,447 articles after duplicates had been removed. 
 
Step Search strategy formula 
1 
((safe$.ti,ab. or exp Safety/ or Err$.ti,ab. or Adverse.ti,ab.) and (exp *Risk Management/ or exp medical Errors/ or 
Safety Management/ or Medical Audit.mp.)) or exp Health Care Quality/ or patient centred care/ or length of stay/ 
or exp consumer satisfaction/ or patient readmission/ or exp evidence based medicine/ or exp "outcome and 
process assessment (health care)"/ or exp Quality Indicators, healthcare/ or quality assurance, health care/ or exp 
clinical audit/ or exp program evaluation/ or guideline adherence/ or (patient centred care or length of stay or 
customer satisfaction or patient satisfaction or medical audit or clinical audit or clinical effectiveness or 
performance measurement or outcome assessment or process assessment or guideline adherence or compliance 
to practice$1 or benchmarking or patient centred care or incident report$ or infection control or patient 
readmission or evidence based medicine or (evidence based adj2 practice) or waiting times or patient experience or 
complaints or target$1 or clinical excellence or service excellence or quality).ti,ab. 
2 
exp Hospital/ or (hospital$ or secondary care or acute care or health care organi*ation$1 or healthcare 
organi*ation$1 or infirmar$).ti,ab. 
3 
exp Health Facility Administrators/ or Governing board/ or (Manager$1 or Matron$1 or CEO$1 or executive$1 or 
director$3 or board$1 or middle management or senior management or lower management or frontline 
management or leader$4 or president$1 or head of department$1.ti,ab. or department head$1.ti,ab. or head of 
nursing or administrator$1 or healthcare administration or (chief adj4 officer$1) or (chief adj4 nurs$) or (chief adj4 
operation$1) or (chief adj4 service$1) or chief of staff).ti,ab. 
4 1 and 2 and 3 
5 limit 4 to (human and English language and yr=”1983-Current”) 
Table 6 Medline search strategy 
 
4.2.4 Screening  
Three reviewers (AP, AR and DG) independently screened the titles and abstracts of the articles for 
studies that fit the inclusion criteria. One reviewer (AP) screened all 15,447 articles, while two 
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additional reviewers screened 30% of the total sample retrieved from the search strategy: AR (a 
research psychologist) screened 20% (3,067) and DG (a researcher) screened 10% (1,532). On testing 
inter-rater reliability, Cohen's kappa correlations showed low agreement between AR and AP 
(K=0.157, P<0.01) and between DG and AP (K=0.137, P<0.00).[250] However, there was a high 
percentage of agreement between raters (95% and 89% respectively). The high agreement and low 
kappa scores has been duly noted in the literature as a paradoxical limitation.[251-253] As others 
have before, a rule was applied to judge the inter-rater reliability; if K is low (<.4), it is only 
considered acceptable if the percentage of agreement is over >70%.[254] In the present case, the 
agreement scores are very high, so we declare good inter-rater agreement. Please see Appendix 2 
presenting the individual number of articles assigned with ‘yes/maybe’ and ‘no’ categories by the 
individual raters. Discrepancies were resolved by discussion and consensus, for example, in respect 
to the acute care criteria it emerged that community hospitals in the UK should be excluded but 
some community hospitals in the US may provide acute care. The main inclusion criteria were that: 
the setting is acute care; the population sample reported on are managers; the context is quality and 
safety; the aim is to identify the managerial activities/time/engagement in quality and safety. The 
full inclusion and exclusion criteria are presented in Appendix 3 and the screening tool is presented 
in Appendix 4.  Figure 6 presents the numbers of articles included/excluded at each stage of the 
review process. 
 
  
69 
 
Figure 6 PRISMA Flow Diagram[255] p.22 
Records identified through 
database searching 
(n = 21,899) 
Additional records identified 
through other sources 
(n = 50)  
[49 cross-searching / 1 hand-searching] 
Records after duplicates removed 
(n=15,447)  
Records screened 
(n=15,447) 
Records excluded 
n = 15,024 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n = 423) 
Full-text articles excluded, 
with reasons 
(n = 404) 
[95 = No empirical data 
presented 
328 = did not address 1 or more 
of the 4 inclusion criteria  
(i.e. aim= 
activities,time,engagement; 
context=quality&safety, setting=-
acute care; sample=managers.)] 
 
Studies included 
(qualitative) 
(n = 6) 
Studies included 
(quantitative)  
(n = 8) 
Studies included  
(mixed-methods) 
(n = 5) 
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423 articles remained for full text screening. These mostly comprised of articles that had insufficient 
information for inclusion/exclusion, for example many articles used the term ‘leadership’ rather than 
management and some articles did not contain an abstract. One reviewer (AP) screened all 423 full 
articles and a second reviewer (AR) reviewed 7% (30) of these. A good agreement inter-rater 
reliability score was calculated (K=0.615,P<0.001) with 73% agreement (Appendix 2). 
 
Hand searching and cross-referencing were carried out in case articles were missed by the search 
strategy.  For example, if an article neglected to mention the setting of the study in either the title or 
the abstract, this article would not be picked up. Hand searching was carried out in Google Scholar 
and cross-referencing (that is searching the references of relevant articles) was carried out on the 
references of those included in the final stage of the review. One additional article was identified 
from hand searching,[193] totalling 19 articles included in the systematic review. 
 
4.2.5 Data extraction  
The characteristics and summary findings of the 19 included studies are presented in Table 7. This 
Table is a simplified version of a standardised template that was used to ensure consistency in data 
extracted from each article. The extraction table included tests of methodological quality described 
below. 
 
4.2.6 Methodological quality 
Each study was assessed using a quality appraisal tool developed by Kmet et al (2004).[256] This 
comprised of two checklists: one used to assess qualitative research and the other to assess 
quantitative research. Assessment of the quality of qualitative studies has particularly been noted as 
a challenge with a call for a more unified approach.[257] Kmet et al’s tools were chosen from a 
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number of published assessment measures because they are validated for internal validity, allow for 
analysis of both qualitative and quantitative methods and were considered to be generalisable to 
the study designs of articles picked up, which were mostly interviews and surveys. Kmet et al do not 
provide an exact cut off score for quality of papers, therefore all studies were included in the review. 
Six (32%) random included articles were scored by AW (an academic researcher) to ascertain 
consistency of scoring and agreement was achieved. All articles were scored on up to 24 questions 
with a number between 0-2 (“no” = 0, “partial” = 1, “yes” = 2) with an additional Non Applicable 
(NA) option for quantitative studies. Ten questions were asked of qualitative articles and 14 of 
quantitative, for example, ‘Design evident and appropriate to answer study question?’ Both were 
asked of mixed-method studies. The total scores are presented as a percentage in Table 7 and the 
individual scores are presented in Appendix 5.  An example definition of what constitutes 
“Yes/No/Partial” can be found in Appendix 6. 
 
4.2.7 Data synthesis 
Systematic reviews comprising qualitative research suffer from a lack of established methods for 
synthesis of their findings.[258] Relevant synthesis strategies include narrative description, cross-
case thematic analysis,[259] meta-ethnography, meta-synthesis, and more.[260] However most 
approaches are in their early development. Meta-synthesis, for example was described as being in 
its infancy with limited information on its application and described as a tool for interpretation of 
results rather than summative.[261]  In my synthesis, I aimed to maintain the original meanings, 
interpretations and raw data offered by the articles, also endorsed by Walshe and Downe, 
2004.[261] Hence, descriptive groupings of the data present patterns on the recurring topics across 
the dataset akin to thematic narrative synthesis. A difficulty in this approach is bias against 
information that does not arise more than once.[262] This partiality is somewhat diminished by 
presentation of all of the key findings within a summary table and mention of some solitary/outlier 
results in the main text. 
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4.3  Results 
  
4.3.1 Description of the studies  
4.3.1.1 Setting, sample and study design 
From the 19 included studies, the majority (14 studies) were carried out and set in the US,[194-201, 
233, 234, 263-266] and investigated senior management/Boards (13 studies).[193-201, 233, 234, 
264, 265] Types of senior managers studied were either CEOs, Board chairs or a collective Board of 
managers. Of those that examined middle or frontline management, 1 examined clinical directorate 
managers,[267]  and the others mostly investigated allied health professional managers or nurse 
managers.[88, 202, 213, 263, 266]  
 
The settings of the study were mostly Trust or hospital-wide, a few articles were set in specific 
settings or contexts: elderly care,[200] evidence-based medicine,[267] staff productivity,[263] 
clinical risk management,[213] and hospital acquired infection prevention.[198] Two studies were 
involved in specific interventions, one investigated the role of managers whom participated in an 
online event-reporting tool called the Patient Safety Net® (PSN),[266] and one author carried out 
action research involving her own programme to enhance QI.[202] Seven studies concentrated 
specifically on QI rather than quality and safety oversight or routine.[195-197, 200, 202, 234, 266]    
 
Study methodologies were a mixture of 6 qualitative design (interviews or focus groups);[196-199, 
265, 267] 8 quantitative survey designs;[194, 201, 213, 233, 234, 263, 264, 266] and 5 mix-methods 
designs.[88, 193, 195, 200, 202]  
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4.3.1.2 Study Quality 
The most common study biases are those incurred from cross-sectional designs and self-reports. The 
majority of authors opted for self-reports (including senior managers reporting on senior 
management); only 3 used objective peer reports which reduces the social desirability bias of the 
findings,[196, 198, 199] and 1 included a small number of supplementary observations.[88] All but 
one study employed a cross-sectional design.[202] The quality of the studies ranged between 50-
100% on Kmet’s quality assessment scales (Table 7, Appendix 5). The assessment additionally 
identified that data collection methods and data analysis was often inadequately described. There 
was little use of verification procedures to establish credibility of interpretation and lack of 
reflexivity of accounts of qualitative methods. Some quantitative results presented descriptives 
alone and failed to report variances for non-nominal data.  
 
4.3.2 Managerial time spent on quality and safety  
The studies on Board level managers appear to highlight an inadequate prioritisation of quality and 
patient safety on the Board agenda and subsequent time spent at Board meetings. Not all hospitals 
consistently have quality on their Board agenda, one study showed approximately a third of all 
Board meetings had quality on their agenda, according to CEOs and Board chairpersons at 30 
organisations.[195] In all studies examining time spent on quality and safety by the Board, less than 
half of the total time was spent on quality and safety.[193, 194, 197, 201, 233, 234] Time spent on 
quality by the Board ranged between 10% to 35%,[197] with a majority of Boards spending 25% or 
less on quality.[193, 194, 201, 233, 234] Although Prybil et al imply that 23% is an adequate amount 
of time spent on quality and safety at the Board meeting, Vaughn et al provide evidence of an 
association between better quality outcomes and hospitals when the Board spends more than 25% 
of their time on quality issues.[234] Additionally approximately half of study participants recognised 
the time spent (10-35%) as insufficient,[197] and less than half of the Boards from 79 organisations 
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reported that they addressed quality and patient safety issues at all meetings.[193] One study 
further reported that hospitals with higher performance on quality had Boards that spent at least 
20% on clinical quality.[194]  
 
Studies examining frontline managers also showed that they placed less time and importance on 
quality and safety issues in favour of other matters. Specifically, quality improvement (QI), was the 
least discussed topic by clinical managers.[88] In a separate study, frontline nurse managers were 
identified to spend little time on managing QI, although greater managerial experience led to more 
time on monitoring, reporting and on QI teams.[263]  
 
Despite time spent, the emerging inference that managers greatly prioritise other work over quality 
and safety is not explicit. Baker et al (2010) found that only 5% of Board chairs reported financial 
goals were more important than quality and safety goals,[193] and examination of health system 
Boards revealed they only spend slightly more time on financial issues (25.2%) compared with 
quality and safety issues (23%).[233]   
 
A critique of the studies that examine Boards time spent is on the methodology. Some of these 
studies provide us not necessarily with Board managers’ time spent on quality and safety but with 
Board managers’ time spent on quality and safety at Board meetings. The two may not equate and 
ideally observations or other methods that assess the senior managers’ time and tasks outside of the 
Board room would go some way to providing a more holistic view of managerial time and provide an 
extra level of evidence on actions taken based on Boardroom decisions.  Additionally, time spent on 
quality may not necessarily be well-spent; Mastal et al (2007) identified certain quality items that 
should be but were never or not consistently addressed.[265] Still, an association was found 
between senior managers including a specific item on quality in Board meetings and better 
performance in process of care and mortality.[201]  
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Although the studies are measuring different things, there appears to be indication of some 
improvement over time, with the earlier studies presenting less time spent on quality and safety 
than the more recent studies. This is a promising trend, yet even the most recent studies conclude 
that much improvement is required.   
 
4.3.3 Managerial activities/behaviours  
 
The included studies identified the following managerial activities: Board priority, strategy and goal 
setting, public reporting/collaboration of strategy, driving improvement culture, commitment to and 
promotion of quality, clinician credentialing, data use/review, and feedback.  
 
4.3.3.1 Strategy-centred  
Board priority-setting and planning strategies aligned with quality and safety goals were identified as 
actions carried out by senior management in several studies.[193-195, 198, 264] High percentages 
(over 80% in two studies) of Boards had formally established strategic goals for quality with specific 
targets, and aimed to create a quality plan integral to their broader strategic agenda.[193, 264]  
Boards that established goals in four areas of quality: hospital-acquired infections, medication 
errors, the Hospital Quality Alliance/Joint Commission core measures, and patient satisfaction were 
linked to high hospital performance[194, 201] Contrary findings however suggest that the Board 
rarely set the agenda for the discussion on quality,[264] supported by aforementioned studies 
portraying limited agenda and time on quality at Board meetings. Moreover, studies reveal that 
Boards did not provide the ideas for their strategies,[193] and were largely uninvolved in strategic 
planning for QI.[197] In the latter case, the non-clinical Board managers felt that they held "passive" 
roles in quality decisions and were disinclined to take up a leadership role on quality. This is 
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important considering evidence that connects the activity of setting the hospital quality agenda with 
better performance in process of care and mortality.[201] Overall the findings between studies 
appear somewhat contradictory, potentially because the Board is made up of a number of different 
managers, some with clinical or quality expertise and others without.  
                                                                                                                                                      
Public dissemination of strategic goals and public reporting of quality information were other key 
activities carried out by CEOs and Board chairpersons,[195] and carried out more frequently in high-
performing hospitals.[194] The literature on frontline staff did not report strategic activities and the 
literature on middle management identified only one related finding, that 80% of nurse middle 
managers in Trusts that had written guidance on types of clinical incident to report, had contributed 
to general guidance.[213] More articles on frontline and middle management would help to 
understand whether strategy planning for quality is a part of their role. 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Culture-centred 
Activities potentially aimed at enhancing QI and patient safety culture emerged from several 
studies.[196-199] Senior management’s activities included encouraging an organisational culture of 
QI on norms regarding interdepartmental and multi-disciplinary collaboration, goal setting, 
innovation, risk taking, and advocating QI efforts to clinicians and fellow senior managers. [196] In a 
study examining successful managerial leadership behaviours in the context of prevention of 
hospital acquired infections (HAI), successful managers at different organisational levels focused on 
developing a vision, articulating the organisational culture to staff, and cultivating a culture of clinical 
excellence. They cultivated leadership skills and inspired the people they supervised. The managers 
also tackled resistant staff or other barriers that inhibited prevention of HAI.[198]  It was 
acknowledged that executive managers’ actions/statements influence the organisation’s patient 
77 
 
safety mission and are powerful messages of commitment to safety.[199] Regrettably, few CEOs in 
one study were keen to lead a change for improved quality culture.[197]  
 
Supporting the impact of senior management commitment on quality are three studies that expose 
a connection between Board priorities or values with hospital performance and on middle 
management quality-related activities.[194, 202, 267] A study involving middle managers found that 
the values bestowed on research by the Trust Board influenced the clinical managers’ position and 
role model behaviour on evidence-based practice.[267] Correspondingly, another study’s 
conclusions infer that Board commitment positively influences middle managerial engagement in 
QI.[202] 
 
Building capacity for high quality standards also appears within the remit of management, as 
physician credentialing (formally documenting doctors as appropriately qualified and competent) 
was identified as a Board managers’ responsibility in more than one study.[197, 201] Although this 
may not be an activity that is often undertaken[267] or that has any impact.[201]  
 
4.3.3.3 Data-centred 
Information on quality and safety are continually supplied to the Board.[233]  Managerial activities 
around quality and safety data or information were recognised in 6 studies.[195, 196, 199, 201, 213, 
266] Activities included collecting and collating information,[213] review of quality information,[195, 
199, 201] using measures such as incident reports and infection rates to forge changes,[199] using 
patient satisfaction surveys,[195] and taking corrective action based on adverse incidents or trends 
emphasised at Board meetings.[201]  Hospitals that carried out performance monitoring activities 
had significantly higher scores in process of care and lower mortality rates than hospitals that did 
not.[201] The frontline managers’ role after intervention of the PSN reporting tool, involved review 
of 65% of the patient safety events reported and use of this information to make 162 changes: 59% 
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policy/practice change; 27% in training, education and communication between care providers; 8% 
on equipment and supplies; and 6% on staffing.[266] 
 
Feedback of quality information was only referred to by 2 articles.[196, 213] The first study 
illustrated dissemination of QI data,[196] and the second reported 60% of middle managers 
reporting that they always fed back to staff. The managers that collated their own incident 
information fed back the most (91%).[213]  
 
4.3.3.4 Engagement  
Serving to answer the review’s research question on how acute care managers are engaged in 
quality and safety and its improvement, 2 articles have each identified a set of factors that shed light 
on how to motivate middle management and engage senior management in QI respectively.[200, 
202] These are outlined in Table 7. Whilst they are different studies/programs, interestingly there is 
no overlap between the identified motivators.  
 
4.3.4 Quality and safety outcomes or perceived importance 
So far, within this results section, I have touched upon the associations found between specific 
managerial involvement and its effect on quality and safety. Here, I summarise the impact and 
perceived importance of managers’ role in quality and safety and its improvement. Of the articles 
that looked at either outcomes of management involvement in quality and safety or at its perceived 
importance, 5 articles suggested that their role was beneficial to quality and safety 
performance.[193, 195, 200, 201, 234] Senior management support or engagement was reported as 
the primary enabling factor in the implementation of QI programmes[200] and in quality outcomes 
and improvement.[195, 201] In Bradely et al’s study, hospital staff believed that a senior managerial 
champion was essential to their QI programme success,[200] whilst Joshi and Hines discovered 
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statistical evidence of this, showing a mild association between Board engagement in quality and 
hospital-wide clinical outcomes.[195] Over a quarter of respondents identified the hospital’s CEO or 
president as the individual who exerted the greatest impact on QI  and hospitals that cited the 
CEO/COO as holding the greatest impact on QI also performed better on quality.[234] 
 
Four articles found activities with little or no influence on quality and safety.[193, 195, 198, 201, 
234] Practices that showed no significant association with quality measures included Board’s 
participation in physician credentialing.[195, 201] Another noted that if other champion leaders are 
present, management leadership (across seniority levels) was not deemed necessary.[198] This 
raises the question whether it is managers or simply leadership that is required. Two articles 
identified a negative or inhibitory effect on quality of care, on evidence-based practices and staff 
productivity.[263, 267]  
 
4.3.5 Contextual factors  
Contextual factors or variables that influence the managers’ role and/or the impact that the 
managers have on quality and safety were identified. Reoccurring factors include: the existence of a 
Board quality committee, compensation attached to quality and safety achievements, organisational 
structure of QI teams, Trust Board values/priorities, time/resources and managerial knowledge on 
quality and safety. This section presents how these contextual factors influence the managers 
studied.  
 
Jiang et al (2009) found a Board quality committee and a clinical Board member to be significant 
positive variables in quality performance. Yet, of the 490 hospitals, under 60% had a Board 
committee focusing exclusively on quality. Similar findings a year on show only 59% of 767 study 
hospitals had a quality subcommittee, 64% of which report at every meeting, and that having a 
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committee was associated with higher quality outcomes of performance.[194] It seems then that 
whilst a Board quality committee appears to have a positive impact on quality and safety, not all 
Boards have them.[233] Other organisational structures have proved beneficial, such as a clear 
reporting structure to executive committee/senior group and presence of teams to address specific 
patient safety issues. These structures were typically formed with senior management. Further 
support for its importance is from disapproving comments by organisations that wished that they 
had these structures in place.[196]  
 
Compensation and performance evaluation linked to executive quality performance was another 
organisational variable that emerged from 4 articles,[195, 201, 234, 264] and associated with better 
quality performance indicators.[201, 234]  This is particularly important when considering quality 
measures are insufficiently included in CEOs’ performance evaluation.[195, 264] A single study found 
almost all of the study CEOs stated that they have specific performance expectations/criteria related 
to quality and safety.[233] Implications are for more tangible compensation when high quality 
criteria are achieved. 
 
Appropriate and standardised quality and safety measures were found to be helpful to management 
of quality. The use of the right measures to drive QI was raised in relation to managerial engagement 
in quality[195] and to impact on patient care improvement.[233] Yet, almost half of this sample did 
not formally adopt system-wide measures and standards for quality. To aid them in these tasks, 
evidence indicates the common use of QI measure tools, such as a dashboard or scorecard.[194, 
234, 264] Two studies indicated promising associations between dashboard use and outcomes. 
Using a dashboard with national benchmarks that includes indicators on clinical quality, patient 
safety and patient satisfaction was associated with better performance in process of care and 
mortality,[201] and higher performing hospitals were more likely to have regular Board reviews of a 
quality dashboard.[194] 
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In addition to organisational factors, study findings reveal individual factors that affect the 
manager’s role and impact on quality and safety. Most notably, the motivation and knowledge or 
awareness that individual managers have on quality and safety, which is in turn related to quality 
and safety training undertaken. Jha and Epstein demonstrated the importance of expertise and 
training. In examination of low and high performing hospitals, high performing hospitals also had 
higher self-perceived ability to influence care, expertise at the Board and participation in formal 
training programs that have a quality component.[194] Unfortunately, there is a low level of 
knowledge on quality and safety reports,[195] salient nursing quality issues,[265] and little practice 
identified to improve quality literacy for the Board.[193, 264] Encouragingly, there is some promise 
that new managers will be better equipped to manage quality, through induction training and 
recruitment of those with relevant expertise.[193] Although a connection between knowledge and 
education with quality measures was not found,[201] improving knowledge at the Board can only 
help their quest for high quality.  
 
The management-staff relationship was recognised to positively affect quality through high level of 
interaction between the Board and the medical staff when setting quality strategy.[234] Promisingly, 
the majority of subjects reported hospital Boards to interact with their staff in establishing the 
organisational strategy for quality.  
 
4.3.6 Management organisational levels 
There are an insufficient number of articles to make a comparison between different managerial 
positions. A broader comparison of the different managerial levels (senior, middle and frontline) 
implies that senior management may carry out more public reporting, clinician credentialing, 
strategic activities and driving a culture for quality compared with middle and frontline managers. 
Equally, some actions appeared only in studying mid-level managers, such as the collection, collation 
82 
 
and feedback of quality information,[213] and influencing evidence-based practice as well as 
inhibiting it through inaction.[267] The majority of articles investigated senior management and 
therefore any comparison of management levels offers a biased view. Still, patterns highlight areas 
for future investigation, particularly those found at frontline or middle management levels that were 
not identified at the senior management level.1 Another interesting observation is in the interaction 
between the managerial levels. That is, senior managerial activities have been suggested to affect 
middle managers actions.[202, 267]  
 
In summary, the input process output (IPO) model is a conceptual framework that I believe helps to 
structure the review findings in a useful way (please see Figure 7). The model suggests that 
particular processes enable input factors to affect outcomes. Use of this framework has facilitated 
learning across disciplines, such as business, computing and teamwork in quality and safety.[268] 
Kunzle et al (2010) used the IPO model to frame this literature review on ensuring patient safety 
through effective leadership behaviour within critical care teams.[269] In a similar way, the 
literature on managerial activities in quality and patient safety may be conceptualised using this 
model, by considering what factors contribute (input) to managerial activities (process) that impact 
on quality and safety (output). Accordingly, input refers to factors that affect or produce managerial 
activities on quality and safety, e.g. motivation, engagement, infrastructure. A process refers to an 
activity, task or action carried out or time spent. An output refers to the importance placed on 
managerial input or process in affecting quality of care or patient safety (e.g. clinical outcomes or 
patient experience) achieved by the inputs/processes. Unlike previous researchers that have used 
this framework, I do not assume it to be a linear one, in fact the three factors are interrelated and 
may in turn affect one another and input and output may become interchangeable. This is presented 
by the cyclical/interconnecting diagram in Figure 7 and supported by criticism of the linearity of the 
model.(Iglen et al, 2005)  
                                                          
1
 Findings from one study cannot be included in this comparison because the authors have grouped their results from a 
mixed subject sample at different management levels.  
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First author; 
Year [Country] 
Methods 
Sample size 
[number of 
organisations] 
Population 
sample 
Level of 
management 
reported on 
[position of 
managers] 
Outcome Measure 
Management Roles 
(Managerial quality and safety activities, time spent and engagement 
& key perceived importance and context factors) 
Quality 
assessment 
score for 
qualitative 
studies 
Quality 
assessment 
score for 
quantitative 
studies 
Baker et al, 
2010 
[Canada][193] 
Mixed 
methods 
(interviews, 
case studies, 
surveys) 
n=15 
interviews;  
n=4 Board 
case studies; 
n=79 surveys 
[79 
organisations] 
Managers self-
report 
Senior 
management 
[Boards] 
Self-reported 
perceptions of 
Board practices 
 Less than half (43%) of Boards reported that they addressed quality and 
patient safety issues in all meetings  
 One-third of Boards spend 25% of their time or more on quality and patient 
safety issues.  
 More than 80% of Boards have formally established strategic goals for quality 
with specific targets, but a majority of Board chairs indicate that their Boards 
did not provide the ideas for strategic direction or initiatives. 
 Board chairs reported a low participation in education on quality and safety: 
43% reported that all the Board members participated, 19% stated that more 
than half participated and 23% said it was less than a quarter of the Board 
 Most Board chairs (87%) reported Board member induction training on 
responsibilities for quality and safety, although almost a third (30%) reported 
few or no opportunities for education on this, 42% reported some 
opportunities and 28% reported many).  
 Approximately half (57%) of the Board chairs acknowledged recruitment of 
individuals that have knowledge, skills and experience in quality and patient 
safety onto the Board. A Board skills matrix included quality and safety as one 
of the competency areas. 
16/20 
(80%) 
12/22 
(55%) 
Balding et al, 
2005 
[Australia][20
2] 
Mixed 
methods 
(action 
research,  
surveys & 
focus groups) 
n=35 [1 
hospital]  
Managers self-
report 
Middle 
management  
[Nursing 
managers and 
allied health 
managers] 
Middle manager 
engagement in QI 
programme 
Five elements deemed essential to middle manager engagement:                                                              
 (1) Senior management commitment and leadership ( e.g. senior management 
provides strategic direction for QI plan)                                                  
 (2) Provision of resources and opportunities for QI education and information 
dissemination (e.g. basic QI skills provided to all staff)                                                                             
 (3) Senior and middle manager role accountability (e.g.: senior managers and 
middle managers agree QI roles and expectations)                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 (4) Middle manager involvement in QI planning (e.g. senior and middle 
managers plan together) 
 (5) Middle managers own and operate QI program (e.g. ongoing review and 
evaluation of the progress of the QI program by the middle and senior 
managers) 
14/20 
(70%) 
15/22 
(68%)
Bradely et al, 
2003 
[US][196] 
Qualitative 
(interviews) 
n=45 [8 
hospitals] 
Clinical staff 
(medical staff, 
nursing staff); 
quality 
management 
staff; and 
senior 
management  
Senior 
management 
[unspecified] 
Perceptions of 
roles and activities 
that comprise 
senior 
management's 
involvement in 
quality 
improvement 
efforts 
Five common roles and activities that captured the variation in management 
involvement in quality improvement efforts:  
 (1) Personal engagement of senior managers  
 (2) Management's relationship with clinical staff  
 (3) Promotion of an organisational culture of quality improvement 
 (4) Support of quality improvement with organisational structures 
 (5) Procurement of organisational resources for quality improvement efforts 
19/20 
(95%) 
NA 
84 
 
Bradely et al, 
2006 
[US][200] 
Mixed-
methods 
(surveys & 
interviews)  
n=63 survey 
respondents 
[63 hospitals]; 
n=102 
interviewees 
[13 hospitals] 
managers self-
report 
(unclear)  
Senior 
management 
[chief 
operating 
officer, 
vice 
president, 
medical 
director, chief 
nursing officer, 
director of 
volunteers, 
program 
director]  
Predominantly self-
reported 
perceptions 
management-
related factors 
around the HELP 
programme 
 Providing resources for needed staffing or staff training  
 Promoting the program among the governing Board, physicians who were 
initially less involved, and other administrators   
 Senior management support reported as the primary enabling factor in the 
implementation of such programmes (96.6%), along with a lack of support as 
the primary reason for not implementing the programme (65.0%) 
 The interviews supported that having an administrative champion was 
considered essential to their program's success 
19/20 
(95%) 
17/22 
(77%) 
Braithwaite et 
al, 2004 
[Australia][88] 
Mixed 
methods 
(ethnographic 
work, 
observations 
& focus 
groups) 
n=64 
managers in 
focus groups 
[1 hospital]; 
Ethnographic 
case studies 
and n=4 
observed [2 
hospitals] 
managers self-
report/ 
observation  
Frontline 
management 
[Medical 
managers, 
nurse 
managers & 
allied health 
managers] 
Observations and 
self-reported 
perceptions of 
clinician-managers’ 
activities 
 Quality was the least discussed topic (e.g. Continuous quality improvement)  
 The most discussed topic was people (e.g. staffing, delegating) and 
organisational issues, e.g. beds and, equipment 
16/20 
(80%) 
NA 
Caine & 
Kenwrick, 
1997[UK][267] 
Qualitative 
(interviews) 
n=10 [2 
hospitals] 
managers self-
report  
Middle 
management 
[Clinical 
directorate 
managers] 
Self-reported 
perceptions of 
managers role in 
facilitating 
evidence-based 
practice in their 
nursing  teams 
 Managers saw their role in research implementation as a facilitator, ensuring 
quality and financial objectives and standards were met    
 Managers perceived their facilitatory behaviours produced a low level of 
clinical change.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 Managers are not actively advocating research-based practice and failing t 
integrate it into everyday practice. Their behaviour inhibited the development 
of evidence-based nursing practice                                             
 Devolved responsibility of use of research to individual professionals          
14/20
(70%) 
NA 
Fox et al, 1999 
[US][263] 
Quantitative 
(surveys &self 
kept activity 
logs) 
n=16 [1 
hospital] 
 managers 
self-report 
Frontline 
management 
[Nurse 
administrative 
managers 
(NAMs)]  
Self perceptions of 
managers on their 
activities impacting 
unit personnel 
productivity 
 The small amount of total management allocated to QI (2.6%) was the least 
time spent of all management functions 
 A negative relationship between time spent in QI activities and unit personnel 
productivity. An increase (from 2.5% to 5%) in QI time/effort by NAMs would 
reduce staff productivity significantly by approximately 8%. 
 The greater the experiences of NAMs as managers, the more time spent on QI. 
These seasoned NAMs spent more time on monitoring, reporting QI results, 
and quality improvement teams (statistics nor provided) 
NA 
13/22 
(59%) 
Harris, 2000 
[UK][213] 
Quantitative 
(surveys) 
n=42 [42 
hospitals] 
managers self-
report 
Middle 
management 
[Nurse 
managers] 
Self-reported 
perceptions of 
managers’ quality 
and safety 
practices 
 The majority of managers (91%) who received collated incident information 
used it to feed back to their own staff. 60% always fed back to staff, 28% 
sometimes did, 2% never did.  
 Of the Trusts that had written guidance on types of clinical incident to report, 
80% of managers had general guidance and fewer (20%) had written speciality 
specific guidance.                                                         
 76% of managers reported information collation of clinical incidents. Of these, 
59% were involved in data collection themselves.                                    
NA 
13/22 
(59%) 
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Jha and 
Epstein, 2010 
[US][194] 
Quantitative 
(surveys) 
n=722 [767  
hospitals]  
managers self-
report 
Senior 
management 
[Board] 
Perceptions on role 
of managers in 
quality and safety 
& quality outcome  
measurement 
(from Hospital 
Quality Alliance) 
i.e. 19 practices for 
care in 3 clinical 
conditions 
 
 Two-thirds (63%) of Boards had quality as an agenda item at every meeting  
 Fewer than half (42%) of the hospitals spent at least 20% of the Board’s time 
on clinical quality 
 72% of Boards regularly reviewed a quality dashboard                                                                                             
 Most respondents reported that their Boards had established, endorsed, or 
approved goals in four areas of quality: hospital-acquired infections (82%), 
medication errors (83%), the HQA/Joint commission core measures (72%), and 
patient satisfaction (91%)  
High-performing hospitals were more likely than low-performing hospitals to have:  
 Board reviews of a quality dashboard regularly (<0.001) & of clinical measures 
(all <0.05) 
 Quality performance on the agenda at every Board meeting (0.003) 
 At least 20% of Board time on clinical quality (0.001) 
 Has a quality subcommittee (0.001)  
NA 
22/22 
(100%) 
Jiang et al, 
2008 
[US][264] 
Quantitative 
(surveys) 
n=562 [387 
hospitals] 
managers 
self-report  
(including 
Board 
managers 
reports) 
Senior 
management 
[presidents/chi
ef executive 
officers 
(CEOs)] 
Perceptions of 
managers on 
management 
practices; and 
outcomes of care 
(composite scores 
of risk-adjusted 
mortality 
indicators) 
 75% of CEOs reported that most to all of the Board meetings have a specific 
agenda item devoted to quality. Only 41% indicated that the Boards spend 
more than 20 percent of its meeting time on the specific item of quality. 
The following activities were most reported to be performed: 
 Board establishing strategic goals for QI (81.3%) 
 Use quality dashboards to track performance (86%) 
 Follow up corrective actions related to adverse events (83%) 
The following activities were least reported to be performed: 
 Board involvement in setting the agenda for the discussion on quality (42.4%) 
 Inclusion of the quality measures in the CEO's performance evaluation (54.6%) 
 Improvement of quality literacy of Board members (48.9%) 
 Board written policy on quality and formally communicated it (30.8%) 
NA 
20/26 
(77%) 
Jiang et al, 
2009 
[US][201] 
Quantitative 
(surveys) 
n=490 [490 
hospitals] 
managers 
self-report 
(CEOS & 
Hospital 
presidents 
reports) 
Senior 
management 
[Board] 
Perceptions of 
managers on 
management 
practices; and  
process of care 
measures (20 
measures in 4 
clinical areas); and 
outcome measures 
(composite scores 
of risk-adjusted 
mortality 
indicators) 
Board practices found to be associated with better performance (all P<0.05) in 
process of care (POC) and adjusted mortality (M) included: 
 Having a Board quality committee (83.8%POC, 6.2M versus 80.2%POC, 7.9M 
without a committee ) 
 Establishing strategic goals for quality improvement (82.8%POC, 6.6M versus 
80.3%POC, 7.9M) 
 Being involved in setting the quality agenda for the hospital (83.2%POC, 6.4M 
versus 80.9%POC, 7.7M)  
 Including a specific item on quality in Board meetings (83.2%POC, 6.5M versus 
78.5%POC, 8.6M) 
 Using a dashboard with national benchmarks and internal data that includes 
indicators for clinical quality, patient safety, and patient satisfaction (all above 
80%POC & below 6.5M versus all below 80%POC and above 7M)  
 Linking senior executives’ performance evaluation to quality and patient safety 
indicators (83.1%POC, 6.6M versus 80.4%POC, 7.6M) 
Practices that did NOT show significant association with the quality measures for 
process and mortality include:  
 Reporting to the Board of any corrective action related to adverse events 
(82.5%POC, 7.0M versus 81.8%POC, 6.6M) 
 Board’s participation in physician credentialing (82.8%POC, 6.9M versus 
81.5%POC, 6.9M) 
NA 
22/24 
(92%) 
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 Orientation for new Board members on quality(82.9%POC, 6.8M versus 
81.7%POC, 7.0M) 
 Education of Board members on quality issues (82.8%POC, 7.0M versus 
81.9%POC, 6.9M) 
Joshi & Hines, 
2006 
[US][195] 
 Mixed-
methods 
(surveys & 
interviews) 
n=37 survey 
respondents; 
n=47 
interviewees 
[30 hospitals] 
managers self-
report 
(including 
Board chairs’ 
reports) 
Senior 
management 
[CEOs & 
Board] 
Management 
reported 
perceptions of 
practices and 
appropriate care 
measure  (ACM) 
and risk adjusted 
mortality. 
 Board engagement in quality was reported as satisfactory (7.58 by CEOs and 
8.10 by Chairs on a 1-10 scale where 10 indicates greatest satisfaction)                                                                                                                                
 Board engagement was positively associated with perceptions of the rate of 
progress in improvement (r=.44, p = .05), and marginally associated with ACM 
scores (r=.41, p=.07) 
 Approximately one third  of Board meetings are devoted to discussing quality 
issues (reported at 35% by CEOs and 27% by Chairs) 
 Integrating Quality Planning and Strategic Planning was also rated as 
satisfactory (7.67 by CEOs and 8.85 by Chairs)    
 Approximately two-thirds of respondents reported using patient satisfaction 
surveys (70% and 65% reported by CEOs and Chairs respectively) 
 Low level of CEO expertise in QI, as reported by themselves (2.70) and by 
Board Chairs (3.35%) on a scale of 1-10 where 1 is low familiarity and 10 is 
high familiarity.  
12/20 
(60%) 
16/20 
(80%) 
Levey et al, 
2007 
[US][197] 
 
Qualitative 
(Interviews) 
n=96 [18 
hospitals] 
managers self-
report  
Senior 
management 
[Hospital 
Board 
members, 
CEOs, Chief 
Medical 
Officers, Chief 
Quality 
Officers, 
medical staff 
leaders)  
Self-reported 
perceptions of 
managements’ 
role in quality and 
safety 
 Few CEOs were willing to take the lead for transformation to a "culture of 
quality"                                                                                                                                                  
 Board members were largely uninvolved in strategic planning for QI                                                              
 In terms of the Board's quality functions, respondents largely agreed that 
physician credentialing was their critical responsibility                                                                                                                    
 Non-physicians reported that they felt relegated to "passive" roles in decisions 
on quality and seemed reluctant to assume leadership roles in the quality 
domain.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 Board meeting agendas maintained a focus on financial issues, although 
patient safety/care and QI were gaining prominence                                                                         
 About half of the respondents said that quality was not sufficiently highlighted 
during meetings. Estimates of time devoted to quality and safety issues at 
Board meetings were between 10% to 35% 
13/20 
(65%) 
NA 
Mastal, 2007 
[US][265] 
Qualitative 
(interviews 
and a focus 
group) 
n=73 
interviewees; 
1 focus group 
[63 hospitals] 
managers self-
report 
Senior 
management 
[Board chairs, 
CEOs, Chief 
Nurse Officers] 
Self-reported 
information 
perceptions of 
managements’ role 
in quality and 
safety  
 Two chief nursing officers (CNOs) reported that nursing quality was never 
addressed at Board meetings.  
 Few of the CNOs, CEOs, and Board chairs responded that issues are discussed 
more frequently, such as at every meeting. 
 Quality and patient safety measures for nurses are not consistently addressed 
during all hospital Board meetings.         
 Staffing concerns are the most frequent measure of nursing quality reported 
at the Board level 
12/20 
(60%) 
NA 
Poniatowski 
et al, 2005 
[US][266] 
Quantitative 
(surveys) 
n=515  [16 
academic 
medical 
centers]  
managers self-
report 
Frontline 
management 
[Nurse 
managers] 
Self-perceptions of 
managers on their 
practices with 
Patient Safety Net 
(PSN) 
 Managers reviewed on average 65% of the PSN events reported 
As a result of what was learned from PSN data, 162 managers detailed their changes 
made to:  
 Policies and practices (59%) 
 Training, education and communication between care providers (27%) 
 Purchase of new equipment and supplies (8%) 
 Staffing (6%)          
N/A 
10/20 
(50%) 
Prybil et al, 
2010(US)[233] 
Quantitative 
(surveys) 
n=123 [712 
hospitals] 
managers self-
report 
Senior 
management 
Self-reported 
perceptions on 
 Health system Boards spent 23% of their Board meeting time on quality and 
safety issues. They only spent slightly more on financial issues (25.2%) and 
N/A 
14/22 
(64%) 
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[CEOs & 
Boards] 
management 
role in quality and 
safety 
strategic planning (27.2%) 
 Almost all (96%) CEOs said that the Boards regularly received formal written 
reports on quality targets  
 88% of CEOs said that the Boards had assigned quality and safety oversight to 
a standing Board committee 
 All but one (98.9%) of the CEOs stated that they have specific performance 
expectations and criteria related to quality and safety 
 CEOs reported 59% of the Boards formally adopted system-wide measures and 
standards for quality 
Saint et al, 
2010 
[US][198] 
Qualitative 
(interviews) 
n=86 
(interviewees) 
[14 hospitals] 
managers 
self-report and 
Senior hospital 
staff reports 
Mixed levels 
[Nurse 
managers, 
chief 
physicians, 
Chairs of 
medicine, 
Chief of Staffs, 
hospital 
directors, 
CEOs & clinical 
non-
managerial 
staff]  
Staff  perceptions 
of management 
practices in 
healthcare-
associated 
infection (HAI) 
 Although committed leadership by CEOs can be helpful, it was not always 
necessary, provided that other hospital leaders were committed to infection 
prevention                                                     
Behaviours of leaders who successfully implemented/facilitated practices to prevent 
HAI:  
 Cultivated a culture of clinical excellence and kept their eye on improving 
patient care 
 Developed a vision 
 Articulated the organisational culture well and conveyed that to staff at all 
levels.                                                                                                                
 Focused on overcoming barriers and dealing directly with resistant staff or 
process issues that impeded prevention of HAI                                          
 They cultivated leadership skills and inspired the people they supervised 
(motivating and energising them to work towards the goal of preventing HAI)                                                                              
 Thought strategically while acting locally; planned ahead and left few things to 
chance 
 They did the politicking before issues arose for committee votes  
 They leveraged personal prestige to move initiatives forward  
 They worked well across disciplines  
16/20 
(80%) 
NA 
Vaughn et al, 
2006 
(US)[234] 
Quantitative 
(surveys) 
n=413 [413 
hospitals] 
Managers self-
report (chief 
executives & 
senior quality 
executives) 
Senior 
management 
[Board, 
executives, 
clinical 
leadership] 
Perceptions of 
management role 
in QI & observed 
hospital 
Quality index 
outcomes (risk-
adjusted 
measures of 
morbidity, 
mortality, and 
medical 
complications) 
 72% of hospital Boards spent one-quarter of their time or less on quality-of-
care issues. About 5% of Boards spent more than half of their time on these 
issues  
 A majority of respondents reported great influence from government and 
regulatory agencies (87%), consumers (72%) and accrediting bodies (74%) on 
quality priorities. Although 44% of respondents also noted that multiple 
government and regulatory requirements were unhelpful 
Better quality index scores (QIS) are associated with hospitals where the Board: 
 Spends more than 25% of their time on quality issues  (QIS 83 – QIS mean 100 
across hospitals) 
 Receives a formal quality performance measurement report (QIS 302) 
 Bases the senior executives' compensation in part on QI performance (QIS 
239) 
 Engages in a great amount of interaction with the medical staff on quality 
strategy  
 
NA 
21/22 
(95%) 
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Weingart & 
Page, 2004 
[US][199] 
Qualitative 
(case study 
documentatio
n analysis and 
meeting 
discussions 
and focus 
group) 
 
n=30 [10 
hospitals and 
other 
stakeholder 
organisations] 
Those with 
executive or 
governance 
responsibility 
for a hospital/ 
system & other 
stakeholders 
(eg. from 
hospital 
associations) 
Senior 
management 
[not stated] 
Perceptions of 
managers on 
management 
practices 
Executives developed and tested a set of governance best practices in patient safety, 
such as:  
 Creation of a Board committee with explicit responsibility for patient 
safety 
 Development of Board level safety reports, introduction of educational 
activities for Board members 
 Participation of Board members in executive walk rounds.                                                                      
 Executives reviewed measures to assess safety (e.g. incident reports, infection 
rates, pharmacist interventions, readmissions, etc)  
 Executives endorsed a statement of public commitment to patient safety.  
 Executives believed their behaviours affected their organisations’ patient 
safety mission                                                                               
 
14/20 
(70%) 
NA 
Table 7 Table of characteristics and summary findings of included studies  
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INPUT FACTORS 
•ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS 
•Infrastructure (Board quality committee & QI teams) 
•Time/Resource  
•Trust Board values/priorities 
•Compensation attached to quality goals 
•Education or orientation in QS for management 
•Appropriate and standardised QS measures 
•INDIVIDUAL MANAGERIAL FACTORS 
•Knowledge on QS 
•Motivation/engagement 
•Manager-clinician relationship  
MANAGERIAL PROCESSES 
•STRATEGY-CENTRED 
•Board agenda/time Spent 
•Board priority, strategy and goal setting 
•Public reporting/collaboration of strategy  
•CULTURE-CENTRED 
•Driving improvement culture 
•Commitment/promotion of QS 
•Clinician credentialing 
•DATA-CENTRED 
•Data use/review 
•Feedback (e.g. reporting corrective actions related to adverse events) 
QUALITY & SAFETY OUTPUTS 
•POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON: 
•Achieving QS objectives 
•Commitment/engagement 
•Processes & outcomes of care and hospital performance 
•NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON: 
•Evidence-based practices 
•Personnel productivity 
•LITTLE OR NO INFLUENCE FROM: 
•Education and knowledge on quality  
•Physician credentialing  
•Education and knowledge on quality 
 
 
Figure 7 Input-Process-Output model  
summarising the reviewing findings
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4.4  Discussion  
 
This review has shown that there is very little empirical research on the role of acute care managers 
in patient safety and quality of care and quality improvement. The majority of existing studies are on 
senior management in the US, mostly using cross-sectional self-report measures. Consequently, 
further research is particularly required to examine middle or frontline managers, to take into 
consideration non-managers’ perceptions, and to assess senior managers’ time and tasks outside of 
the Boardroom. Future studies would especially benefit from better experimental controls, ideally 
with more than one time point and more reflections on qualitative work. However, primarily what is 
required is more exploratory research across all levels of management, especially outside of the US. 
The evidence from the existing studies expose the activities undertaken and time spent on quality 
and safety by managers in acute care and suggest that time spent, activities and engagement of 
acute care managers can positively influence quality and safety and its improvement. The following 
sections are framed by the IPO model presented in Figure 7. 
 
Evidence from our review promotes acute care settings to have a Board quality committee, with a 
specific item on quality at the Board meeting, a quality performance measurement report a 
dashboard with national quality and safety benchmarks,[201, 234] along with appropriate and 
standardised quality and safety measures,[195, 233] According to hospitals that do better in quality 
and safety metrics, time spent on these by the Board should exceed 20-25%.[194, 234] Outside of 
the Boardroom, senior managers should aim to build a good infrastructure for communication and 
involvement with staff;[201, 234] and strive for good staff-manager interactions and 
relationship,[196, 234] alongside support of QI with organisational structures.[196] They should also 
have both compensation attached to quality and safety achievements, as well as their performance 
evaluation linked to quality and safety indicators.[195, 201, 234, 264] For QI programmes, the 
following types of motivators/facilitators are identified for management: the program’s potential to 
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improve safety and quality, its consistency with the hospital's mission, return on investment, senior 
management commitment, resources and education, role accountability, and external pressures to 
achieve quality targets.[200, 202] 
 
Literature elsewhere supports these findings, such as the use of quality measurement tools, the use 
of the scorecard tool in particular,[204, 270] better quality-related compensation,[224] and have 
also emphasised poor manager-clinician relationships as damaging, both to patients and quality 
improvement.[271, 272] Experts similarly agree with a number of these findings, Goeschel for 
example supports the case that particular Board structures influence Board effectiveness, that 
Boards should have a separate quality committee and that compensation is a key incentive to 
improve quality at the Board.[164] The argument emerging is that quality should be approached in 
the same way that finance is in the acute setting, with monetary reward/penalties or at least with 
monitoring practices that are on par with those of financial goals.[273] This would hold implications 
for management knowledge and training on quality and safety, of which our review shows mixed 
findings of its benefits,[194, 201] with mixed results on intentions to improve quality literacy for the 
Board.[193, 264] More apparent is the low knowledge/training levels that exist and require 
improving.[193, 195, 265]  
 
The following managerial activities were identified across the included studies: Board strategy, 
priority and goal setting; public reporting of quality strategies; driving improvement culture; 
commitment/engagement and promotion of quality and safety; clinician credentialing; data 
use/review and feedback. Of the articles that examined quality outcomes or perceived importance 
of these roles, the majority found the roles to be beneficial to quality and safety performance. 
Significant positive associations with better quality and safety outcomes/processes of care were 
found with management engagement,[195]  establishing goals and strategy to improve care,[194, 
201]  and managers involvement in setting the quality agenda.[201] Although not statistically 
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examined, the following were found to be primary enablers of good quality of care and safety: 
management support,[196, 200] promotion of a QI culture,[196, 198] cultivating leaders, dealing 
with resisters, planning ahead,[198] and procurement of organisational resources.[196] There were 
a few variables that were found to have little, inhibitory or no influence on quality and safety, such 
as Board’s participation in physician credentialing, reporting corrective action on adverse events to 
the Board, orientation and education of the Board,[201] research-based practice,[267] and even 
time spent by managers on QI.[263] 
 
Again, much of the findings support the assertions made in the non-empirical literature. Above all, 
involvement through action, engagement and commitment have been suggested to positively affect 
quality and safety.[188] While researchers have stressed the limited empirical evidence showing 
conclusive connection between management commitment and quality,[204] some supporting 
evidence however can be unearthed in research that concentrates on organisational factors related 
to changes made to improve quality and safety in healthcare.[274, 275] Keroack et al found that top 
performing organisations had CEOs that were ‘hands-on’ and passionate about quality and 
safety.[206] In addition to this evidence base, there are a few studies that have specifically 
investigated the impact that hospital managers have on quality and safety (rather than examination 
of their role). These studies have shown senior managerial leadership associated with a higher 
degree of QI implementation,[221], promotion of clinical involvement,[222, 223], safety climate 
attitudes,[225], and increased Board leadership for quality.[224] Whilst these types of studies do not 
tell us whether the manager’s role or actions are commonly carried out or if they have included the 
correct items under the constructs of commitment or leadership, a clear case for the positive 
influence of management commitment on quality is emerging both from the findings of our review 
and related literature.   
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4.4.1 Review limitations 
There are several limitations of the present review to consider. These are limitations of the search 
strategy and review process, the limited sample of studies, publication bias, and limitations of the 
studies themselves.  
 
Our search strategy was low in specificity but high in sensitivity, capturing a broad net of articles, 
however the search strategy may have missed relevant papers that were held in databases 
elsewhere or where one or more of the key facets was not mentioned in the title or abstract of the 
paper, for example, where the setting was not mentioned in the abstract. Hand searching and cross-
referencing helped to reduce this limitation. Restricting the language of studies to English in the 
search strategy is likely to have biased the findings and misrepresent which countries conduct 
studies on this topic. At the screening process we identified that some articles that detail the 
responsibility of Trusts as a whole may be relevant to senior management or the Board, but did not 
explicitly reveal the manager’s part. Likewise, screening solely focused on articles that explicitly 
aimed to investigate the quality and safety role of the acute care manager, therefore, an article 
aiming to investigate an improvement programme or patient safety culture was not included within 
this review because they did not have the research objective to examine managers in relation to that 
programme or patient safety culture, or, for example, they focused on management attitudes rather 
than activities or impact. Consequently, while there may be some more relevant wider findings 
within the literature, I can confidently say that there are limited studies that have investigated the 
role of acute care managers in quality and safety. Further related to my design limitations, one may 
argue that a different model of literature review might be more relevant to the nature of this topic. 
However I believe that the robustness of this review is necessary for the management field that is 
often over-ridden by anecdotal evidence and unsystematic summaries. It should also be noted here 
that the quality assessment total scores are not entirely representative of the quality of the study or 
appropriate for inter-study comparison.[276]  
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The small number of included studies and the varied population samples makes generalisations 
difficult. I have grouped demographics, such as senior management with the Board, justified by the 
overlap between positions and patterns that emerge across both. With more literature on this topic, 
distinctions could be made. Goeschel, for example, describes CEOs as having a ‘hospital focus’ on 
quality whilst the Trustees have a ‘hospital and community focus’, with Trustees developing strategy 
and policy and CEO’s implementing them.[164] Similarly, the variation between study aims, design 
and findings did not allow for a clear comparison in the synthesis of results.  
 
Other unavoidable limitations from the literature itself may include publication bias, referring to the 
fact that studies that show no relevant involvement by the manager on quality and safety are 
unlikely to be written up for publication. While such bias may have skewed the findings, the 
literature that we found did include variables that showed a negative or no influence of managers’ 
work on quality and safety. As most of the study findings relied on self-reports by the managers 
themselves, social desirability may have resulted in exaggerated processes and inflated outputs. 
Although, encouragingly, Jiang et al (2009) found that managers that perceived their Boards to be 
effective in quality oversight were from hospitals that had higher processes-of-care scores and lower 
risk adjusted mortality.[201] Such associations, however, cannot provide us with causality, especially 
directional causality, which is a restriction of all the associations asserted within our included 
studies. Differing outcomes and examination of time spent impair constructive comparisons 
between study findings. 
 
Finally, a few findings could not be presented within this Chapter, because it was unclear as to 
whether they were based on evidence alone or based on previous literature, because the authors 
presented a literature review alongside their own empirical work and produced combined 
results/recommendations.[193] Some conclusions may also be exaggerated as two studies (with 
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different populations) came from one larger study,[195, 265] and one study developed upon 
another included study by the same authors.[201, 264] 
 
4.4.2 Conclusion  
In summary, there is a dearth of empirical research on the role of acute care managers in quality of 
care and patient safety and quality improvement. Existing studies are mostly on senior management 
in the US and have a cross-sectional and subjective design. The modest evidence that exists 
highlights key managerial activities and their positive affect on quality and safety outcomes. The 
studies demonstrate a collection of factors that affect the managers’ performance of their roles. 
They further raise concerns on the inadequate prioritisation of quality and patient safety on the 
Board agenda and subsequent time spent at Board meetings, and on inadequate knowledge and 
training on quality and safety. Much of the content of the articles focused on these factors rather 
than information on the managerial role itself, more empirical research is required to elucidate 
managers’ actual activities. Towards this aim, the next three empirical Chapters present research on 
the unexplored issue of senior managers’ tangible work in a quality and safety improvement 
intervention, followed by three empirical studies filling the research gap on middle management 
work in quality and safety and improvement.   
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1. There is very little empirical research on the role of acute care managers in patient safety and quality 
of care and quality improvement 
 
2. Existing studies are mostly on senior management in the US and have a cross-sectional and subjective 
design 
 
3. The evidence from the existing studies suggests that actions and engagement of acute care managers, 
especially at the senior level, can positively influence quality and safety and its improvement 
 
4. We offer a model to frame the inputs processes outputs that comprise the activities, impact and 
contextual factors of management work in quality and safety.  
 
5. Concerns raised are of inadequate prioritisation of quality and patient safety on the Board agenda,  
subsequent time spent at Board meetings, and of inadequate and unclear benefits of management 
knowledge and training on quality and safety 
 
Box 1 Key messages from systematic review 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE SELF-REPORTED ROLE OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS 
IN A QUALITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE: A CASE STUDY2 
 
5.1 Introduction and aims 
 
The number of quality improvement initiatives in the healthcare sector is growing rapidly. Their aim 
is to improve processes, structures and systems through continuous quality improvement 
techniques in order to improve outcomes of care.[277-279] Research examining these programmes 
and larger-scale collaboratives have found some evidence of their impact;[280] their 
sustainability;[131, 281]and economic benefits.[282-284]  
 
Effective support from senior managers is believed to be critical to the success of their 
programmes.[196, 221, 285] In a review of healthcare Board level and senior management 
behaviours associated with quality improvement outcomes, Øvretveit (2009) identified a plethora of 
studies that impart the importance of managerial involvement and engagement in quality and safety 
improvement.[242] Actions frequently referenced as beneficial included displays of senior 
management commitment and support[286] and creating the right culture.[287] However, Øvretveit 
concluded that there is little research-based practical guidance to outline the details of the senior 
management role in leading improvement and called for more academic research on this topic.[242] 
The following three Chapters address senior management participation in quality improvement and 
derive from analysis of a case study quality and safety collaborative, the Safer Patients Initiative 
(SPI).   
 
                                                          
2 This Chapter has been published in BMJ Open 
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5.1.1 The Safer Patients Initiative and my previous research 
Funded by the UK Health Foundation, the Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) was developed by the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI). It was piloted with four UK NHS organisations in its first 
phase (2004-2006) and applied at a further 20 in its second phase (2006-2008).[288, 289] Designed 
to achieve improvements in patient safety, SPI attempted to make changes at an organisational level 
and in front line care processes within four clinical areas through implementing a number of clinical 
working practices with continuous quality improvement and process measurement techniques. The 
main elements of the SPI programme are outlined below in Table 8. Today, many of the principles of 
SPI have continued with 18 of the involved organisations opting in to the follow-up initiative ‘The 
Safer Patients Network’. 
 
In my previous research, myself and a research team (JB, SB, SI, Apo, CV) have investigated a number 
of factors affecting the SPI programme. These include organisational readiness for SPI, clinicians’ 
engagement with SPI, leadership walk rounds prescribed by SPI, and predictors and perceptions of 
impact of SPI. In the pilot phase of SPI, survey responses by those involved (clinical leads, 
coordinators and management) rated senior management support as the highest ranking strength in 
the implementation of SPI.[290] Additional qualitative analyses revealed manager involvement as a 
reported facilitator of medical engagement in SPI.[291] This involvement comprised of allocating 
resources, having good management-doctor relationships, and commitment at executive 
management level. Other interview findings showed that senior managers helped to remove barriers 
and empower staff to change processes through events such as leadership walk-rounds.[292] In 
research on the main phase of SPI, we extracted further perspectives on leadership walk rounds that 
revealed that they can help executives learn about their organisations and help clinical staff 
overcome misperceptions of the executives.[293]   
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In our longitudinal quantitative work, programme implementation factors, including senior 
management processes, were found to contribute significantly to change in organisational safety 
climate and capability linked to programme milestones, above and beyond the effects of programme 
contextual factors and organisational preconditions.[294] We have not previously identified which 
senior management behaviours are perceived to be important. In other investigation across two 
time points, we identified strategies for sustaining SPI that were reported to require senior 
management help on financial and human resources for the programme, as well as incorporating 
patient safety into induction and training.[295] In addition, the coordinators considered 
‘management involvement’ generally to facilitate continuation of the programme and suggested 
that it was essential to feedback to senior management to keep SPI aims high on their agendas to 
improve their understanding and enthusiasm for the programme.  Exploring CEO and MD actions 
may highlight the reasons why this is important, for example whether feedback elicited follow-up 
actions by the managers. Other generic findings from investigation at the main phase revealed 
executive management commitment to quality as a strength of the programme according to ratings 
from both senior management and frontline staff.[296]  
 
In summary, our previous research has suggested an importance in managerial involvement and 
commitment in SPI and identified some potential dimensions of this involvement. However these 
have not been described in detail or confirmed by senior managers directly. 
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SPI Aims 
• Mortality: 15% reduction 
• Adverse events: 30% reduction 
• Ventilator-associated pneumonia: 0 or 300 days between 
• Central line bloodstream infection: 0 or 300 days between 
• Blood sugars within range (intensive care): 80% or more within range 
• MRSA bloodstream infection: 50% reduction 
• Crash calls: 30% reduction 
• Harm from anticoagulation: 50% reduction in adverse events 
• Surgical site infections: 50% reduction 
Workstreams (example change elements) 
• Perioperative care (deep vein thrombosis prophylaxis, beta-blocker use) 
• Medicines management (medicines reconciliation, anticoagulants) 
• General ward care (early warning systems, rapid response team, hand hygiene) 
• Critical care (ventilator bundle, central line bundle, daily goal sheets) 
• Leadership (leadership walk-rounds, strategic prioritisation of quality and safety) 
Programme tools and methodology: 
• Continuous quality improvement: semi-autonomous teams 
• PDSA cycles and small tests of change 
• Incremental spread to successively larger work systems 
• Process measurement and analysis of run charts to determine effects 
• Expert faculty support from IHI (site visits, conference calls, online email support) 
• Large-scale learning sessions for multi-disciplinary improvement teams  
• Online extranet for uploading & comparing process data with monthly feedback 
• Collaborative learning community for networking and sharing best practices 
                         Table 8 The Safer Patients Initiative - A Description[297] p2 
 
This Chapter explores the self-reported participation of CEOs involved in the second phase of SPI.  
The specific research aim is to identify the critical dimensions of hospital CEOs involvement in SPI 
(comprising of managerial work activities, engagement, impact and time spent), and to offer 
practical guidance and classifications that will assist them to fulfil their leadership role in quality 
improvement. 
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5.2 Methods  
5.2.1 Sample 
5.2.1.1 Setting 
Interviews were carried out across all 20 NHS hospitals participating in the second phase of the SPI 
programme across four geographical locations in the UK: England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. The hospitals varied in terms of type (e.g. teaching) and size. The biggest participating Trust 
had a total of 22,000 staff (not all of their hospitals were involved in SPI) and the smallest had 2,100 
staff (est. June 2008). Two Trusts each had two hospitals involved in SPI.  
 
5.2.1.2 Participants  
A purposive sampling strategy across all 20 organisations aimed to include the Chief Executive 
Officers at all of the participating organisations. These senior managers were often involved in the 
‘Leadership workstream’ that governed the SPI programme across all of the clinical workstreams in 
which it was implemented. This workstream were advised to walk around the hospital in “Leadership 
Walk rounds” and to have a strategic prioritisation of quality and safety.  
 
Seventeen interviews were conducted with CEOs representing 19 of the 20 hospitals participating in 
the SPI programme. There were only 17 participants because one CEO did not participate in the 
interviews (we have reason to believe this was because s/he was busy in the process of moving on to 
another Trust), and two of the CEOs managed more than one participating hospital. Specifically, 
every Trust was managed by a different CEO and two Trusts had two hospitals participating in the 
SPI programme. Please see Table 9 for participant demographics.  
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Gender 
Clinical/Non-clinical 
Background 
Tenure in Trust 
No of SPI Hospitals 
Overseen by CEO 
Male Non-clinical 6-9 years 1 
Male Non-clinical 0-11 months 1 
Female Clinical 21 or more years 1 
Male Non-clinical 3-5 years 1 
Male Non-clinical 1-2 years 1 
Female Non-clinical 1-2 years 2 
Male Non-clinical 6-9 years 1 
Male Non-clinical 0-11 months 1 
Male Non-clinical 3-5 years 1 
Female Non-clinical 10-20 years 1 
Female Non-clinical 10-20 years 1 
Male Non-clinical 6-9 years 1 
Male Non-clinical 0-11 months 1 
Female Clinical 0-11 months 1 
Male Non-clinical 1-2 years 2 
Male Non-clinical 10-20 years 1 
Male Non-clinical 3-5 years 1 
Table 9 Participants demographics 
 
 
5.2.2 Ethics approval 
Ethical approval was obtained from the NHS National Research Ethics Service Leicestershire, 
Northamptonshire and Rutland Research Ethics Committee 2. Reference no. 07/H0402/69 and 
Research and Development approval granted from each site. 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
The data collection period was between April-August 2008 towards the official end of the SPI 
programme and comprised of face-to-face interviews lasting approximately between 45-60 minutes. 
Interviewees were shown a research information sheet, briefed on their anonymity and asked to 
sign a form consenting to audio recording the interviews for transcription and analysis (see Appendix 
7 & Appendix 8). A standardised semi-structured interview topic schedule was used by two 
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interviewers (pairings of five different researchers, JB, AP, SB, SI, APo), which addressed the senior 
managerial role along with a host of issues regarding the programme. This is because, as shown in 
the introduction, the study investigated a number of issues surrounding SPI of which the senior 
management role was one topic of investigation. Example questions directly asking CEOs about their 
role included: “What are your main responsibilities?” and “how were/are you involved in SPI?”   
 
5.2.4 Data analysis 
The interviews were transcribed by professional transcribers. Qualitative analysis was performed, 
based on thematic and inductive grounded theory analysis techniques3 of open coding, constant 
comparative analysis and theory building, with the aid of NVivo 8 software.[298-300] The 17 CEO 
transcripts were divided and independently coded by the five researcher interviewers (JB, SB, SI, AP, 
APo). This comprised of identifying any text, indirect or direct, pertaining to the executives’ 
involvement (actions, work or contributions) within the SPI programme.  This resulted in one code 
containing all references to CEOs’ involvement. Line-by-line open coding was then performed by one 
researcher (AP) on all of the CEO transcripts to deconstruct the dataset and draw out singular 
dimensions (alongside which brief memos and code definitions were made). This was also carried 
out on this node coded by the other researchers to compare inclusions. At this stage of analysis, 
highly specific codes related to perceptions of CEO contributions and actions were identified. The 
importance of their involvement in the SPI programme, and barriers and enablers were also coded 
to provide additional contextual information to the managers’ roles. All references coded concerned 
the managers’ actual involvement/contributions and barriers or enablers faced, as opposed to their 
opinions on what managers in their position should do or would likely face. The constant 
comparative method was used to compare emerging codes with earlier codes drawn from the 
dataset and individual codes were grouped into related themes in order to build a model of the main 
dimensions and their sub dimensions. No previous theory was used to analyse the data, all 
                                                          
3
 Analysis is only based on some Grounded Theory techniques, theoretical sampling was not used. 
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categories were developed from the data. After iterative refinement of the relationships, a model 
was identified that consisted of the critical dimensions of the CEOs involvement within the SPI 
programme, based on the CEOs’ reports. To ensure reliability of coding and interpretation, a sample 
of data fragments were checked and resolved through dialogue with other members of the team by 
one researcher (AP) identifying differences in coding between the five coders and speaking with the 
coders in question to arrive at an agreement. The model was considered by external members of the 
team for their opinion on whether the sub dimensions have face validity under the chosen 
dimensions.   
 
 
5.3 Findings 
 
The levels of involvement in the programme varied between the executives, however all gave 
accounts of the value that they believed to have brought at all stages of the process. They 
considered their involvement in the initiative as a significant influence on the potential for 
programme success/failure. 
 
“I went away on leave, came back, and it had just all gone downhill because I wasn’t there.” (Interviewee 8) 
 
The most reported barrier to their involvement was their time constraints to participate within 
programme efforts, which was often attributed to the demands of managing a large Trust. 
Facilitators of their engagement included early involvement in the process (from helping at the 
application stage or/and from attending the first learning session), learning about the programme 
(such as the quality improvement techniques, the targets set, the support networks available, and 
the motivational impetus delivered by IHI) and having other executives and staff engaged with the 
programme.  
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“it’s really important the Board is engaged early on in a real way and that the Board begins to see the data.” 
(Interviewee 3) 
 
Five primary managerial roles within the SPI programme were identified (presented in Table 10). 
These dimensions are described within this section along with example quotations. In terms of 
weighting, the dimensions ‘commitment and support’ and ‘monitoring progress’ were referred to by 
almost all CEOs. Most CEOs also discussed ‘embedding programme elements’ and ‘staff motivation 
and engagement’. Resource provision was mentioned less than the others, but was still referenced 
by well over more than half of the CEOs. Although not discrete from one another, the findings show 
some indication of the stages in which CEOs most get involved in these dimensions, most notably 
resource allocation before the start and (to a lesser extent) at the end of the programme, followed 
by engagement, motivation, commitment and support for staff, and towards the end of the process 
the CEOs are more likely to engage in decisions and strategies to embed the programme elements in 
order to sustain it. 
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First Order Dimension Sub-dimension Dimension Description 
1 RESOURCE PROVISION 
1.1 Securing funding This factor refers to the CEO function of 
securing funding for the SPI programme and 
allocating financial and human resources to 
aid the implementation and continuation of 
the programme. 
1.2 Resource allocation 
2 STAFF MOTIVATION & 
ENGAGEMENT 
2.1 Motivation & 
empowerment of staff  
This factor describes CEOs motivating, 
involving and engaging clinical staff with the 
SPI programme through communication, 
methods of empowerment and 
reinforcement. 
2.2 Shared dialogue 
2.3 Reinforcement of staff 
involvement 
3 COMMITMENT & 
SUPPORT 
3.1 Display of visible 
commitment  
This factor refers to the CEOs’ 
demonstration of their own commitment to 
the programme along with the CEOs’ role of 
support (not through resources) to clinical 
staff involved in SPI. This includes “creating 
the right environment” for staff and “selling” 
the programme to them. 
3.2 Creation of right 
environment/climate 
3.3 Directing staff & stating 
purpose 
4 MONITORING PROGRESS 
4.1 Reviewing SPI measures This factor illustrates the CEO activity of 
monitoring programme outcome measures 
and regularly requesting and reviewing 
overall performance on SPI, as well as 
indirectly generating accountability on 
progress. 
4.2 Performance management  
5 EMBEDDING 
PROGRAMME ELEMENTS 
5.1 Strategy & agenda change 
This factor comprises of changes made by 
the CEOs to strategies, agendas and 
processes in order to integrate SPI 
procedures and practices into them, so that 
they are sustained. 
5.2 Structure change &  
embedding for sustainability 
Table 10 Dimensions and sub-dimensions associated with the CEO role in SPI  
 
5.3.1 Resource provision  
Funding to support the SPI programme was deemed important and many CEOs recognised this as 
one of their primary contributions to the programme. This took two forms: their activities to bid and 
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secure funding from outside the Trust (both at the application stage of SPI and for its continuation) 
and their authorisation of internal Trust resources (both financial and human resources).  Each 
organisation involved in the programme were provided with an allotted sum of money (approx. 
£270,000 per hospital) and external resources, such as external monitoring by IHI. After the official 
two year period of implementation, withdrawal of these resources instigated plans to ensure that 
resources covered by initial funding and support could be continued.  
 
“we would probably take a paper to our Trust executive group shortly after that *the end of IHI involvement in the 
programme+ with a decision…whether to continue on the current method [SPI approach], if so, are we going to 
internally fund it” (Interviewee 6) 
 
“We did make a decision to put aside a £200,000 patient safety reserve, a SPI reserve if you like, to fund the 
consequences of any initiatives that might come out or any requirements that might come out.” (Interviewee 7) 
 
The most common resources authorised by CEOs for the SPI programme were: time allowed for SPI 
work and training; data collection and data support personnel; and an SPI coordinator to oversee the 
project.  
 
“we resourced the central office, if you want to call it that, and tried to ensure that people had time, and energy, 
and the desire to do the right thing there.” (Interviewee 16) 
 
“You have to do it and do it well and do it properly and fully and resource it properly.  And I guess the NHS as a 
whole and to some extent us as well have a history of getting in to projects, not resourcing them properly, and 
then doing them half heartedly.  And then they never work and you wonder why, and the answer’s bloody obvious 
actually.  But they won’t let you do that with SPI.”(Interviewee 12) 
 
5.3.2 Staff motivation and engagement  
The CEOs described activities that empowered, motivated and reinforced staff involvement with the 
SPI programme. In accounts of motivating staff, the CEOs described “creating an appetite” and 
“free*ing+ up peoples thinking”, reporting an aim of changing staff attitudes towards the programme. 
Their actions to empower staff also included allowing them more power to authorise resources.  
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“I think we created the appetite. Nobody was knocking on our door saying they wanted to do patient safety so we 
created the appetite. So I guess that was top down.” (Interviewee 9)  
 
“we’ve slowly over time ..*delegated work+.. to try and increase level of autonomy..So I suppose it was part of me 
trying to free up people’s thinking actually..my first couple of meetings saying, well what *is+ 8 of those at 300 
quid?  Well do it you know and they just found that really liberating because that meant they made some really 
big strides in the middle of the project.” (Interviewee 14) 
 
Leadership walk rounds were considered a particularly useful tool for shared dialogue and as a 
listening exercise. The walk round involved speaking with frontline staff across the hospital and was 
the principal activity of the CEOs position in the ‘leadership workstream’.  
 
“talking to the staff actually and more importantly listening to the staff about what’s going on.  You always learn 
such a lot..When did you last have an incident?  What was, what caused it?  What did you do about it?.. How 
many opportunities do you get to raise these sorts of issues?” (Interviewee 13) 
 
“They *walk rounds+ help the visibility mantra which everybody says about executive teams don’t they?  They have 
been an interesting cross check about the things that you think are going on in the organisation” (Inteviewee 17) 
 
Constant communication with staff was critical to encourage their engagement with the programme. 
At times the CEOs were called in to deal with resistance to the programme, whereby they would 
either discuss the situation with the resisters, attempt to instil a sense of purpose, or in the worst 
case, threaten disciplinary measures for not adhering to SPI practices. Doctors were singled out as 
the profession with the most resistors, therefore facilitating doctor engagement was a commonly 
cited role. CEOs who attended SPI learning sessions to learn about relevant improvement practices 
reported that their learning helped when engaging staff, as they were more knowledgeable on 
various aspects of the programme, such as quality improvement techniques and targets set.  
 
“what I see it *my role+ as doing is setting an example that’s about having the right dialogue.. And once you’ve 
got that engagement, and you’ve got that dialogue, these issues become central to the debate.” (Interviewee 16) 
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“clearly if they’ve *clinical staff+ not been following our policies in terms of hand washing and so on, they’ll be 
disciplined.  Simple as that..I’ve got nurses ringing me up saying I’ve told a doctor off, he hasn’t changed his 
behaviour and we’re now following that up..They’ve been talked to..some of that is about saying, excuse me, but 
you are doing this actually.” (Interviewee 3) 
 
“what I then used..saying right where are all the surgical CDs who are looking at their shoes, why aren’t you doing 
it?  And next time we meet to talk about this I want to know your experiences on how you do it, so you sort of try 
and create a purpose to it” (Interviewee 14) 
 
Another critical task was encouraging Board buy-in through highlighting the programme strategies 
and targets. An NHS Board is made up of a chairman, executives, directors, and non-executives and, 
through regular meetings they jointly oversee, offer direction and are responsible for the financial 
and quality performance of the hospitals within their Trust. Employed by the Trust, the full-time 
executives/directors (e.g. CEO, Medical Director) are responsible for the day-to-day oversight of the 
hospitals and together with the chair and non-executives (recruited externally to the Trust on a part 
time basis) are all responsible for overall governance, strategy, achieving performance targets and 
standards. Therefore, collectively they hold influence over the quality and safety of their 
organisations.  
 
“initially it was more around initial conversation with *director name+ and getting him on Board” (Interviewee 16) 
 
 
5.3.3 Commitment and support  
All 17 CEOs highlighted the importance of personal commitment and most believed that they acted 
as a support to staff implementing the programme. Some CEOs described acting as a role model to 
others and most agreed on the powerful effects that their visible commitment had. Demonstrations 
of commitment included: attending learning sessions; emphasising the purpose of SPI; attending 
leadership walk rounds; integrations of safety into the Board agenda such as safety stories at 
meetings and prioritising it on the agenda; speaking at sessions to explain the programme; and 
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providing approval for SPI related practices. These were considered demonstrations of commitment 
to SPI because they required observable effort by the CEOs to prioritise, promote and become 
involved in the programme. Some made the point that acting as a figurehead is not enough, and that 
visible acts of commitment need to follow. A few described the potential for loss of momentum if 
their commitment was absent. 
 
“I think if I hadn’t had a commitment to the SPI it would have floundered.” (Interviewee 1) 
 
“If they don’t see you believe in it *SPI+, why the hell should they struggle?” (Interviewee 2) 
 
“I think the most important role is to be seen to be committed to it *SPI+.. It’s all very well being a figurehead, but 
this doesn’t allow you to get away with just turning up for the celebratory glass of wine or whatever it is.  You’ve 
actually got to be in there and do it”(Interviewee 12) 
 
 “we’ve puffed our chests up and said we are serious about this and then we have to follow through.  But what’s 
interesting now that we are following through, people believe it and there is a visible, noticeable difference in the 
last two or three weeks out there on the wards in terms of consultants, they’re taking their ties off, they’re rolling 
their shirts up, they’re washing their hands and people are challenging.” (Interviewee 3) 
 
Several interviewees recognised their role in creating the right climate and environment for others 
to undertake the programme work effectively, however they fell short of offering detailed 
description of what this actually involved.  
 
“What a Chief Executive has to do is to build a coalition of support to a broad framework within which people 
work.” (Interviewee 15) 
 
 “And it’s about creating the right climate..in some respects I created a climate of restraint” (Interviewee 14) 
 
The interviewees reported to further aid their staff with statements of purpose and direction. This 
endeavor was also referred to as “selling” the process. This was done through disseminating the 
programme aims and targets via workshops to staff and presentations to the Board. The CEOs also 
increased their involvement when SPI work activity was not heading in the right direction. 
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“one of the things I was keen that we did was to make this something that the whole Board was interested in and 
not just the acute hospital because some of the learning will run across other parts of our service out in the 
community.  So from day one we put together a very broad communication.” (Interviewee 9) 
 
“we have a five year vision that actually can be brought down to one sheet of paper.  Eventually it will be in 
several vehicles, it will be a glossy document that will be presented to all new staff, that will be brought out at the 
start of any project meeting...on the one page one, the work SPI appears..So a Chief Executive has to do some top 
down things, about setting a tone, setting a direction...The first one [task], [is] to adopt it [SPI], to take advice, to 
accept advice.  The second one, then, is to learn enough about it that you can speak authoratively.  Chief 
Executives have to be able to speak about everything for 90 seconds..so a Chief Executive needs to have a 90 
second elevator speech..that you can turn to a group of doctors, in the right situation, and say SPI is really the 
thing because, and then you list whatever” (Interviewee 15) 
 
 
5.3.4 Monitoring  
Monitoring the progress of the initiative was a frequently reported activity. The CEOs monitored 
progress by reviewing SPI outcome measures, reading reports, checking information and asking for 
information on particular programme actions and challenges at Board meetings. Outcomes were 
reviewed on a weekly or quarterly basis depending on the Trust, often in the form of presentations, 
safety-style dashboards and Run Charts.(23) While regularly reviewed, it was not always analysed or 
actioned, however many CEOs agreed that it both raised awareness and flagged safety issues, as 
well as offering the Board an opportunity to prioritise, openly discuss, understand and address 
trouble areas.  
 
“we are seeing well populated Run Charts, we’re being able to use and understand the data more effectively, both 
at a senior level and within the teams.” (Interviewee 9) 
 
  “I’m regularly looking at the information that is produced from it *SPI+, I wouldn’t say I’m looking at the data 
itself...It’s normally a presentation, or patient story, or something like that..so that’s changed the Board *agenda+ 
in that you’re not straight into finance..But whether we’re hugely different to where we were 18 months ago, I 
don’t know really.”(Interviewee 10)  
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“at the breakfast meetings..we go through all the *SPI+ measures” (Interviewee 7) 
 
Monitoring of progress was not only to explore challenges, but also as way of ensuring targets were 
met. Feedback to senior management at Board/project meetings on whether staff were complying 
with SPI prescribed activities, was thought to be a powerful influence on staff engagement and 
accountability. This is because staff were influenced by positive or negative responses from senior 
management. Accountability was generated at these meetings through assessment of targets met 
and actions delivered.  The CEOs primary intention to monitor the process and its key clinical 
indicators was to become familiar with the programme and to keep track of progress rather than to 
improve compliance. Timeframes were set by the workstream leads and coordinators but CEOs 
would query the programme leads if they were falling behind on self-imposed deadlines and targets. 
Outside of the meetings, the CEOs did not audit the programme’s progress or compliance to it, 
instead they relied on the implementers of the programme to report back on these, especially if 
there were any problems. 
 
“we’ve got a different design for our performance management.. data points that will be demonstrated for 
assurance purposes at the Board.” (Interviewee 3) 
 
“I think it’s *SPI is+ in our operational plan, it’s a performance measure in there, so therefore, when we meet the 
divisions on a monthly basis, one of the things we’ll be asking them for is their SPI measures.” (Interviewee 10) 
 
5.3.5 Embedding programme elements 
Many CEOs discussed changing system processes and strategies in order to facilitate change 
necessary for new SPI activity and procedures. Embedding them into existing systems and processes 
was considered the most efficient way to sustain practices and the most cited approach used. The 
profile of quality and safety targets and plans were raised through adding SPI objectives high on the 
agenda and amending strategies to focus on SPI prescribed activity and aims. Examples included 
adding SPI targets into mission statements and strategic objectives.  
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“for me, it’s, it’ll *SPI will+ be a way of doing things, integrated into where we are, and it has to be key item on 
every agenda, the things that’s shaping the debate.” (Interviewee 16)  
 
“I had to make some clear statements from the word go about where it *SPI+ was on the agenda, so it was, it has 
been the first item on the Management Board agenda for the last 18 months.  The patient SPI, right, where are 
we, what have we achieved, what are we doing?..we’ve set, tried to set it in the strategic context of what the 
Trust is doing. The Trust Board adopted a new mission statement..that there would be three main themes..and 
one of them was the Safer Patient Initiative and patient safety.” (Interviewee 13) 
 
Integration of programme elements into existing systems involved amendments to processes, such 
as changes to performance management systems and strengthening lines of accountability 
associated with targeted outcomes. Putting reporting mechanisms in place and incorporating SPI 
elements into other existing initiatives, such as LEAN (a continual improvement process model), 
were other frequently quoted methods of integration, as was including practices into staff objectives 
and individual performance management.  
 
“*we need to+ make sure that the elements of SPI that we keep are integrated into our performance management 
regime.” (Interviewee 4) 
 
“the way we’ve rolled out SPI..we integrated it into people’s directorate objectives, that’s why we keep the profile 
up.” (Interviewee 5) 
 
“that’s how you begin..you narrow the gap between the activities of the initiative and disciplines around 
directorate management and delivery, you narrow that by drawing it together and holding people to account for 
outcomes” (Interviewee 14) 
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5.4 Discussion  
 
All of the CEOs in this study recognised the importance of their part in the SPI programme. The 
executives gave detailed accounts of their activities and perceived value they brought to all of the 
different stages of the process: from the initial application to start the initiative, through overseeing 
and encouraging the process, to its sustainability after resources diminished. This supports proposals 
that senior management make a significant contribution to quality and safety improvement 
initiatives in the healthcare setting.[221, 242, 285]   In exploring the parts played by the chief 
executive officers, five critical dimensions were identified: 1)resource provision; 2)staff motivation & 
engagement; 3)commitment & support; 4)monitoring progress; and 5)embedding programme 
elements.  
 
Managerial commitment was an expected finding considering literature support for this inside and 
outside of healthcare.[173, 265] We identified manifestations of commitment from: attending SPI 
learning sessions; leadership walk rounds; prioritising safety on the Board agenda; talks explaining 
the programme; stamps of approval for programme practices; and stating its purpose. On the latter, 
research has implied the relevance of senior managerial influences in building the right culture for 
improvement.[287] Whilst a few of the interviewees recognised their responsibility in this they did 
not define these activities. Recent articles offer managerial actions on producing a good patient 
safety culture,[160] but less is known on creating the right culture for QI. 
 
Studying the components of the senior management role in a hospital setting in the US, Bradley et al 
(2003) identified that the following manager-related variables affected their quality improvement 
(QI) initiative:  senior management engagement; management’s relationship with clinical staff; the 
promotion of an organisational culture of QI; support of QI with organisational structures; and 
procurement of organisational resources for QI.[196] Our findings are in accord with theirs, although 
 115 
interestingly our CEOs made more reference to their role as a monitor of the process. This included 
reviewing SPI measures and ensuring that programme targets were met.  
 
There is much recognition that QI initiatives require an open and mutual communication between 
management and clinical staff.[301, 302] Our interviewees emphasised that the benefits of shared 
dialogue with clinical staff was both to receive input on quality and safety and to engage staff. 
Indeed, senior managers have been identified as holding a facilitating responsibility,[222, 272, 303] 
including research from another study on the first phase of the SPI programme showing importance 
of management involvement and commitment.[291] The present study confirms the earlier 
conclusions and shows that this entails motivating and empowering staff by providing them with 
more autonomy, reinforcing SPI compliant behaviours and attendance at the learning sessions to 
learn about improvement practices. Such learning is supported by studies that recommend 
managers to enhance their QI knowledge.[242] CEOs involvement in resource provision is also 
supported by research proposals that senior managers’ activities for safety include granting 
resources for a comprehensive safety programme and permitting staff time for safety.[100] Our 
findings show that the most common resources authorised by CEOs for the SPI programme were 
time allowed for SPI work and training, data collection and data analysis support personnel, 
information technology tools, and an SPI coordinator to oversee the project. However, these were 
mostly prescribed by IHI, and, while CEOS were happy with their distribution, they otherwise may 
have chosen different areas to resource.  
 
Finally, a role reported by the CEOs as essential to achieving sustained learning and outcomes 
involved embedding SPI activity and procedures into existing organisational systems, strategies and 
processes. Recommendations based on these findings are to: modify Board agendas and prioritise 
safety; integrate programme targets into mission statements and strategic objectives; strengthen 
lines of accountability and introduce reporting mechanisms associated with programme outcomes; 
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and incorporate programme approaches into other existing initiatives. Change of structures and 
systems by management has been shown to assist in the sustainability of QI programmes.[196] In 
other analyses of the SPI programme, its integration within organisational structures and processes 
featured dominantly within strategies to sustain it.[295] Such tasks arguably fit within the remit of 
senior management and further support the argument that their activity is relevant to collaborative 
methods being sustained, even if it may or may have not been in this case study.[285]  
 
5.4.1 Limitations 
It is important to highlight that this research has not been able to assess any association between 
the CEOs’ roles and successes/failures of the SPI programme. It instead describes the CEOs’ self-
reported contribution to the programme. These self-reports may be subject to social desirability 
bias, especially as the interviewees were involved in the application process to secure 
implementation and additional programme funding. In a previous research survey of 635 of the SPI 
participators (including the CEOs), not only did senior management and frontline staff have many 
divergent views on the programme’s strengths, weaknesses and impact, but also the senior 
managers held overall more positive views than the frontline.[294, 296] Equally, the fact that this 
sample volunteered for this high-profile initiative brings with it a self-selecting bias that is arguably 
likely to have led to an over-estimation of the involvement that senior managers at this level would 
typically engage in within most improvement initiatives in their Trusts. However this limitation is 
lessened with supplementary analysis with staff views of those involved in SPI in Chapter 7.  
 
The SPI programme achievements remain unclear. In a large formal evaluation of hospitals involved 
in the SPI programme, while gains in quality and safety were found, the gains were no larger than in 
the control hospitals that were not involved in the programme.[304] In particular, there may have 
been improvements in specific areas in some hospitals which were not detected by the broader 
evaluation. The evaluators themselves further noted that large scale effects may take a longer time 
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to surface.[304] As the SPI as a programme did not demonstrate overall improvement or elucidate 
which organisations performed better than others, it is difficult to link CEO self-perceptions with 
formal outcomes, and the existing data does not show clear enough trends for this analysis. Lastly, 
the sample size is relatively small yet can be judged respectable when considering that the 
interviewees included all but one of the CEOs in charge of all of the NHS Trusts that participated 
within SPI across the UK and when considering the low number of CEOs in the wider UK population 
compared with other healthcare professionals.  
 
5.4.2 Conclusion 
This study addressed the call for more research-informed practical guidance on the role of senior 
management in QI initiatives and specifically identify critical dimensions of CEO involvement within 
the Safer Patients Initiative. The findings show that the CEOs provided key participation considered 
to significantly contribute towards the SPI programme, namely resource provision, staff motivation 
& engagement, commitment and support, monitoring progress, and embedding programme 
elements. The reports reinforce conclusions in change management and the safety literature that 
have stressed the importance of CEO involvement, and further provide new evidence for specific 
critical dimensions of CEO involvement. Queries raised include the tangible benefits of executive 
involvement in the practical steps to creating the “right” environment for QI. This study has provided 
a case-study example of the type of involvement undertaken by CEOs and can assist others at this 
level undertaking a similar QI programme. The next Chapter explores more senior management 
involvement within SPI to expand upon the present homogenous sample. 
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CHAPTER 6 - THE SELF-REPORTED ROLE OF MEDICAL DIRECTORS IN A 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE: A CASE STUDY 
 
6.1 Introduction and aims 
We have already outlined the case for investigation of the acute care senior managers’ role in quality 
improvement. The previous Chapter explored the self-reported role of CEOs in the SPI programme. 
This Chapter similarly aims to identify the role of Medical Directors (MDs) in the same phase of SPI. 
Additionally, this Chapter will compare similarities and differences with the work of the CEO and the 
emerged model of critical dimensions. The main aim is to identify the critical dimensions of hospital 
MDs’ involvement in SPI (comprising of managerial work activities, engagement, impact and time 
spent) in order to offer practical guidance and classifications to aid their work in quality 
improvement.  
 
 
6.2 Methods  
 
6.2.1 Sample 
Chapter 5 describes the setting of 20 NHS hospitals participating in the second phase of the SPI in 
the UK, the ethical approval and the procedure for interviews. The MDs were similarly mostly 
involved in the ‘Leadership workstream’ that governed the SPI programme across all of the clinical 
workstreams in which it was implemented. Eighteen interviews were conducted with MDs 
representing 16 of the 18 Trusts. Two MDs did not interview and two additional MDs from two 
Trusts were interviewed. The MDs were made up of 16 males and two females and one was a 
Deputy MD and one was an associate MD.  
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6.2.2 Data analysis 
The analysis for this study was the same as described for the CEO transcripts in Chapter 5, apart 
from the initial analysis by the five researchers. Additionally, the model that emerged from the MD 
transcripts was compared with the model that emerged from the CEO interviews.  
 
 
6.3 Findings  
The same five primary managerial roles within the SPI programme were identified (presented 
Chapter 5, Table 10). These dimensions are described within this section along with example 
quotations. In terms of weighting, the dimensions ‘commitment & support’ and ‘staff motivation & 
engagement’ were referred to by almost all MDs. Most MDs also discussed ‘monitoring progress’, 
‘resource provision’, and ‘embedding programme elements’. The levels of involvement in the 
programme varied between MDs, but they considered their involvement important to the 
programme. Barriers to their involvement included high SPI workload, their own clinical work and 
time constraints. Facilitators of their involvement included engagement from others, such as those 
enthused after returning from their learning sessions and leadership from the Board, their own 
clinical background helping them work better on issues and with those on the ground, and IHI 
involvement through presentations and conference calls.   
 
“when I started the first thing I had to sort out was a major pathology incident here.  So in the early days.. my role 
here I wasn’t much involved.” (Interviewee 12) 
 
“I think that the leadership has helped me move it forward, so it's the Board, the executive leadership, and 
especially clinical leadership has helped move it forward.  I think having IHI has helped me facilitate it and moving 
it forward, just the way they work and interact.” (Interviewee 13) 
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6.3.1 Resource provision  
The MDs were involved in much of the pre-programme activities, including initiating the idea to 
apply for the SPI programme to secure funding for it, making a case to the Board to apply, visiting 
and receiving presentations from other sites that were involved in the first phase of SPI, completing 
the application and meeting IHI.  
 
“I was originally responsible for suggesting we get involved in the project after I had a conversation with *name+, 
who was the medical director in *hospital name+.  So *hospital name+’s our couplet.  So *name+ rang me and said, 
what do you think?  And so we then discussed it in our senior management team and thought it would be 
something that we’d want to get involved with, the right thing to do, the right time to do it.  And so I then, with 
[name], we did the presentation to the visiting team in [hospital name] when they came to assess the sites.  So 
*name+ and I led the bid I suppose if you wanted to put it like that.” (Interviewee 16)   
 
Resource provision was most mentioned in relation to securing the bid and rarely to describe 
distribution of internal resources. One example was of introducing remuneration into doctors’ 
payment structures for them to carry out SPI work. The MDs were thinking about how continuation 
of funding will sustain programme activity after Health Foundation provided resources finish. Some 
MDs were not yet in their Director position at the time of the start of SPI, so they were not involved 
in these activities.  
 
“apart from getting senior executive buy in, the other big problem is getting medical buy in.  So by actually 
putting it into, I, by paying, we use some of our money from SPI, and some of the money, and some matching 
funding, to pay PAs, programmed activities under the consultant contract to consultants.  And I actually put it in 
their job plans.  It worked a treat...I think, but the £320,000, or 160, whatever it was, to each of the, plus, was 
hugely important.  And that disappears in September, and I don’t actually know how I’m going to keep it.  I don’t 
know yet how I’m going to fund everything, and some bits may go.  We may have to focus... I worry a little bit 
about medicines management..  I obviously have to find some funding for these doctors who are very involved, 
because I’ve been paying them to do this.  And if I can’t identify the funding to do that, then I have another 
problem.” (Interviewee 2)  
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6.3.2  Staff motivation and engagement  
MDs outlined actions to empower and engage staff with the programme and its principles. 
Descriptions of empowering staff included spreading the news of others’ success and providing 
permission to do things differently. Targeting certain influential people to champion the programme 
was a method to engage staff through others, particularly including them in learning sessions. MDs 
would offer staff data as evidence of success to motivate them. Their talks with staff were 
considered especially important because the staff rarely had the opportunity to provide feedback on 
quality and safety issues to senior managers. The MDs believed that this element improved staff 
interest in the programme. 
 
“people struggle to give themselves permission to have the time to work differently, do you know what I mean?  
They don’t believe they can work any harder, and they can’t see that actually if they change the way they work 
they’ll take chaos out and that’s a constant battle for me is to try and get that message across and to encourage 
people to accept new ways of doing things as an improvement, not as God yet another thing has been lobbed on 
me.” (Interviewee 6) 
 
 “there’s no doubt it *leadership walk rounds+ helps with communication and picking up issues that people feel 
strongly about.  And it’s interesting, some of the wards are very good and different levels of staff come in, there’s 
the nursing staff.  The doctors are a bit hard at times, they seem to keep their heads down on these things.  But 
certainly get input from allied health professionals, pharmacists, auxiliary nurses, domestics, and some of them, 
very interesting conversations are held with people working at that level, because sometimes they’re not the 
people that get the opportunity to perhaps meet with directors generally.” (Interviewee 5) 
 
One MD said that they ignored staff who resisted the programme and another believed a top down 
approach through chastisement from himself would make them more resistant. However, the 
majority of the MDs spoke of intervening when staff were not complying to SPI practices, through 
reprimanding letters, naming those who were incompliant (for example with hand hygiene) and 
even applying sanctions and instructing the staff to re-take relevant training.  
 
“I saw my role as someone who was able to go out and talk almost on a one to one with clinicians to champion it, 
persuade them, cajole, whatever we needed to do... it needs somebody, dare I say, of my level in the organisation 
to be able to go on and say, I’m sorry but this is the way this organisation is doing things now.  We’ve shown you 
the evidence, we’ve explained why.” (Interviewee 1)  
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“for example I’ve done a grand round, so you have the hospital grand round and we presented a grand round to 
use cases to introduce a SPI philosophy.. you could say we’ve tried to influence medical staff.. we’ve gone to every 
service group meeting and outlined what SPI is, so we’ve taken it, as well as at a lower level, we’ve taken it at a 
top level, and that includes going to audit meetings and, to use the phrase at our meeting this morning, we are 
going to put our tin hats on and we are going to go into the trauma and orthopaedic audit meeting 
tomorrow..with a smiley face tell them how wonderful SPI is and plan the roll out through that group.  So that’s 
the other way in terms of which we’re trying to get physician/clinician engagement.” (Interviewee 18) 
 
Senior/Board management was reported by the MDs to help with engaging staff, as they act as 
senior champions for the programme. This engagement was encouraged by the MDs through 
teaching their Board how to interpret measures and run charts, putting patient safety high on the 
agenda, advising CEOs on their visibility and role, bringing patients, data and reports to the Board, 
and educating them with extranet information and papers.  
 
 “we’re already starting to build capacity within the organisation at several levels.. we’re doing some capacity 
building and knowledge improvement around Board directors, non exec and exec as well as senior managers, so 
there's an event later on this year to teach them how to understand the dots that they're looking at on these … 
charts that we’re giving them, so..Again I'm trying to get the Board engaged, involved, feeling ownership of, 
which is now it's patient safety, I want it to be clinical improvement yes.” (Interviewee 4) 
 
 
6.3.3 Commitment and support   
Visible commitment to staff was mostly in the form of letters received, leadership walk rounds and 
executive attendance at meetings. Some MDs admitted that actions were not made on leadership 
walk rounds, but many gave examples of where they had followed up problems. Commitment from 
themselves and other senior managers was believed to be very important to staff and showed staff 
that the programme was of high importance to them. 
 
“The chief exec and I came back from London and said that instead of them, they have these breakfast meetings, 
these 8 o’clock meetings, which amused me because there’s no breakfast, why didn’t they make it fun, why didn’t 
they buy bacon sandwiches for everybody, pick you up before work, why don’t we make it nicer for them?  So 
what they were doing was having these lovely meetings once a month and then somebody was hauled out to 
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come and see the chief executive once a month.  So we stopped that straight and said, no we don’t want you to 
do that, thank you very much, the executive will come to your breakfast meeting.  So [name], the chief exec, and I 
have pledged to go to every meeting.  And that’s hugely empowering, so they were thrilled to bits to see us, 
except I have a groan that there was no breakfast, 8.15 in the morning.  So that’s every month so that’s putting 
executive leadership into their meetings and, of course, they were delighted.  Goodness me, the local director’s 
turned up to this one.  So that’s important.” (Interviewee 7)  
 
 
The MDs described advertising and raising the profile of the programme and communicating the 
work of those involved in SPI to the rest of the organisation. Activities included sending organisation-
wide letters inside wage slips, visiting directorate Boards, deciding on content of SPI newsletters, 
display Boards and introducing plasma screen advertisements. Content on these mediums raised 
awareness of QI tools (PDSAs, run charts) and headlines from each workstream on plans, progress 
and achievements. Support though positive reinforcement (telling staff that they are doing a great 
job) was frequently reported.  
 
“we also discuss at that group what information we’re going to spread wider in the organisation.  What I didn’t 
mention was that [CEO name] and [name] are producing a series of SPI newsletters that go out.  I think they 
might have sent them out with the wage..just a few headlines from each of the groups about the sort of things 
they’ve been involved in and where the project was around the organisation.  So we discuss that at the steering 
group as well...what information we take outside in terms of publicising the programme..so we use that as a form 
for saying, what shall we put in the next newsletter?  What shall we put on the display boards?  And this Trust 
hospital management group, which is all the senior managers, clinicians and managers that meet once a month, 
what we’ve done about every quarter, maybe every two months is get that project lead from one of the groups, 
just update people where we are in their particular areas.  So we try to keep the profile of it high.” (Interviewee 
16) 
 
Deciding on priorities and refocusing staff on them was carried out frequently, along with problem 
solving issues as they arose. MDs would encourage the use of QI tools, measures and evidence, for 
example, they would direct staff on missing QI principles, such as where their measurement of 
change is and urge staff to settle on a definition of measurement. 
 
 “I’d go down and wander around the place and try and cajole and encourage and give people access to evidence 
that I had got from looking at Brent’s work, looking at Africa, the intensivists have been heavily involved with a 
100,000 lives, it’s … Quann way is it?  And the other staff, evidence from some of these American hospitals that 
 124 
had got to zero VAP and had been there for a year and a half or more and just gently trying to persuade people.  
There were others things that you find and you’ll be personally familiar with this.  Things like normathermia and 
the management of hair” (Interviewee 10)  
 
6.3.4  Monitoring  
At project and Board and cross-directorate meetings, the managers would most discuss progress on 
Gantt charts, staff buy-in, practical difficulties, methodologies, updates of other SPI meeting 
outcomes, and metric outcomes through Run charts and Statistical Process Control (SPC) charts. 
Performance management often followed with intervention by the managers if teams were behind 
in the deadlines.  
 
 “*We+ go through the minutes of the previous meeting, we’ll have an update of SPI in general, of any meetings 
that people may have attended, any SPI meetings.  And then we’ll tend to cover each of the areas that, in terms of 
… management, critical care, general Board areas..I’d asked for reports. (Interviewee 17) 
 
“the Board assurance to [Trust name] is provided by review of progress against SPI targets which has been 
integrated into our performance report for the monthly Board meeting.  So they see SPC charts looking at where 
we are, where we are in terms of our variation from where we should be and against a final goal and the 
organisation also gets that report every month, the submission that goes into the IHI is placed on my Board in the 
communications meeting which takes place weekly and we review those results monthly.  When the reports go in 
we then at the next meeting review those results with the senior management team of the Trust.” (Interviewee  
6) 
  
Some monitored targets for SPI were integrated into performance reports for the monthly Board 
meetings. Proactive monitoring included listening and receiving feedback from staff, arranging 
meetings and lunches to discuss progress. The MDs reported bringing the reports to the Boards 
themselves or delegating who was to be in charge of the reports.  Examples showed that they 
carefully controlled the quality of data and reports and questioned explanations provided by staff for 
clinical outcomes and asked them to re-examine data.  
 
“the issue basically, we had, there was a rise in length of stay and mortality on patients on ventilation, and there 
was just a little box saying winter pressures and I said what are the grounds for this? ..You’re showing me as 
Medical Director a graph, which says there is an increase in length of stay but more importantly there’s an 
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increase in morbidity, and without any evidence you’re just saying that’s going to be winter pressures, and I’m not 
prepared to accept that ..So we got the anaesthetists to individually go back and use notes, review and go back 
and the end result was yes, there were significant actual differences in case mix which would make this 
understandable but I think, I hope for others it was a valuable learning lesson in the sense that you can’t just 
accept these things at face value without an understanding of what has caused the change and I think for me, I 
hope we’ve got over that now but it was, I got very, very frustrated..I would much rather not have any data at all 
than have data which is not questioned when something clearly is showing it’s potentially going wrong. 
(Interviewee 14) 
 
6.3.5  Embedding programme elements 
MDs spoke of integrating SPI practices into daily clinical practice and building capacity of knowledge 
for Board members and staff. This education was through events provided for all staff, including 
those that have not been involved in SPI on improvement principles and methodology, and through 
aforementioned specific training for the Board on how to understand and interpret data. 
 
The topic of SPI was placed by the MDs at the top of the Board agenda and meetings such as the 
operating framework and divisional performance. Examples of the MDs’ involvement in changing 
structures were provided; changing the SPI names, combining two existing Boards to create a patient 
safety Board, working with a service improvement team to incorporate safety, and integrating SPI 
into clinical governance arrangements. Referred to as “on different tramlines”, an MD emphasised 
the difficulties arising from two streams of targets to prioritise (SPI and the Department of Health 
targets) and attempting to combine them. 
 
“We’ve just this year got it *SPI+ as the number one item in the annual operating framework and in the divisional 
performance meetings, so again, that needs to be.. we meet with them monthly and the first item, now, I had to 
fight for that one, the first item is quality and safety.” (Interviewee 9) 
 
 “it’s *SPI’s+ coming to the end of its actual project but it now has to be embedded, break open this Easter egg and 
become what the Trust does.  And one of the things I have done is that we had a sort of management Board at 
the hospital and we had a Clinical Governance Board at the hospital and those also were like two train lines and 
I’ve just integrated the two Boards.  So we have just created this month a Board that will be called the 
Management and Patient Safety Board..So a couple of things that we’ve done, I talked about the integration of 
the executive team, the chief exec who needs to be more visible out on the wards, the management and the 
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Patient Safety Board I think is an initiative to put patient safety right at the heart of this organisation, and that’s 
my job.” (Interviewee 7) 
 
 
6.3.6 CEO and MD roles shared and differences 
The model borne from the CEO transcripts on their role in SPI reflects well the dimensions of 
involvement by the MDs and thus remains mostly unchanged. There were however differences in 
some dimensions of involvement and in responsibilities, these are summarised in Table 11 and 
described in this section. The MDs in almost all cases served as a clinical lead in one of the four 
workstreams in addition to their position in the leadership stream. This, along with their clinical 
background, affected their involvement in the programme in a number of ways. Firstly, they detailed 
prioritising clinical outcome targets based on their own clinical experience and interests. For this 
reason they were more involved in work relevant to their area of clinical expertise or related 
interests. The MDs additionally spoke more to IHI and staff on resolving difference of definition of 
clinical measures. They demonstrated understanding of the reasons for clinical reluctance on certain 
practices and were more familiar with application difficulties. Generally, the MDs were more 
involved in frontline work and more familiar with ground work than their CEO counterparts. For 
example, the MDs provided more in-depth descriptions of redesigning processes such as drug charts, 
etc.  
 
“Yes, I guess I was involved in setting the main areas of focus, so care of the deteriorating patients, hospital 
acquired infections, medicines management, those were the three that I felt most passionately we needed to do 
some work on.” (Interviewee 15)  
 
“we’ve decided to put the mandatory 100% of all admissions DVT profile axis scoring onto it as well.  So we’ve 
kind of, also warfarin initiation.  We’ve actually got quite a lot of work streams that have all piled into the solution 
to this is a brand new drug chart, and the final version will be due back from the printers next week piloting.  Then 
by the time we roll that out Trust wide it might just hit the target when they will get medicines reconciliation 
seven days a week.” (Interviewee 8)  
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Despite many MDs showing a closer working relationship than the CEOs with the frontline staff that 
worked on SPI, some MDs reported that they were similarly detached from groundwork. This 
included reports of holding a delegatory role, not being “hands on”, and chairing rather than 
informing meetings on SPI. In some instances this limited functional role partnered with delegation 
of work to their Deputy MD. In one example, the low level of involvement was related to the fact 
that their medical speciality was not at the forefront of SPI target areas: 
 
“I was on the fringes for a few months, so I didn’t go to the initial London trips and I think there were two.  And 
then I did get invited to the third one, because by that time I was medical director.  So I was a late entry into it 
and because my clinical work is as a paediatrician there wasn’t a huge amount going on in the work streams for 
Children’s and Women’s Services initially.” (Interviewee 11)  
 
Unlike the CEOs, the MDs hardly mentioned creating the right environment or resource allocation. 
Resource provision was most mentioned in relation to securing the bid and rarely to describe 
distribution of internal resources. Instead they reported the following dimensions of involvement 
more frequently than the CEOs: building capacity of knowledge of SPI practices and improvement 
techniques for Board members and staff, dissemination and feedback of SPI data to staff, such as 
checking and bringing reports to the Board, engaging medical staff with the programme, creating the 
project structure by selecting people to be involved and to attend learning sessions, and delivering 
presentations to staff and the SPI team.  
 
The MDs also recognised additional facilitators and barriers to their involvement. Barriers included 
high SPI workload, their own clinical work and time constraints, and clinical crises taking their 
attention away from SPI. Facilitators included their own clinical background helping them work 
better on issues and with those on the ground, IHI involvement from presentations and conference 
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calls, and engagement from others, particularly Board leadership and staff enthused after returning 
from their learning sessions.   
 
The majority of dimensions between CEO self-reports and MD self-reports were very similar. This 
was partly because they had many shared roles and partly because they subsume one another’s 
responsibilities. Examples of joint work were on their joint decisions and efforts to apply for the SPI 
programme, presentations to IHI and staff, and attending meetings on SPI. It is apparent in both CEO 
and MD interviews that some CEOs delegated their Medical Director to perform the critical 
dimension or on how to divide tasks between them.  
 
“the *Trust name] Trust has a turnover of £[x], and therefore directors in the [Trust name] Trust fulfil the role that 
might in smaller organisations be occupied by Chief Executives.  So the Medical Director has really been my 
deputy, my representative at all those things.” (CEO, Interviewee 15) 
 
“When I became Acting Medical Director which was in last year, April, so it was probably about June.  So the 
person who was leading it was .. Acting Chief Exec and then I became Acting Medical Director, and so we were 
sharing some of the roles and responsibilities for a few months from April till about September, and it became 
clear I'd have to stay on for a lot longer and so I took over all the responsibilities..I took over pretty soon 
afterwards” (Interviewee 13) 
 
Finally, MDs offered further insight into the CEO role in SPI, particularly giving accounts of CEO 
support, commitment and staff motivation through enthusiasm and leadership walk rounds, and 
monitoring progress, and securing the SPI bid, as described by the CEOs themselves. In line with 
inferences taken between the two sets of interview with CEOs and MDs, some MDs clearly implied 
that the CEOs are less involved in the detail of SPI.  
 
“the Chief Executive has been very supportive of it *SPI+.  He may not be following the detail of it, but he’s been an 
overall supporter of it, and his message has been supportive to staff.” (Interviewee 2)  
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Similarities Differences 
 Both CEOs and MDs are to some extent 
detached from the groundwork of SPI 
 Both management groups delegated outlined 
dimensions of involvement to those below 
them in the organisational hierarchy. 
 The majority of dimensions of involvement in 
the programme between CEO self-reports 
and MD self-reports were very similar. These 
are: securing funding, motivation & 
empowerment of staff, shared dialogue, 
reinforcement of staff involvement, display 
of visible commitment, directing staff & 
stating purpose, reviewing SPI measures, 
performance management, strategy & 
agenda change, structure change &  
embedding for sustainability.  
 There was much joint work between the 
managers. For example, on their decisions 
and efforts to apply for the SPI programme, 
presentations to IHI and staff, and attending 
meetings on SPI. 
 MDs were more involved and more familiar 
with ground work and application difficulties 
than CEOs.  
 MDs almost always served as a clinical lead 
in one of the four workstreams in addition 
to their position in the leadership stream. 
 CEOs made more references to creating the 
right environment and embedding 
programme elements. 
 MDs most mentioned resource provision in 
relation to securing the bid and rarely to 
describe distribution of internal resources. 
 MDs reported the following dimensions of 
involvement more frequently than the CEOs: 
building capacity of knowledge of SPI 
practices and improvement techniques for 
Board members and staff, dissemination and 
feedback of SPI data to staff, such as 
checking and bringing reports to the Board, 
engaging medical staff with the programme, 
creating the project structure, delivering 
presentations to staff and the SPI team, and 
speaking to IHI and staff on resolving 
difference of definition of clinical measures. 
Table 11 Similarities and differences between the roles of CEOs and MDs in SPI 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
The MDs revealed their contributions to SPI and demonstrated many similarities and shared 
responsibilities with the CEOs, as well as a few key differences. The MDs identified the same first 
order dimensions of involvement in SPI reported by the CEOs: 1)resource provision; 2)staff 
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motivation & engagement; 3)commitment & support; 4)monitoring progress; and 5)embedding 
programme elements.  However the MDs did not report the sub dimensions of creating the right 
environment or resource allocation and showed differing emphasis on the dimensions to that of 
CEOs, for example, fewer reports of embedding programme elements.  As the CEOs did not define 
the behaviours they used to produce a good patient safety culture, there is an indication that the 
behaviours that collectively create a good culture is unknown. The actions described however are 
conducive to creation of a good culture. For example, a recent review shows that leadership walk 
rounds have a positive impact on patient safety climate.[305] 
 
Other differences were that the MDs were more involved in ground work, particularly areas relevant 
to own area of expertise. They prioritised clinical outcome targets, resolved definitions of clinical 
measures, dissemination and feedback of SPI data, and provided more examples of engaging clinical 
staff. These differences are likely due to the clinical background of the MD. For instance, the 
professional group with the most resisters were doctors, and other findings from investigation of SPI 
has shown that a clinical leader is most appropriate to get engagement from the doctors.[291] In 
contrast only two of the CEOs had a clinical background and their organisational position is further 
removed from the frontline staff. Consequently, the MDs were more likely than the CEOs to double 
up as a clinical workstream lead.  Together, these points explain the reports that some CEOs were 
more detached from the frontline and less involved in the details of the programme than MDs. 
  
However, some MDs conceded themselves to be intentionally removed also. In both sets of 
interviews, the managers divulged that that they passed on many of the outlined dimensions of 
involvement on to others (to MDs, Clinical Directors or Deputy MDs). This raises the question 
whether a delegatory role is sufficient for those at this level of management, especially as the SPI 
had an intended remit to be ‘bottom up’ in a number of ways. 
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Another dimension mentioned by the MDs was to build knowledge at the Board. The need to 
improve senior managers’ expertise for quality improvement has been noted.[195] The MDs helped 
educate the Board by bringing them relevant papers and delivering presentations on SPI and its 
methodologies early on. Similar activities from the CEO interviews were deemed as engaging the 
Board; the MD interviews establish that education constitutes part of this. The MDs brought (and 
quality controlled) data, reports and patients to the Board and illustrated how to interpret 
measures, run charts, extranet information and papers, and advised on visibility and roles.  
 
Overall, the findings from both analyses infer that the roles of the MDs and CEOs overlap 
considerably. This strengthens the model created from the CEO reports and provides further detail 
of the actions taken by senior management in a quality and safety improvement collaborative. The 
shared and different roles by the CEOs and MDs are likely to evolve in reaction to one another, 
resulting in negotiations and deliberately split activities. 
 
6.4.1 Limitations 
The limitations outlined in the CEO study translate to this study. Views by some MDs on the lesser 
extent that CEOs were involved in the programme particularly raises speculation on the accuracy of 
self-reports. However, this study confirms much of the CEO descriptions and diminishes biases 
through increased sample size and reduced homogeneity.  Another limitation is exaggerated by the 
fact that the MDs and CEOs shared many actions, that is that the frequent use of the subjective 
personal pronoun “we” rather than “I” made it difficult to establish who “we” referred to. In some 
cases “we” referred to the following sets of people: the entire Board, the SPI team, the MD and CEO, 
or the Trust. This is one difficulty arising from the design of the topic guide that asked questions on a 
series of different issues surrounding SPI. Similarly, prompts for more information on the role of the 
senior managers were not always used.     
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6.4.2 Conclusion 
This study has provided additional rigor to the identification of the role of senior management in the 
specific case study of the Safer Patients Initiative. This study adds to the previous study on the role 
of the CEOs by both confirming the model and adding to it. The MDs provided a similar contribution 
to the SPI programme but appear to be more closely involved in the groundwork and the reports 
delivered to the Board. Contrasting to the CEOs reports, they did not mention the activities of 
creating the right safety culture and resource allocation. Instead they mentioned more information 
on feedback to staff and more examples of engaging clinical staff.  To overcome the bias of self-
reports, an objective perspective is required from those involved within the initiative at these 
participating hospitals. This is presented in the following Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 - STAFF PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
OFFICERS AND MEDICAL DIRECTORS IN A QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 
INITIATIVE4 
 
7.1  Introduction and aims 
In Chapter 5, I set out the case for investigation of the senior managers’ role in quality improvement 
and described the case study example quality and safety improvement programme of the Safer 
Patients Initiative. The previous two Chapters offer critical dimensions based on senior management 
statements on their involvement in this initiative. Senior management could potentially be 
describing what they think they should be doing rather than what they actually do, or have an 
inflated view of the impact of their work compared to other workers. This examination would 
therefore be strengthened by incorporating perspectives from others that had the opportunity to 
witness their involvement. This study intends to examine staff views to confirm/disconfirm or add to 
the self stated critical dimensions of hospital Chief Executive Officers’ and Medical Directors’ 
involvement in the Safer Patients Initiative.  
 
7.2  Methods   
 
7.2.1 Sample 
7.2.1.1 Setting and Participants 
Interviews were carried out across all 20 NHS hospitals participating in the second phase of the SPI 
programme across four geographical locations in the UK. More description of the setting can be 
found in Chapter 5.  A purposive sampling strategy across all 20 organisations aimed to include staff 
                                                          
4 Parts of this Chapter have been published in BMJ Open 
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members involved within the SPI programme across the clinical workstreams in which it was 
implemented. Thirty-six interviews were conducted with staff involved in SPI to verify/challenge the 
CEO/MD self-reports. This comprised 20 workstream clinical leads (five per workstream), 10 
programme coordinators, and six managers from the leadership team (a general manager, and a 
clinical governance manager, one director of organisation and development, and three directors of 
nursing), which amounted to two interviewees per CEO/Trust. Please see Table 12 for participant 
demographics. The clinical leads hold clinical positions in their respective workstreams, for example  
clinical leads of perioperative included consultant surgeons. Consequently, they are likely to have a 
different relationship with the MD and the CEO. They also will have a different relationship and 
encounters with the CEOs/MDs compared to other staff participants, such as the directors of nursing 
who regularly meet with the CEO/MDs and may better understand their work.  The coordinators 
were hired especially for the position to work on SPI so they would have a newly formed perspective 
of the senior management relevant specifically to the programme. Although the nature of the 
relationships vary between the staff and the CEOs/MDs, the reports from the staff participants on 
the senior managers’ work are based on SPI work only, of which they share similar interactions, for 
example attending the same SPI meetings.  
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NHS Trust ID 
Number 
Interviewee ID 
Number 
Gender Position 
1 
1a Male Clinical lead, medicines management 
1b Female Clinical lead, general wards 
2 
2a Male Programme coordinator 
2b Male Clinical lead, general wards 
3 
3a Female Programme coordinator 
3b Female Clinical lead, perioperative 
4 
4a Male Clinical lead, medicines management 
4b Male Clinical lead, perioperative 
5 
5a Female Programme coordinator 
5b Male Clinical lead, medicines management 
6 
6a Female Clinical governance manager 
6b Female Clinical lead, perioperative 
7 
7a Male Clinical lead, general wards 
7b Female Leadership team, director of nursing 
8 
8a Female Programme coordinator 
8b Female Clinical lead, critical care 
9 
9a Male Leadership team, general manager 
9b Female Clinical lead, critical care 
10 
10a Male Programme coordinator 
10b Female Clinical lead, critical care 
11 
11a Female Programme coordinator 
11b Female Clinical lead, general wards 
12 
12a Female Programme coordinator 
12b Female Clinical lead, critical care 
13 
13a Male Clinical lead, medicines management 
13b Female Programme coordinator 
14 
14a Female Programme coordinator 
14b Male Leadership team, director of nursing 
15 
15a Female Programme coordinator 
15b Female 
Leadership team, director of organisation and 
development 
16 
16a Female Clinical lead, perioperative 
16b Male Clinical lead, general wards 
17 
17a Female Clinical lead, critical care 
17b Female Clinical lead, medicines management 
18 
18a Male Clinical lead, perioperative 
18b Female Leadership team, director of nursing 
Table 12 Participants demographics 
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7.2.2 Procedure 
The procedure and ethical approval is the same as described in Chapter 5. Example question 
prompts directly asking staff about their manager’s role included: “how was/is your senior 
management/executives involved in SPI?” 
 
7.2.3 Data Analysis 
The analysis for this study was the same as described for the CEO transcripts in Chapter 5. The 
dimensions from the staff reports were compared with the model that emerged from the CEO and 
MD self-reports in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
 
7.3  Findings   
 
Overall, the reports from the clinical workstream leads, programme coordinators and other 
managers involved in the SPI programme confirmed that executive involvement in the programme 
was important. The dimensions of CEO/MD involvement reported by the staff can be closely 
matched to those that emerged from the CEO/MD self-reports. However, different weightings were 
placed on the dimensions to those offered by the CEO/MDs’ transcripts and two sub-dimensions 
were not confirmed. The most referenced dimension in the staff reports was of ‘commitment & 
support’, followed by the majority referencing ‘monitoring progress’ and over half reporting ‘staff 
motivation & engagement’. ‘Resource provision’ was mentioned by only a quarter of the 
interviewees almost solely referring to allocation of resources (i.e data collection, IT help and backfill 
time) rather than securing funding.  Even fewer mentioned the action and benefits of the CEO/MDs 
embedding programme elements, with no mention of their activities to change structures and 
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embed programme elements for sustainability, instead mentions were of agenda change alone. 
Despite the difference in weighting of the dimensions, the staff perceptions substantiated the 
activities reported by the CEO and MDs.  
 
7.3.1 Resource provision  
Evidence was present on resource support from senior management. Resource was allocated for 
staff time ‘backfill’, data collection and IT resources. Although securing new funds were not 
described, there was much confirmation on the MD and the CEO working towards the initial 
application of the SPI programme. 
 
“some of the changes that we’ve needed with IT and that I have pushed up to the leadership because it’s not 
something I’ve been able to influence really.”  (Interviewee 17b, clinical lead, medicines management) 
 
“Any other support *from Board+ has been around trying to acquire resources, so for instance there’s a large 
infection control component and..we’ve had a nurse on this site who’s been collecting information around central 
lines, VAPs and so on and they haven’t had that resource on the other site, because we were two separate Trusts.  
So they collected their data on VAPs and other infections in a different way.  Because we’re one Trust now and 
we’re taking this forward, we want to have the same process on all the sites, so that’s where the management 
are essential, so it’s that sort of financial and resource support” (Interviewee 12b, clinical lead, critical care) 
 
 
7.3.2 Staff motivation and engagement  
As highlighted by both the CEOs and the MDs, staff also reported empowerment through senior 
management permission for staff to solve their own issues. In some cases, examples showed that 
the executives provided ideas for solutions with authorisation for the staff to action them. In other 
cases, they gave them their consent to proceed with their own ideas, such as by-passing 
bureaucratic regulations.   
 
“they’re *executives are+ well equipped to give that person the idea of how to put it right themselves.  Which really 
empowers them more and makes them feel an awful lot better, because then they realise that they can actually sort 
the problem out themselves, and they didn’t have to go to somebody quite high up the Board to get it sorted.  It was 
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something that they could have done themselves.” (Interviewee 8b, clinical lead, critical care)  
 
“when we first started doing the SPI stuff I still felt that if I wanted to change something, I had to go to the clinical 
effectiveness committee and ask permission and they don’t meet very often.  Then theoretically it should be approved 
by clinical governance, they meet less often.  And I raised this at one of our first group huddles with the chief executive 
and she said, this is ridiculous, just do it and tell the chairs of the committees.  And all she was empowering me to do 
was to make changes in my own clinical area” (Interviewee 16b, Clinical lead, general wards) 
 
 
One of the most staff cited tasks carried out by both CEOs and MDs was their intervention in the 
event of staff resisting new SPI imposed practices. Those championing SPI only asked the senior 
managers to intervene when there were incidents of non-compliance. In these cases, the managers 
wrote to or emailed all staff sending out a clear message of their backing for the programme, the 
importance of it, and the negative consequences for those that do not observe the new procedures. 
One CEO invited a meeting with any clinician who did not want to follow the SPI rules for hand 
hygiene to be bare below the elbow. Elsewhere, an MD emailed to affirm that the new policies are 
supported at the top and are important.  
 
“We had such a problem with infection here, we were just desperate to do something about it and quite a lot of 
the, my more dapper colleagues, were very reluctant to shed their nice suits and shirts and, or to roll up the 
sleeves on their shirts because they didn’t think it looked professional.. all the problems evaporated when the 
chief executive sent out an email inviting for a one-to-one interview any clinician who didn’t wish to follow this 
particular policy, and I believe no one took her up on it.” (Interviewee 16b, clinical lead, general wards) 
 
“..about the naked from the elbow down, there was quite a bit of difficulty around particularly our medical 
staff..this time we said no.  This is it and we’ll tell you and then if you don’t do it, we’ll tell you again and then if 
you don’t do it, you’ll see the Medical Director and we were really clear.. the Medical Director had to write out to 
all the medical consultants to say, the Board have adopted this policy, it’s come from the Safer Patients, it’s 
evidence based, please don’t question that, we are saying and this is really important to us.  And it’s a policy we 
have signed up to.” (Interviewee 7b, Leadership team, director of nursing) 
 
 
7.3.3 Commitment and support 
Commitment and support from the senior managers through other actions were well-received by 
staff. Though not explicitly referred to as symbolic of commitment, it was confirmed that both MDs 
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and CEOs had attended learning sessions on the SPI programme delivered by IHI. A director 
confirmed the executive’s intentions to filter knowledge on improvement to frontline staff. 
 
“It was the exec team going in the first and getting that knowledge, and then it becomes a bit dripping tap 
because the information comes back in that way, people start to interpret it properly and the conversations 
change.” (Interviewee 15b, Leadership team, director of organisation and development) 
 
 
Leadership walk rounds were initially considered apprehensively by many frontline staff (staff were 
intimidated or viewed it suspiciously) but later welcomed. Generally, meeting with and speaking to 
staff was considered to be observable commitment that was conducive to the programme. 
 
“it’s very much a chief exec walking around, I wouldn’t say picking on a nurse but going up to a nurse and to be 
fair she gave a fairly good account of herself but it was slightly, I think it’s got, I believe it’s got better since then, 
it’s probably slightly less intimidating.”  (Interviewee 18a, Clinical lead, perioperative) 
 
 
In addition to the visible commitment and empowerment bought with walk rounds, other benefits 
from the managers’ visits were that they helped to identify the problems, to speed up or make 
changes, and fed back the problems to the Board. One interviewee considered resource distribution 
by the Board had changed as a result. The walk rounds also helped to make the managers more 
accountable to frontline. However, remarks cited the disappointment at the lack of feedback and 
actions following the walk rounds, and it was often the programme coordinators and middle 
management rather than senior management that allocated the actions. Whilst examples supported 
CEO/MDs claims that they empowered staff to fix problems themselves, staff also viewed this as 
managers disregarding the opportunity to make organisation-wide changes:  
 
“we’ve got leadership rounds, and that’s made a big difference to identifying the problems on the wards, but 
actually some of the problems have been given back to the wards when really we should be saying, this is 
common across the Trust, let’s solve it by the Trust.” (Interviewee 13a, clinical lead, medicines management)  
 
 
7.3.4 Monitoring 
The type of monitoring and work described by the CEOs and MDs were confirmed by the staff. 
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“there’s a quarterly report to the Trust Board.. the chief exec does a section as part of his report each month.  And 
then [name] or I, or both, go and talk about something specific every quarter.  So in December, it was the walk 
rounds and what we’d done there.  And in, three months after that, whatever it was, March, February, March, we 
presented to them he Run Charts.  And next time we’ll do something different” (Interviewee 9a, Leadership team, 
general manager)  
 
“we will go through..our traffic light measures..which would show all of our measures then and then where we 
are with them.  Green, we’re passing the Run Chart rows, and the amber, where we aren’t passing the rows just 
yet, and then the red is if we haven’t got any data points against it..what we do is pick on, put together a progress 
report, which is then brought to a Trust Board.. and generally during the meeting we can raise any concerns we 
may have about certain, about if there’s any measures that we’re struggling with” (Interviewee 10a, programme 
coordinator) 
 
Staff perceptions offered further insight into why CEO/MD involvement was important and what 
each dimension offered to them. For example, staff feedback and presentation to the CEO/MDs on 
SPI data measures (in the form of high level data and metrics in Run Charts and traffic light 
measures) and summaries of progress and future plans (through verbal presentations and written 
reports), were reported to provide awareness, recognition, solutions and direction from the 
CEO/MDs. These were considered invaluable, especially the recognition of staff work, and staff 
conveyed their wish to avoid disappointing the CEO/MD. This suggests benefits gained from subtle 
acts of listening to presentations, reading reports, understanding and acknowledging the difficulties 
faced in implementation. The CEO/MDs may not have realised the power of such straightforward 
intangible acts.  
 
“it almost felt as if  people [management] didn’t care, but I would, I was really proud feeding back to the 
leadership team, oh we’ve done this, and we’ve done that, oh god, this was so awful, but we’ve managed to do it.  
But that went, so we didn’t have that.  I, not praise, but it was only a well done [name] for, because it’s a lot of 
work this project.” (Interviewee 14b, Leadership team, director of nursing) 
 
In comparison, only one CEO from the earlier interviews made a direct statement of understanding 
this stating that staff “just want us to recognise their hard work and to know that we’re with them” 
(CEO, Interviewee 7).  
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7.3.5 Further staff insights into CEO/MD involvement and perception differences 
 
Staff perceptions additionally exposed that, although in agreement that their CEOs and MDs were 
engaged in the process and that this involvement was valuable, they also portrayed the role of their 
CEO/MD in SPI as secondary and supplementary to their own role. The staff saw themselves as the 
true implementers of the programme, while the CEO/MDs were perceived to be best placed to offer 
assistance particularly in the form of organisation-wide messages (statements of importance of the 
programme), recognition, direction, and trouble shooting.  
 
“I think initially the commitment is very important, that actually the message is out there from the top, patient 
safety is our priority.  But in terms of actually taking forward the program, I really believe it’s me, it’s my level that 
are the people that’s taking it forward.” (Interviewee 14a, programme coordinator)  
 
“I don't feel that I've had honest discussions with *MD and CEO+, and even my line manager, *name+, who is more 
than capable and very supportive, has no time for this project, she has no time to give to it whatsoever.  So there's 
me on three days a week and a data manager and that's it for the whole thing, and that's just, so there's no 
project lead in effect.” (Interviewee 5a, programme coordinator)  
 
Across Trusts, some staff expressed a preference for more involvement by their CEO/MD on the 
dimensions outlined or more from this involvement. Alongside this, some reluctance to ask for help 
was communicated by the staff. There was speculation that the CEO/MDs were preoccupied with 
organizational restructures and Foundation Trust status or other higher priorities, that they had 
superficial reasons for being involved (i.e. funding and profile), and that they were only concerned 
with a couple of aspects of the whole programme (meetings and walk rounds).  
 
“I've had a little contact with the chief executive or the medical director over it, apart from at the meetings.” 
(Interviewee 4b, clinical lead, perioperative) 
 
“We were going through a particularly tough time in terms of our Foundation Trust application, and our 
relationships with the PCT.  And I think he [CEO] had a one track mind at that time, and it, unfortunately, it wasn’t 
this *SPI+.  He got it going.” (Interviewee 18b, Leadership team, director of nursing) 
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As the CEOs and MDs before them, the staff did not define management practices of creating a good 
safety culture. Similarly, only agenda changes were frequently described in relation to embedding 
SPI.  Lastly, the staff reports highlighted the following activities and benefits of the CEO and MD 
involvement that were not emphasised by the managers themselves: ensuring the right people are 
nominated for the programme, acting as a figurehead when IHI visited and meeting with the senior 
management of their paired SPI organisation (the 20 organisations paired up to share learning), 
maintaining external links with primary care Trusts, and offering an organisational perspective across 
all four workstreams. Table 13 summarises staff versus CEO/MD’s perceptions on their role in SPI. 
 
I know that the trust, to get parochial, they’re going to go to the PCT and say that this is not a no cost option and 
we need to continue to be able to backfill the people who can lead the projects, don’t we?  And it’s not a big cost 
actually, it’s modest compared to the departmental costs, are you with me? But the key is that those guys have to 
keep, the PCT have to remain interested, because that’s a good link as well, the PCT.. [and] the medical director. 
(Interviewee 4a, Clinical lead, medicines management) 
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CEO/MD perceptions Staff perceptions 
Offered a hands-off approach enabling more 
bottom-up responsibilities, and delegated 
responsibilities to others 
Wished for more involvement from CEOs/MDs. 
Some reluctance for staff to ask them for more input 
Cemented a foundation for staff to drive the 
programme 
CEO/MD role secondary and supplementary to staff 
role as true implementer 
Leadership walk rounds considered useful for 
understanding issues and empowering staff 
Leadership walk rounds initially viewed 
apprehensively but later welcomed. They made 
managers more accountable, but offered limited 
feedback and follow-up actions 
Self-reported commitment to the programme 
and to quality and safety generally 
CEOs/MDs displayed good commitment to 
programme, but sometimes were preoccupied by 
other higher priorities (e.g.  organisational 
restructures or foundation status) 
Facilitated staff engagement and 
empowerment  
Agreed that the managers offered more authority on 
taking actions on quality issues, but some viewed 
this as managers failing to take action themselves 
Monitoring programme work and output 
helps to understand SPI measures, progress 
and to performance manage 
Monitoring programme work and output provided 
staff with recognition, solutions, direction and 
management awareness/understanding 
Involved in embedding programme into 
organisations’ practice through res-structuring 
and amending strategies and agendas. CEOs 
referenced embedding more than MDs 
Only agenda changes were noted in respect to 
embedding SPI 
CEOs/MDs emphasised the following more 
than the staff did: Resource provision and 
creating the right culture. MDs referenced 
staff motivation and engagement more than 
CEOs 
Staff emphasised the managers nominating SPI 
workers and conducting figurehead duties more 
than the CEOs/MDs did 
 
Table 13 Comparison of staff and CEO/MDs’ perceptions on the role of the CEO/MD in SPI 
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7.4  Discussion  
 
Staff views of CEO and MD involvement closely matched the dimensions that emerged from the self-
reports by the CEO/MDs: 1)resource provision; 2)staff motivation & engagement; 3)commitment & 
support; 4)monitoring progress; and 5)embedding programme elements. However, the dimensions 
of embedding for sustainability and securing resource did not surface as markedly and the weighting 
of the dimensions differed from the self-reports. A role reported by the CEOs as essential to 
achieving sustained learning and outcomes involved embedding SPI activity and procedures into 
existing organisational systems, strategies and processes. However, apart from references to 
changing Board agendas, staff made no mention of any of these strategies in relation to senior 
management involvement. This may be because some aspects of their involvement are unseen by 
staff or that managers have either communicated their tasks differently or exaggerated their work 
on this. Similarly, staff reports did not make many references to the managers’ finance actions, 
which again may be because it is not as visible to the staff as other activities, as the literature 
suggest that healthcare managers focus on finance for QI.[302]  Recommendations are for better 
visibility of certain actions to avoid disenfranchisement by staff. 
 
From the divergence of monitoring benefits perceived by managers and staff, further understanding 
of the beneficial ways of monitoring could assist managers in how to best carry out this task. 
Recognition, praise, and awareness should be regularly expressed by the senior managers. Especially 
as there is a great deal of work required above and beyond the usual call of duty for the staff 
involved that is not often monetarily rewarded. The behavioural literature has long shown that 
workers require positive reinforcement to engage in safety processes and that they require role 
models on these tasks.[306, 307] Commitment and communication from the managers helped to 
achieve these.  
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There appears to be a fine balance between management empowering staff to address their own 
problems and pursuing follow-up actions and opportunities to make organisation-wide changes. A 
feedback loop from staff on actions following their discussions with managers would go a long way 
to establishing how successful their discussions have been. Communication appeared to be the 
biggest facilitating activity of the managers to help the staff progress with the programme aims. 
 
The analysis further reveals other more negative views of the managers’ involvement; primarily that 
they are not involved enough on the dimensions outlined. This supported some MD and CEO reports 
that they held more of a delegatory role. This was put down to the managers being preoccupied with 
other priorities and staff hesitation in requesting further input. Whatever the reason, it was clearly 
reported that meetings and walk rounds alone is insufficient involvement. Informing staff of other 
management actions (e.g. embedding, changes made, presenting, further resources secured) as well 
as making further contribution on these will help to emphasise to staff other unseen work carried 
out. A better system of passing on quality improvement knowledge and defined management 
practices of creating a good safety culture are also required, as these was rarely mentioned by staff.  
 
This analysis has shown that there are some crucial activities that specifically require a CEO or MD to 
perform. These include; intervening when medical staff resist new practices, visible commitment 
through walking round the hospital, offering recognition and awareness through monitoring, and 
organisation-wide messages. As well as activities not emphasised by the managers: nominating staff 
to be involved and liaising with external organisations, such as IHI, PCT, paired Trust. 
 
7.4.1 Limitations 
The limitations regarding a lack of association between the managers’ roles and successes/failures of 
the SPI programme and unclear programme achievements remain, while other limitations of 
homogeneity of sample, small sample size and self-reports have been addressed with this additional 
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study. Some dimensions of the model consistently overlap, such as the dimensions of 
commitment/support and empowerment/motivation, showing that these areas of the model are not 
very distinct. The overlap can be explained by some acts of empowerment and motivation also 
revealing to staff that the managers are committed to the programme and are supporting them. It is 
considered however, that these are discrete enough to be separate categories of involvement. 
Another limitation in interpretation of analysis is that the staff often used the terms ‘senior 
management/leadership’, ‘executives’ and ‘the Board’, which may include the CEO and MD along 
with other senior managers. Whilst these were not disregarded, attention was given to the quotes 
that made it clear they were discussing the CEO or MD. Finally, this study would have benefited from 
more frontline staff to get more junior perceptive of senior managements’ work in the programme. 
 
7.4.2 Conclusion 
This study has attempted to offer another perspective on the senior managements’ key participation 
considered to significantly contribute towards the programme. These reports confirm the main 
dimensions of involvement and raise additional points for CEOs and MDs to focus on when engaging 
in a similar intervention. Activities that were both crucial and specific to CEO and MDs were: to 
engage staff and programme resistors, show commitment through talking to staff, offering 
recognition and awareness through monitoring, delivering organisation-wide messages, nominating 
staff champions, and liaising with external organisations. Recommendations are for greater visibility 
on managerial activities of embedding SPI activity and procedures into existing organisational 
systems, strategies and processes; securing resources; and clear recognition, praise, and awareness 
of programme progress. Constant communication and feedback from staff on actions following their 
discussions with managers and more ways of passing on quality improvement knowledge is needed. 
 
Following on from the work of senior managers in a quality and safety improvement initiative, the 
next three Chapters turn to middle management work in quality and safety and improvement 
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unbounded by a programme in order to present another dimension to the examination of the work 
of the acute care manager in quality and safety and address further gaps identified from the 
systematic literature review.   
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CHAPTER 8 - THE WORK ACTIVITIES OF ACUTE CARE MIDDLE 
MANAGEMENT IN QUALITY AND PATIENT SAFETY: A QUALITATIVE 
STUDY  
 
8.1 Introduction and aims 
Out of the different levels of managers (senior, middle, frontline) within the acute care setting, 
middle management appears to be one of the least researched.[100, 242, 282, 308] Literature 
describes the difficulties of the middle management position by outlining the negative perceptions 
of middle management stuck in ‘the middle of a long hierarchy’, coping with unaligned expectations 
from below and above,[210] with perceptions held by some that managers at this level offer little 
contribution to organisational efficiency.[3] Arguably partly based on such perceptions, the UK 
government have recently revealed plans to cut at the middle management tier of the NHS and 
remove middle managers in a bid to improve efficiency.[4] However, without research-based 
literature demonstrating the roles and influences that these managers have on quality of care and 
patient safety, neither the government nor the public can be aware of what affect the cuts may have 
on patient care. 
      
Management academics advise that middle management are beneficial in promoting change and 
important in business planning.[83, 91, 309] Experts in the field of quality of healthcare insist that 
middle-management ‘act as a crucial bridge’ between senior leadership and the frontlines of patient 
care and that they play a vital role in patient safety and quality improvement.[202, 209] Potentially 
middle managers within the health sector can be involved in safety management [100] and in 
ensuring good quality care [210] and improvement.[242] O’Dea and Flin (2003) stress that a range of 
study variables across the literature demonstrate an indisputable association between middle 
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management involvement in safety and positive workplace safety outcomes.[150] Unfortunately, 
there is limited empirical investigation to support these suggestions within the healthcare 
setting.[100]  The systematic review in Chapter 4 has identified only two articles that focused solely 
on the quality-related work activities of mid-level management.[213, 267] The review additionally 
exposed a demand for exploratory research outside of the US to discover whether middle managers 
do have a role to play in quality and safety, what that role involves and where it may have impact.  
 
This Chapter presents a study that explores the day-to-day role of the acute care middle manager in 
quality and safety and in turn identifies their contributions to patient care.  The specific aims for this 
study were: (1) to explore what routine work activities5 acute care middle managers’ carry out in 
relation to quality and safety and its improvement, and what time is reportedly spent on these; (2) 
to explore how these activities are perceived to potentially impact on quality and safety; and (3) to 
explore what role contextual factors play in these activities. In order to build a model that presents a 
more in-depth revelation of the work activities and the role that contextual factors appear to play in 
them, I will draw on Stewart’s framework to explore which activities are demands, which are choices 
and what role constraints may have on the work. Finally, where relevant, comparisons will be made 
between specialities and Trusts. 
 
8.2 Methods 
8.2.1 Design, setting and sample 
Due to the limited research in this area, a fully exploratory and open ended qualitative approach was 
chosen to explore the issues surrounding the role of the healthcare mid-level manager in quality and 
safety.[310] Researchers in the field have pronounced qualitative methodology as valuable in 
offering us a better understanding of healthcare quality and safety.[257, 311] 
                                                          
5
 Work activities are defined as observable behaviours carried out at work, such as actions, tasks, or functions.   
 150 
 
There is no universal definition of a middle manager.[93, 312] The choice of the mid-level managers 
in our study was based on definitions that identify middle managers as those in the middle of the 
organisational hierarchy chart that have one or more managers reporting to them.[43, 82] This also 
follows advice that initial research on middle managers' role in healthcare improvement should use 
a broad definition of middle managers.[90] To validate the decision of who is a middle manager 
within the NHS, both senior and other level hospital managers were asked their opinion on which 
job titles and band levels fulfilled the title of a middle manager in their opinion. In addition to this, 
roles that were far more clinical in their position were excluded that otherwise fit the rest of the 
inclusion criteria and it was decided that additional criteria were that they must hold budgetary 
responsibilities. Therefore consultants were not included. Other criteria were that they did not hold 
a position on the Trust Board or an overseeing function across the Trust as these have been 
identified as defining senior management.[313] A final exclusion criterion was to exclude any 
managers that had a primary official role in quality or safety improvement. This would have skewed 
the data away from generalising the findings to typical managers. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the two-by-two study design, made up of two UK NHS Trusts, one an Academic 
Health Science Centre (AHSC) representing a 'teaching' trust in London and the other a District 
General Hospital (DGH) based in a rural location. The rationale for choosing a DGH and a teaching 
hospital is to compare the two for differences in roles, especially when asking about knowledge 
acquisition, evidence based practices and translation of research. Within each Trust, the participants 
were split again by speciality. The two specialities were surgery6 and general medicine7. This was to 
allow comparison of differences in arrangements and perceptions between the two specialities that 
cover most of the hospital trade. A purposive sampling strategy initially had aimed to obtain 40 
participants, comprising of 20 at each organisation, with ten middle managers from each speciality, 
                                                          
6
 Surgery is the branch of medicine that deals with surgical treatments. 
7
 General medicine is the branch of medicine that deals with the nonsurgical treatment of diseases of the internal organs in adults. 
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but four were eliminated after the interviews began as they did not fit the exclusion criteria. 
Therefore, in total, 36 eligible middle managers took part in the interviews, 20 at the teaching 
hospital and 16 at the DGH. Of those at the teaching hospital, 11 were managers who worked within 
the speciality of surgery and 9 worked within medicine. At the DGH, 6 were managers who worked 
within the speciality of surgery and 10 worked within medicine. Participants were mostly made up of 
divisional managers, general managers, service managers and service delivery managers (16 with 
clinical backgrounds and 20 non-clinical). Please see Table 14 for a demographics table of all 
interviewees. Whilst the demographics table seems to show a disproportionate imbalance of 
seniority levels of middle managers between the Trusts (with the DGH interviewees comprising of 
many more divisional and general managers), in fact, the two Trusts used different job titles and, 
due to the size of the hospitals, different titles are given to those with equivalent responsibilities.   
 
 
 
  
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Figure 8 Two by two study design 
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Interviewee No. Position Tenure Gender Background Speciality Trust 
I4 Service manager 3-5yrs Female Clinical Medicine AHSC 
I6 Service manager 0-11mths Male Non-clinical Medicine AHSC 
I7 Service delivery manager 1-2yrs Female Non-clinical Medicine AHSC 
I9 Service manager 1-2yrs Male Non-clinical Medicine AHSC 
I11 General manager 1-2yrs Male Non-clinical Medicine AHSC 
I12 Service delivery manager 1-2yrs Female Non-clinical Medicine AHSC 
I16 Service manager 1-2yrs Female Non-clinical Medicine AHSC 
I17 Service manager 0-11mths Female Non-clinical Medicine AHSC 
B1 General manager 1-2yrs Female Clinical Medicine DGH 
B2 General manager 1-2yrs Female Clinical Medicine DGH 
B3 Head of services 0-11mths Female Clinical Medicine DGH 
B4 General manager 6-9yrs Female Non-clinical Medicine DGH 
B5 Nurse manager 1-2yrs Male Clinical Medicine DGH 
B7 General manager 0-11mths Male Non-clinical Medicine DGH 
B10 Divisional manager 1-2yrs Female Clinical Medicine DGH 
B12 Service manager 3-5yrs Female Clinical Medicine DGH 
B13 Service manager 3-5yrs Female Clinical Medicine DGH 
B17 Divisional manager 1-2yrs Female Clinical Medicine DGH 
I1 Service manager 10-20yrs Female Non-clinical Surgery AHSC 
I2 Theatres manager Missing Female Clinical Surgery AHSC 
I3 Service manager 1-2yrs Male Clinical Surgery AHSC 
I5 Lead Nurse 1-2yrs Female Clinical Surgery AHSC 
I8 Service manager 3-5yrs Male Non-clinical Surgery AHSC 
I10 General manager Missing Female Non-clinical Surgery AHSC 
I13 Service delivery manager 1-2yrs Female Non-clinical Surgery AHSC 
I14 Service delivery manager 1-2yrs Male Non-clinical Surgery AHSC 
I15 Service delivery manager 0-11mths Male Non-clinical Surgery AHSC 
I18 General manager 6-9yrs Female Clinical Surgery AHSC 
I19 Service delivery manager 1-2yrs Male Non-clinical Surgery AHSC 
I20 Service manager 3-5yrs Female Clinical Surgery AHSC 
B6 General manager 3-5yrs Female Non-clinical Surgery DGH 
B9 General manager 3-5yrs Female Clinical Surgery DGH 
B11 Divisional manager 1-2yrs Female Non-clinical Surgery DGH 
B14 General manager 1-2yrs Female Non-clinical Surgery DGH 
B15 General manager 0-11mths Female Non-clinical Surgery DGH 
B16 General manager 3-5yrs Female Clinical Surgery DGH 
           Table 14 Demographics of interviewees 
 
8.2.2 Development of interview 
Firstly, seven pilot study interviews lasting between 45-60 minutes were carried out with mid-level 
managers in directorate management positions from seven different hospitals across the UK. The 
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pilot took place as part of a study looking at a patient safety initiative with managers that were not 
involved. This helped to inform the development of an interview schedule. Findings from this in-
depth pilot study led to a number of the topics being included in the main study. The literature and 
theory also informed questions, for example, questions asking about how the managers influence 
others to draw out information related to their power. Secondly, five pilot study interviews lasting 
between 30-60 minutes were carried out with middle managers within medicine or surgery outside 
of the targeted hospitals. Three of these worked at a teaching hospital and two at a DGH. This tested 
the interview schedule to be used in the main study and as a result amendments to the schedule 
were made.  
 
Ethical approval for all documents and study design was sought and approved by The North London 
Research Ethics Committee 2 (ethics reference number: 10/H0724/51) and Research and 
Development approval was achieved separately for each organisation. 
 
8.2.3 Procedure 
8.2.3.1 Recruitment strategy 
The sampling strategy was a purposive one. The two Trusts were identified based on their type of 
Trust (ASHC or DGH) and their geographical location (inner London city and rural). In order to recruit 
participants, a key contact at both the DGH (a former executive director) and at the ASHC (a former 
service manager) were asked for their managerial contacts at the Trusts. In addition to this, a review 
of the management hierarchy organisational structure charts determined others that fit the 
inclusion criteria. After an introductory email from the said contacts, the lead researcher (myself - 
AP) followed up on correspondence. The email detailing the study included an attached research 
information sheet.  
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8.2.3.2 Data collection 
Semi-structured face-to-face exploratory interviews lasted approximately one hour on average, 
conducted between December 2010 and February 2011. Prior to the start of the interview, the 
participants were presented with the research information sheet and a consent form (see Appendix 
9 and Appendix 10). An audio recorder and a standardised interview topic guide were used. Please 
see Appendix 11 for the interview topic guide, designed to ask clear, non-misleading and open-
ended questions (with prompting/probing at interview) as advised by qualitative experts.[314] 
Questions covered the following sections: impact on care and quality and safety (Q&S); perception 
of Q&S; Q&S targets/priorities; barriers & facilitators of Q&S; how influence & change QSI initiatives; 
Q&S knowledge & research translation; competencies for Q&S; and professional background. One 
researcher (AP) conducted the majority of the interviews at the teaching Trust and another 
interviewer (JP) interviewed the majority of managers at the DGH. To reduce interviewer bias and 
for reliability purposes, the initial interviewees were interviewed jointly by both interviewers, as well 
as a minimum set interviews of at least four at each Trust by each interviewer.  
 
8.2.3.3 Data analysis  
The interviews were professionally transcribed and qualitative analysis was performed, based on 
thematic and grounded theory techniques of open coding and constant comparative, and grouping 
of themes, with the aid of NVivo qualitative analysis software.[298-300] Inductive techniques were 
used due to the exploratory nature of the interviews and the limited literature/theory on the topic 
area. The analysis started with detailed open-coding of each line of text, along with brief memos and 
code definitions made. References coded were those made to work activities (defined as observable 
behaviours carried out at work by the manager, including actions, tasks, or functions), the impact 
that these activities have and the contextual factors relating to them. References that were related 
to managerial work alone were also coded under a separate theme of non quality and safety related 
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information, in order to judge the balance of references made to irrelevant information. The 
constant comparative method was used to compare emerging codes with earlier codes drawn from 
the dataset. Grouping and relating the emerging codes into parent themes and sub-themes 
followed. This was performed through addition and reorganisation of the tree structure of codes in 
the NVivo programme and resulted in fewer umbrella themes covering a larger number of codes. 
One researcher analysed all 36 transcripts (AP) with input from a second coder (JP) who analysed 
17% of transcripts fully to ensure consistency in coding. JP further coded the remainder of the 
transcripts on a single topic. Coding divergence was discussed, for example, a coding discrepancy 
comprising a bias to under code financial management was resolved through discussion. The 
inclusion of a second coder was particularly helpful on this topic to ensure multiple perspectives. The 
first coder (AP) holds a background in organisational psychology with experience in quality and 
safety research and interviews and the second (JP) is a former secondary care middle and senior 
manager and an Associate Director of Patient Safety for a large Strategic Health Authority.  AP 
trained JP on interview techniques and analyses. 
 
Theme saturation was realised and iterative refinement was made to the structure and relationships 
of codes. Next, the codes were organised in accordance with Stewart’s demands, constraints and 
choices framework, in order to build a model that presents a more in-depth revelation of the work 
activities and the role that contextual factors appear to play in them. I additionally refer to Stewart’s 
classifications of ‘profiling behavioural demands’ of managerial work: type of job contact, type of 
work pattern, and behavioural demands made by contacts, exposure and on private life.[46, 54] The 
impact that the work has on quality and safety was connected back to the activities and context. 
Finally, comparisons were made between the two specialities (surgery and medicine) and between 
the two Trusts (AHSC and DGH), particularly on specific issues including research use and evidence-
base practices. Where relevant, these comparisons are referred to within the findings. Although I 
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make some reference to how many participants remarked on the same point, the number of times 
issues or themes were raised was not used to denote its importance. 
 
 
8.3 Findings   
 
In summary, managerial quality and safety (Q&S) work demands are: Q&S performance targets; 
capacity demands; responding to Q&S failures; allocating financial resources; and ensuring clinical 
staff competency. Managerial choices of quality and safety work are on: opting into Q&S 
improvement initiatives and changing processes/systems; strategic planning for Q&S; and creating a 
good patient safety culture. Constraints of this work are: information access to Q&S; managerial 
power base; peer clinician attitudes/perceptions; fire-fighting Q&S; resource limitations; multiple 
and geographical work locations; and limited Q&S knowledge, research & training. This model is 
presented in Figure 9 and Stewart’s (1967, 1982) dimensions are discussed in depth below.[46, 54] 
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Figure 9 Demands, Choices and Constraints of the acute care middle managers’ role in quality and patient 
safety based on Stewart’s (1976, 1982) framework[54]  
 
Demands 
Profile of Behavioural 
Demands (type of job 
contact,  work pattern, 
and source of demands in 
Q&S)  
Q&S Performance Target 
demands (e.g. clinical key 
indicators) 
Capacity Demands  
(overall running of service 
& capacities) 
Demands to Respond to 
Q&S Failures      
(Patient Complaints & 
Incidents) 
Demands to Maintain 
Clinical Staff Competency  
(ensuring staff up-to-date 
with training) 
Demands to Disseminate 
Monetary Funds  
(decisions on where to 
spend finances on Q&S) 
Constraints 
Q&S Information Access 
(information technology 
limitations) 
Power and Influence to 
Improve Q&S  
(limited position power) 
Peer Clinician 
Attitudes/Perceptions 
(misperceptions of 
managerial intentions) 
Fire-fighting Q&S  
(trouble shooting 
impromptu events) 
Resource Limitations  
(limited  budget and 
staffing) 
Physical  Work Locations  
(away from clinical peers 
& at multiple-sites) 
Q&S Knowledge, Research 
& Training (limited 
training and room for 
knowledge improvement) 
Choices 
Time Spent on Q&S Work 
Activities  
(actual and desired) 
Q&S Improvement 
Initiatives & Changing 
Processes/Systems 
(volunteering to 
participate or lead Q&S 
interventions) 
Strategic Planning for Q&S 
(long term strategies for 
Q&S improvement) 
Creating a Good Patient 
Safety Culture  
(open culture for 
reporting) 
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8.3.1 Demands  
‘Demands’ refer to the demands of the job (here in relation to quality and safety work), which the 
manager must do that cannot be delegated. Disregarding these demands is likely to result in some 
form of penalty. These demands may be behavioural demands (necessary activities) or performance 
demands (achievements required). The demands were quality and safety performance target 
demands, capacity demands, demands to respond to quality and safety failures, demands to 
maintain clinical staff competency, and demands to disseminate monetary funds. 
 
8.3.1.1 Profile of behavioural demands  
Liaising at both set and unplanned meetings was the dominant mode of work. Most commonly this 
was with their own line managers, their administrative subordinates or their peers: clinical 
governance or patient safety manager; lead clinician or lead nurse depending on the issue. This 
corresponds with Stewart’s job contact typology of the ‘Hub’ whereby managerial contacts are 
commonly made from all levels of the organisational hierarchy (sideways, up and down).  Examples 
of activities across each levels include communicating with their administrative employees on daily 
capacity concerns and on correspondence with patients; reviewing quality performance targets and 
serious safety issues with their managers and other seniors; and consulting peers after an 
incident/complaint or regarding patient/theatre lists and equipment. These findings support 
assertions that managers manage through verbal communication,[51] as well as findings that 
effective general managers spend most of their time with a wide variation of people, discussing a 
breadth of topics.[53] The type of work pattern described is consistent with Type 1 of Stewart’s type 
of work patterns (fragmented, recurrent, trouble shooting). Different levels of middle managers 
shared similar type of job contacts, but slightly different work patterns, for example senior middle 
managers were more strategic. 
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High behavioural demands are made by conflicting demands (balancing finance and quality and 
safety, detailed below), by exposure (performance outcomes) and by peers (e.g. peer-imposed 
requests on equipment, capacity issues) and other seniors (on service delivery). These are further 
described in the following sections. Moderate demands were made by subordinates and bosses 
dependence. Low demands were made by external and short-term contacts and on private life.   
 
8.3.1.2 Q&S Performance target demands  
In reports on performance demands, the managers reported their main accountabilities as finance, 
HR, governance and quality and safety targets and overall service delivery. The manager’s 
performance is indirectly reviewed at meetings with their seniors on at least a monthly basis. These 
performance review meetings are at the divisional or Trust Board level and reports such as 
governance reports are compiled for these meetings and performance is reviewed against set 
targets. They include review of clinical indicators, status of waiting lists, areas overspent on the 
budget and HR issues such as sickness, staff retention, appraisals and mandatory training. They 
particularly review high level performance targets and the middle manager raises patient safety 
incidents and concerns or explains breaches on targets. System, HR and financial issues rather than 
quality and safety issues were most discussed at all forums of performance appraisal, with the line 
manager, HR representative and an accountant. Formal individual performance appraisals with a line 
manager occur on an annual basis. This was described as an ineffective way of monitoring 
performance with little importance placed upon it. The managers are most accountable to their line 
manager, Trust Board, and national bodies such as the Department of Health and Monitor.  If unmet 
targets went unexplained or target breaches incurred considerable financial penalties, the managers 
would be held accountable, asked to defend their performance at meetings, verbally reprimanded 
by their seniors and performance managed on those targets. 
 
“what am I personally responsible for, what do my senior management regard me as being? They would hold me 
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account for total financial management of the department, and the performance targets. Performance and 
quality targets of the division. And which comes first depends on where we are.” (B17, divisional manager, 
medicine, DGH)  
 
 “through the monthly Board meetings. So we’d have a Board meeting for the whole directorate and that would 
have all the reporting around complaints, incidents, bare below the elbows and that kind of thing, and if we were 
not reporting well on that, then that question would come to me, ‘Why is that?’” (B17, service manager, 
medicine, AHSC) 
 
“Well my performance is measured by the Divisional Manager based on my performance and delivery of the 
objectives of the role, both formally and informally, and using the appraisal system. Also we have 12 standards 
for nursing against which we are measured on a monthly basis. We provide the data though which is a bit strange 
I suppose. Not much of this is specifically about safety or quality but more about systems and processes although 
this is changing with the new focus on outcome” (B9, general manager, surgery, DGH)  
 
“I would get performance managed if I wasn’t meeting a target.  And I couldn’t give..a reasonable reason why I 
wasn’t meeting the target.” (I2, theatre manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
 
The mandatory external quality and safety-driven targets mostly derived from the governmental 
Department of Health, instructed much of what managers did in their work. These targets were a 
considerable focus for managers on a daily basis. The managers welcomed most of the external 
targets but made a point of how many there are.  Over 30 different quality and safety related targets 
were mentioned by the interviewees. The most mentioned targets were waiting times and access 
targets, including 18 week access and referral to treatment time, 31 or 62 days to treating cancer 
(depending on pathway), 2 week suspected cancer wait to see a specialist, 28 day rebooks for 
cancellations from theatres, and four hour Accident and Emergency waiting time. Complaints (21 
day response time) and clinical outcomes were also frequently mentioned, such as pressure sores, 
and Healthcare Acquired Infections (HAI). Other national targets for quality improvement have been 
introduced in the form of CQUIN (Commissioning for Quality and Innovation) targets. These ensure 
that payment to the Trust is dependent on achievement of local quality improvement goals.  
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The governmental national mandatory targets were deemed the priority over Trust/local targets. For 
example, the government scrapping the 18 week target resulted in less attention on this issue, 
despite it remaining as a Trust target. Unlike internal targets chosen by management, the centralised 
top-down targets offered monetary gains and also withdrew them as a penalty. The lesson here is 
that financial targets and competition may be the key levers driving focus on specific areas of 
quality.  
 
Measures and audits carried out, or at least ordered, on quality and safety by the managers are 
dependent on the targets. For example, audits to check that clinicians were ‘bare below the elbow’ 
were an indicator for hand hygiene targets. Moreover, the managers make decisions on what to add 
or remove to their service in order to avoid breaching a target. For example, adding a clinic or hiring 
a locum consultant in order to prevent patient delay beyond their allocated waiting time.  
 
“I mean I might have some extra patients that are about to breach a target and we need to set up an extra clinic 
to get them seen, so be booking the consultant” (I19, Service Delivery Manager, Surgery, AHSC)  
 
“I have a role to interpret the national drivers in the NHS for the staff on the ground so they understand where 
they fit in and what the expectation are of the service they deliver.” (B9, general manager, surgery, DGH) 
 
 
The majority of managers agreed with the chosen targets and believed them to be aligned with their 
self-imposed targets. They believed that targets have improved the quality of the NHS radically, 
resulting in patients being seen more promptly.  One reminiscent example of the pre-target system 
was of “a patient who had to wait for a haemorrhoid procedure for seven years on a waiting list”.  
The targets were also perceived to be, on the whole and resources allowing, achievable targets. 
However, a few managers highlighted constraints of specific targets as conflicting, impractical and 
eliciting misleading measures. For example, readmission rates may be inaccurate if a patient returns 
for a new and unrelated procedure or conflicting choices between Accident and Emergency waiting 
time targets or elective (non-emergency) waits. Finance targets and quality and safety related 
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targets were reported as unhelpfully at odds and in some cases where financial incentives for targets 
affects the incentive of running a safe service for patients. For example, discharging and readmitting 
a patient for a bronchoscopy would result in an additional £1000 income rather than providing the 
service while the patient is already in hospital: 
 
“I look at patient care and patient pathway and the best thing to do for the patient, if a patient is an inpatient 
and there is a procedure which needs to be done in order to finalize the diagnostics, which for example would be a 
bronchoscopy and I can do that for the patient as an inpatient and still have them discharged within the same 
time they would be anyway, you know see them on the ward on a Thursday afternoon with the respiratory team, 
possible lung cancer, TB, something…schedule a bronchoscopy for Friday morning, they’re still discharged by the 
end of the day on Friday which is the same as they would be otherwise and then I get them out.  The problem with 
that financially is that I then don’t get paid for the bronchoscopy because it’s part of an inpatient tariff and an 
inpatient stay, where if the team discharges the patient and brings them back on a Monday for the bronchoscopy, 
I then get a thousand pounds for the bronchoscopy.  So there is a bit of a problem…the PVR pay structure doesn’t 
necessarily support and encourage the best patient experience and patient care.” (I11, service manager, 
medicine, AHSC) 
 
“Eighteen weeks [target] only counts from point of treatment.  So you can be in the system for 18 months, until 
we treat you..They weren't cancelled on the day, so that's within 28 days; they were cancelled way ahead.  You 
can leave them to rot, as such..That is one of the pitfalls of 18 weeks.” (B7, general manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
 
8.3.1.3 Capacity demands 
Arguably the biggest demand placed on the middle managers in the present study is to sustain and 
improve the overall running of their service. In their reports, this service delivery covered all areas of 
the service: inpatients, outpatients and external services (e.g. home visits) as well as care-pathways 
beyond the acute care setting to the primary care Trusts.  Most spoke of overseeing a “smooth 
service” which comprised an array of managerial activities. Reported by almost all of the managers 
was to check correspondence between the number of beds, operating theatres and staff available 
with the number of incoming and waiting patients. To make such decisions, patient lists and notes 
are checked. Some tasks were delegated to administration staff, such as calling to cancel/rebook 
patients. While this part offers some choice to the manager, the managers must then, with 
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agreement from clinical colleagues, decide whether patient cancellations or re-scheduling is 
necessary, how to free up beds, amend places on operating lists or cancel patients. If the managers 
fail on coordinating a correspondence between capacity and patients, they will be held accountable 
to explain why they failed to their seniors. Also, a few managers reported that their choice of leaving 
such work to their administration staff was constrained by the lower competency level of some of 
their staff. Similarly, interviewees remarked that chasing disorganised clinical staff takes up their 
time. For example, if the consultant neglects to cancel a clinic, the manager has to step in. The 
difficulty of this managerial demand appears to be that there are shared duties and decisions that 
forces the managerial work to be dependent on others. 
 
“just organising clinics lists and we have a bed management role as well. So it's actually rota at the moment, 
which is myself and the other delivery managers, so I have..capacity meeting at 8 o'clock to see what electives are 
coming in for the day and check what your bed state is. So for instance today we have no beds and we have six 
electives coming in. Ward round will happen, we’ll see what discharges we get. It's not looking good so we may 
be looking at cancelling, and that’s kind of throughout the day.” (I12, service delivery manager, medicine, AHSC) 
 
 “I think it would be nice if we had a stronger admin support that we could delegate stuff to” (I19, Service Delivery 
Manager, Surgery, AHSC) 
 
 
The different managerial positions dictate slightly different capacity-related activities. In surgery for 
example, the theatre manager and service/operations manager start off with capacity planning on a 
Friday morning by reading the following weeks’ theatre timetables. They will close theatres that are 
not being used and offer them out to different specialties. Next they will review the previous week 
in terms of numbers of patients, both emergency and elective and decide on the pressures put on 
out-of-hours work if there is an increase in emergency procedures. They will also consider the range 
of skilled staff able to do the job. Elsewhere within surgery a service delivery manager may be 
setting up extra clinics whilst the general manager is making a calculated decision to overbook 
clinics.  
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Related to such capacity activities, many interviewees ensured that the right people (clinicians and 
patients) are in the right place (clinics, wards, operating theatres) at the right time (scheduled 
appointments), through staff rotaring, controlling staffing levels and skill mix and querying whether 
the patient is attending the correct clinic. 
 
“It’s managing the resources..I mean it’s coming back to that one-stop clinic element, I think that’s probably a key 
part of it.  Managing our resources in such a way that we can provide the capacity with the right people in it at 
the right time, so when patients are coming in they are able to get that imaging and get the results straight away. 
(I15, service delivery manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
“I would think that the service manager role and, sort of, line one on the job description, is to ensure that the 
services are managed so that patient care is delivered by the most appropriate person at the most appropriate 
time within agreed timescales and guidance.” (I6, service manager, medicine, AHSC) 
 
 
These capacity-related activities cut across specialty type and type of Trust and are unanimously 
reported to have a large influence on patient experience. Specific aspects reported to be impacted 
were patient cancellations; waiting or referral times to treatment; prioritisation of patients; length 
of patient stay; patient time with clinicians; and the gender mix on wards. Most of these could 
additionally result in or prevent potential deterioration of the patient. For example, avoiding patient 
cancellations and maintaining appropriate waiting times were said to avoid late diagnosis or 
treatment: 
 
 “in terms of patient experience, waiting times is very important..could potentially have an impact on their 
outcome if they have their treatment sooner rather than later” (I1, service manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
 “Going through all the data from the theatre department to see if the people we expect to come in have actually 
come in and they've gone and then the rebooking, any cancellations, unfortunately that often happens a lot more 
than we would want so we've then got to try and get the patient in quite quickly and before their symptoms 
deteriorate or before any other changes in the global presentation.” (I3, service manager, surgery, AHSC) 
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8.3.1.4 Demands to respond to Q&S failures 
When patients raise concerns or complain about the quality of the service they received, the duty of 
responding to and investigating the reasons for these complaints often falls on middle management. 
The managers are expected to deal with these complaints within a timeframe as they arrive formally 
as a written complaint and more informally via a Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) that logs 
and sends through complaints from a PALS officer or complaints coordinator. Patient complaints 
may comprise of concerns over the cleanliness of the clinical environment, the respect and dignity 
bestowed by staff, staff competency and waiting times. Managerial actions include collecting and 
collating statements and information from the relevant parties involved in the complaint. Speaking 
and listening to the complainant and writing, editing or approving responses. These responses can 
sometimes be initially written by the clinicians involved. Verbal correspondence with the patients 
aims to ameliorate their concerns, through apology, listening openly and explaining the situation. In 
this way, the manager acts as a mediator between the patient and the staff accused. After 
coordinating a response, the manager creates an action plan and decides whether further 
investigation is necessary. The type of complaints can vary by the manager’s position, for example 
ward based complaints can be addressed by the matron, whilst the general manager would pick up 
issues from outpatients, or on waits for surgery/appointments, etc.  
 
“one task can be complaints, so obviously I can be investigating complaints.  And I might have sent out emails and 
I might have been asking for statements and then once I get that back I’d be collating the information and writing 
the complaint letter.” (B1, general manager, medicine, DGH) 
“I spend a large amount of my time doing complaints. Probably the best of half an hour, 45 minutes, maybe an 
hour, three times a week doing complaints. But that's the validation of the final letters, that's not the time that's 
been spent on doing a complaint or seeing complainants sometimes or meeting consultants to talk about how we 
resolve complaints issues.” (B17, divisional manager, medicine, DGH) 
Incident investigation by the managers involved similar actions to those described for complaints - 
collating and collecting information to assess the root cause and attendance at incident/complaint 
resolution meetings. The emphasis in their reports on incidents was more on the investigations and 
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action plans that they are responsible for, and the writing comprised of writing up incident reports. 
Incidents are formally relayed to the managers via emails sent from an information systems (e.g. 
Datix) that can comprise of incident reports completed by staff. Like the capacity demands, 
addressing incidents and complaints is more reactive than proactive. 
 
“On the reactive side there’s things like responding to Datix incidents.  So, when members of staff, or anyone have 
put in concerns about clinical standards or clinical quality.  So we would investigate those and then write a report 
and feed that back, myself and the associate head of nursing that I’ve just mentioned, and ensure that those 
issues are addressed.” (I6, service manager, medicine, AHSC) 
 
 
The task of dealing with incidents and complaints is not a solitary one. They take a multi-disciplinary 
approach, sitting down with lead medical and nurse clinicians, a clinical governance manager and 
administrative staff to discuss the incident and to identify the patterns of complaints and propose 
actions.  
 
8.3.1.5 Demands to maintain clinical staff competency  
An indirect impact on quality and safety was from maintaining the competency of clinical and 
administration staff. The managers kept staff up-to-date with their mandatory training and 
development so that they remain competent at their work. The managers relay targets and 
standards to their staff, e.g. safeguarding or specialist commissioning standards. They further 
encourage clinical staff to continue with research, evidence-base practices, postgraduate courses, 
training and continued personal development. In addition organisational practices are taught to the 
staff, such as ward staff training on how to behave in different safety scenarios. These activities 
again, are not exclusive to middle management, as line-managers or ward nurses may also carry out 
acts of training supervision. Formal evaluation of staff competency, training and development is 
covered by annual appraisals and training reviews. Clinical performance is further monitored from 
clinical indicators that are exposed when managers review performance targets. Some aspects of 
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ensuring staff competency are informal, for example judgement of how well a staff member 
interacts with patients. This demonstrates that the demands placed on the manager to ensure the 
competency of staff comprise of a mixture of mandatory actions (e.g. official training reviews) and 
chosen activities (e.g. encouraging professional development). The demand is that the competency 
is maintained, which in turn maintains the safety of the patients and the quality of care they receive.  
 
“The first aspect is that we provide training and education for nurses, so that they’re aware of nutritional risk 
factors and how to identify patients at risk.” (B13, service manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
“Accountability, obviously, for each of my teams and ensuring their practice is competent practice, for their 
training and development for their understanding of workforce issues and management of their teams in 
appropriate qualifying policy procedure stuff.  So that’s for training and development and workforce management 
of the teams, in terms of operational management undertaking their roles.” (B12, service manager, medicine, 
DGH) 
 
“I think often people once they get into the role of actually delivering the care it's almost like the research and 
training, that continual personal development almost stops in some cases. And then unfortunately it comes down 
to managers or ward nurses or lead nurses trying to push that continuous professional development and we have 
annual appraisals and we try and do in year training reviews to encourage people to keep up to date with new 
evidence that's coming out..so you've got to keep highlighting to them that actually the information changes, the 
technology improves and patient’s requirements change so you need to keep getting that update.” (I3, service 
manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
8.3.1.6 Demands to disseminate monetary funds 
The managers all have varying budgets that they must allocate within their service 
(units/departments). Management have a choice on where to spend their finances on quality and 
safety, but they are required to resource certain aspects of their service, including: recruiting 
permanent, bank and agency clinical staff; purchasing equipment/medication; and making payments 
to fix the physical environment. In doing so they are held accountable for budget overspends and 
expected to write business cases for additional money required. Business cases are reports put to 
the Board to apply for funding or permission of changes. They demonstrate the need for a number 
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of quality and safety changes, such as required refurbishment, new equipment, additional staff, or a 
change in service (e.g. changing the order of patients’ port of calls). There are peer demands on 
much of the choice of where resources are allocated (e.g. a nurse required in a specific ward) and 
what equipment is needed. The manager discusses with clinicians why certain pieces of clinical 
equipment are necessary and are in charge of procuring the equipment. Some decisions are easier 
than others, e.g. replacing a broken patient alarm compared with purchase of the latest technology 
that could improve performance rates. In more tricky decisions, peer demands reduce and give way 
to higher managerial choice. Smaller decisions on low cost equipment are left to clinical staff, e.g. 
sisters to decide themselves. The managers also (sometimes in assisting ward managers) help check 
that equipment is available and withdraw equipment based on national safety alerts that notify 
incidents associated with the equipment.  
 
“So quality and safety are kind of expected, and I think the nurses and doctors are the guardians of it clinically, so 
I need to make sure they are in a position to put it first for patients and that they have the necessary resources to 
do their jobs. So if I do a good job then they can do a good job too.” (B9, general manager, surgery, DGH) 
 
 “if I don’t get them *clinical staff+ the right equipment it directly impacts the patients.” (B12, service manager, 
medicine, DGH) 
 
“If I've got members of staff that are working 70 hours a week just to get the job done then that's a quality and 
safety issue in itself. Because the level of the quality of the work they're going to be doing is definitely going to go 
down and safety is an aspect to them, so that work life balance as a manager that's really important. So in terms 
of how I monitor that I have regular one to ones with my team. Regular team meetings and regular appraisals as 
well. And objective setting so that we can see. And at the moment we're just building a business case to expand 
our team because we have taken more and more and more with one of the services. That's not sustainable for the 
staff that work in it as well.” (I20, Service Manager, surgery, AHSC) 
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8.3.2 Constraints  
 
This section refers to the constraints placed upon the managers’ quality and safety work that limit 
what the managers are able to do. This section presents how knowledge, research use, managerial 
power base, peer attitudes/perceptions, fire-fighting, work locations, information and resource 
limitations may constrain managers’ quality and safety work and their potential to engage in or 
influence quality and safety. 
 
8.3.2.1 Q&S Information access 
Information and information technology limitations were identified as constraining access to quality 
and safety indicators, tracking patients, and awareness and proactive analyses of adverse incidents 
reported. It especially hinders identification of problem areas/patterns of incidents. Poor 
information systems (e.g. Datix and Ikis where incidents and complaints are stored) are set up to 
deliver this information, along with poor data enclosed within them.  
 
Individual access was “cumbersome” and “convoluted” and in some instances fully reliant on others 
to send the managers the data. Once information is accessed, it can be out-of-date on systems, 
contain missing data or inaccurate or misleading quality indicators due to poor quality and coding 
from manual data entry errors.  Often the information is irrelevant to the service of the manager or 
entirely unrelated to quality and safety, for example personal computer breakdowns. Some 
managers argued that a centralised blanket approach did not allow for relevance at a specialty level, 
while others argued that patterns were difficult to identify as there was too much detail. Provision of 
quantitative data alone reduced the richness of the data that qualitative data could offer. 
Additionally, owing to a recent merger of hospitals within the teaching Trust, different systems were 
being used that were as yet unconnected. For this reason, the interviewees at the teaching Trust 
reference information access as a barrier to work far more than those at the DGH. 
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“it's the systems we use and the whole process seems quite cumbersome..I seem to be on email alert for every 
single area in cardiology, and I need to get that changed because most of the time it's got nothing to do with me, 
but I get an email alert the Datix come through, so generally I’ll read the briefing ‘patient fell and bumped her 
head on the ward’ not me, but certain things are my area, so ‘patient was meant to be picked up by transport at X 
time and transport didn’t pick them up until’ whatever time, they’re late, they missed appointment. I think people 
need a lot more training on the system to understand what actually needs to be on Datix and what doesn’t. 
There’s a hell of a lot which comes through which are not clinical incidents, it's just consultant moaning about 
their computers not working” (I12, service delivery manager, medicine, AHSC) 
 
“Information, lack of information, without a doubt [is a barrier]...for example, on dealing with quality and safety 
issues, I think my job here is not being able to access easily the information that you might need to help to arrive 
at a conclusion about something. So I’m thinking particularly..information around a number of incidents, that kind 
of thing.  I mean, we have [name+, who’s our Quality and Safety Coordinator, and she’s fabulous and helpful, and 
produces information and reports, but sometimes you just wanna be able to go and access things yourself.  And I 
think when you work in such a large organisation with so many systems, there’s so many different pieces of 
software, there’s Datix and Ikis and, you know, you name it.  So, yeah, that’s an absolute battle.  And then if you 
can, sort of, email the information team and ask them for this information, or whatever, and of course you have 
to wait for two or three days.  Information, it’s a nightmare, from a manager’s point of view…I mean, having 
more than one hospital number is a big Quality and Safety issue, it’s a big safety issue.  Having different systems 
on the [name] site, to this site, to the [name+ site, when you’re looking at patient records, is a big safety issue.” 
(I17, service manager, medicine, AHSC)  
 
8.3.2.2 Power and influence to improve Q&S 
On the topic of influencing change and decisions in quality processes and safety matters, the 
interviewees reported that they would rarely reward or reprimand clinicians, because it would be 
ineffective and uncomfortable. Instead they use their social skills to build relationships with their 
colleagues and present them with local evidence where possible. Evidence consisting of facts and 
figures showing improvement on clinical outcomes was particularly valued by clinicians as was 
evidence that their individual practices were under par, e.g. evidence showing that they have 
breached all of their four hour waits.  
 
 “I would not put pressure on people to do things differently if I hadn’t built up a relationship with them.  And 
therefore you should always really try and develop a relationship with people” (I18, general manager, surgery, 
AHSC) 
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“I show them.  I prove it to them.  Particularly consultants, their feeling for something is data; they like data.  With 
staff, it's physically showing them how things can improve.” (B7, general manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
Although the interviewees believed others to be happy with their level of competency on quality and 
safety (important competencies were recognised as knowledge of data analysis; and good 
organisation, communication and leadership skills, etc.), offering expertise on the topic was not 
referenced by the interviewees, in fact references to clinicians as the experts on clinical quality and 
patient safety was more common. In instigating big changes, a strategy was to call on consultants or 
senior management to assist as they hold more authority. The managers did not report to use their 
position of authority to influence.  
 
“to be honest, there's certain circles that they *consultants+ can push things into that I can't.” (B7, general 
manager, medicine, DGH)  
 
“I think a lot of the problems in this department have been quite longstanding.  We are going to higher levels and 
getting high level support to actually, to put forward the changes and the ideals we want to put in place.” (B3, 
head of service, medicine, DGH)  
 
“you try and change the small things that you can on a day to day basis you can change..you're just so restricted 
that you can't - I think some things are best not being on your radar sometimes because it just frustrates you that 
you can't actually action them.” (I20, service manager, surgery, AHSC)  
 
8.3.2.3 Peer clinician attitudes/perceptions 
Several managers raised concerns of how other staff view their work and intentions in quality and 
safety. Specifically, a barrier to their quality and safety work was that clinicians judged their 
intentions as solely finance driven. This particularly constrained managerial influence when 
approaching them on quality and safety targets. Interviewees described examples where clinicians 
have told the managers directly that they believe that the managers are more interested in keeping 
to budget and target than interested in the patient’s care or safety. The clinicians further see their 
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manager as a blockade to getting equipment or extra staff. Interestingly, these perceptions were 
reported by both managers with and without a clinical background, although a couple of managers 
regarded their previous position as a clinician within the organisation to diminish these negative 
stereotypes.  
 
“I think coming in as the manager often starts as a barrier which is always a big challenge because you come in 
and the immediate perception is well, we've seen managers come in before and you're only interested in one 
thing which is the finance so the first sort of hour of any conversation, often the first meeting is just about 
reassuring the person that you're seeing you're aiming for the same thing. you might not even get round to 
actually planning any changes or talking about safety” (I3, service manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
“it is sometimes difficult as people do not necessarily give high regard to NHS managers” (B16, general manager, 
surgery, DGH)  
 
“the other day we had an issue where we’re breaching on a particular target.  And the nurse that I was trying to 
understand why we were breaching, you know, explain your pathway to me so I can understand what’s going 
wrong, where I could help influence.  And she was saying ‘Yes but the difference is you’re a manager and you just 
want to meet the targets, whereas I’m the patient’s advocate.’..So I would say everything as a manager that we 
do is all about, should be all about improving the patient’s experience and that’s quality and safety. It’s a difficult 
barrier to overcome, because we are seen, and that was one of the big big things that I had to decide when I lost 
my matron role, I left my matron role… You get less respect as a manager.  And I’ve had to work really hard to 
prove to people that just because I’m a manager, that I’m not going to lose my basic core standards..that is what I 
would say for my job is the hardest, is, you know, to break down those barriers of what they, what they see us 
there for..or they see managers as the barriers to prevent them getting their brand new wizzy piece of kit that 
we’ll use once that cost £100,000.” (B1, general manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
In addition to misperceptions of managerial intentions, the clinicians’ resistance to change practices 
constrained the managers’ power to implement new safer procedures. The clinicians do not wish to 
change the way they have always practiced and disagree with fitting their work around certain 
targets, such as treatment within 18 weeks. One example given was reluctance by senior clinicians to 
count surgical swabs before and after surgery using a swab count board. More powerful than the 
managers protests was a safety error occurring (a swab left in a patient) that ultimately changed 
their practice.  Stories of safety errors have been used by managers to influence clinical staff. 
Doctors rather than nurses were most referenced as a barrier of managerial work, reportedly due to 
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their strict preferences, “ego” and difficulty to “pin down”. This was highlighted as an attempt to 
retain control by the clinicians over their area. 
 
“consultants ultimately do want to provide the best for the patients, but I think sometimes that can be clouded. 
And if that's getting clouded because somebody just wants to build a little empire then that's where I find it really 
difficult working in the NHS if you've got those bigger egos. Just play ball, just play nicely.” (I20, Service Manager, 
surgery, AHSC) 
 
“For some people, that's very difficult because they're very opposed to change and they're used to doing things.  
'This is how it's worked for 30 years.  Why should we change it? ' I believe don't change it if it's not broken.  Only 
change something that needs changing or is going to improve productivity or improve that patients lot.  So yeah, I 
just gnaw away at it a bit at a time.” (I4, service manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
8.3.2.4 Fire-fighting Q&S 
A large number of references described trouble shooting or “fire-fighting” in their role. In this 
context, the term fire-fighting depicts a response to a sudden or unforeseen circumstance that 
requires immediate attention in order for quality and safety to be maintained. A reactive rather than 
proactive approach was described when dealing with impromptu matters such as patient 
complaints, adverse incidents, missing information, capacity problems or unexpected issues that 
may have an adverse impact on quality. In the same vein, post rather than pre-emptive work on 
safety was highlighted, for example, incidents picked up after they occur results in retrospective re-
tracing of the error pathway to establish the cause. 
 
“more often than not it’s very responsive, so there’s a lot of things that go wrong, a lot of troubleshooting.” (I13, 
service delivery manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
“A working week? For me personally, it’s a lot of, kind of, fire-fighting, to make sure the lists go ahead, to try and 
avoid patient cancellations, making sure the staffing is adequate, keeping rotas up-to-date. That probably 
dominates most of the time and that creates a lot of fairly unproductive periods where you’re just ringing around 
trying to get stuff sorted, without actually having much of an impact” (I19, Service Delivery Manager, Surgery, 
AHSC) 
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 “I think historically a lot of it has come up to me after an incident has happened, it's a shame that we pick it up 
either through datix incidents or adverse incident reporting. So if  a patient has been in theatre and the wrong 
image was uploaded and the procedure couldn't be done and the patient had already been anaesthetised or 
something like that, then it'll come back to me as an incident that needs reporting. I'll have to walk backwards 
through the pathway to see at which point the image was uploaded and what mechanisms are in place to check 
that it's the right image, whether it's the right files etc, the right information. So those are usually the ways that I 
get involved..It's more retrospective, yeah. And I think we'd like to do it more prospectively.” (I3, service manager, 
surgery, AHSC) 
 
 
Most managers spoke of how constant fire-fighting reduced their capacity or “head space” to spend 
time on developing services, strategic planning or systems thinking, and identify the root cause of 
systemic problems. Spending more time on proactive strategic planning for QI would address some 
of the issues on which they have to ‘fire-fight’.  
 
“In an ideal world if your processes were sorted and your capacity actually matched your demands then actually 
you would be spend a lot more time doing service development and improving the services that you manage 
rather than sort of fire-fighting and dealing with the same issues over and over again because you don’t have 
enough time to actually implement a process that would actually resolve it.” (I1, service manager, surgery, DGH) 
 
“There are conflicts between reactive things and things that are more strategic and that’s why other things do get 
put to the bottom of the list, you know, whether that’s business continuity plans and those things..you’re then set 
targets from above almost to say, ‘this must be done by this month,’ which I think you need some time for those 
longer term planning things otherwise you do just react to all the day-to-day things.” (B6, general manager, 
surgery, DGH) 
 
8.3.2.5 Resource limitations  
Held accountable for the financial side of quality through targets and penalised for not achieving 
them, the subject of finance was considered to be a contentious issue, especially due to the poor 
current economical state of the NHS and imminent governmental fund withdrawals. A perpetual 
balancing act between money and quality was often expressed as weighing up the trade-off 
between financial expenditure and quality assurance. Mental cost-benefit analysis aided decisions 
on whether the managers would opt for patient safety or cost savings in certain instances. Decisions 
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made to save money were defended by the acknowledgment that the short term saving will result in 
better patient safety/quality at a later stage or best for the greater good of all patients.  
 
“I think as a manager you have to weigh up, it’s always to be that compromise isn’t it, or you always feel 
sometimes you’re being asked to compromise between finances and patient safety..I don’t have an infinite pot of 
money.  So you might be faced with an issue that is very difficult to come to a decision, because you know if you 
make the right decision you’re going to probably take that out of service.  And because I know I’ve got to hit 18 
weeks, I know the impact that that’s going to have..for me, I had the conflict between what is safe for the 
patients but also trying to continue offering a service.” (B1, general manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
“I mean, clearly one could say there’s probably a, there could be conflict between the financial resource, pressures 
and targets that I have to deliver and the quality..if somebody said there is a quality issue and they say, ‘we need 
this to solve it,’ and I say, ‘well we haven’t got that to solve it, what can we do?’” (B11, divisional manager, 
surgery, DGH)  
 
The limited resources result in managers being constrained in provision of staff, procurement of 
equipment, providing maintenance for the clinical environment and implementation of innovative 
ideas for improvement. Resource limitations also affected managerial achievement of targets, for 
example, restricted space available for incoming patients and inadequate theatre space reduced 
rates of clinical activity. The limited resources were described as “demoralising” whilst noting that 
“quality costs”.   
  
“yes, everything we do should be about improving patient care and the quality and safety and the environment 
that we work in, but because again the resource constraint we are under it's not something that is particularly 
done, but yes, if we did have more of a formalised almost dictate around what we, as managers, should be 
doing.” (I12, service delivery manager, medicine, AHSC) 
 
“there is always a tension in this type of job where you're judged and managed on targets and money, in being 
able to balance that because quality inevitably can cost significant amounts of money and you need to be able to 
get that balance right, that you live with that level of integrity with what you do.” (B17, divisional manager, 
medicine, DGH) 
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8.3.2.6  Work locations   
At the larger Trust (AHSC), managers often worked between three hospital sites, up to half an hour 
away from one another. They reported this to restrict their time in clinical areas in order to build 
relationships with clinicians and be better informed of quality and safety issues as they arise. The 
managers who are office-based often complained of hopping between hospitals within their Trust. 
Spending two days in one hospital and three days in another would not be uncommon and this 
would vary week-to-week. At the smaller Trust, their physical location was emphasised more as a 
positive in conducting their work and building relationships with clinicians, as they were positioned 
closer to the wards and surgery. This constraint was not mentioned as frequently as the other 
limitations, however, the managers repeatedly reported their wish to spend more time in clinical 
areas. 
 
“The problem working across three sites is that sometimes you're just the person on the site.  If [manager name] 
minds the [inaudible] surgery, he's at [hospital name] and there's an issue here, I will necessarily back fill.  So I 
would like to spend a bit more time on that aspect.” (I8, service manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
“We've got to cancel 120 patients in two weeks with nowhere to put them back at present.'  So as a department I 
think we work quite closely.  I think geographically that helps because we're all on the same floor.  The one area I 
always have concerns about is fracture clinic because it's on B floor and working there myself, you do sometimes 
feel there is a separation between you and orthopaedics, because the geographical separation, I think you get 
that mental separation as well.” (B7, general manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
8.3.2.7 Q&S Knowledge, research & training 
The managers generally understood the definition of quality of care and patient safety. Yet some 
interviewees were unsure whether some tasks would be eligible as a quality issue and at times 
confused patient safety with staff health and safety. A significant number of managers admitted that 
they would like to improve their knowledge of quality and safety and would particularly welcome 
training that specifically looks at this subject in relation to their work.  Those that had knowledge on 
the topic, for example on QI tools, learnt it elsewhere such as on a Masters course. Limited training 
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was afforded to the managers, aside from annual training in which only a small part referred to 
patient safety if at all. Those that took the managerial graduate scheme also complained of lack of 
such content. Similarly, little self research was conducted on quality and safety, especially on 
scientific information available (e.g. journal reading), even though they wished to. Managers often 
cited that they would rely on their clinical governance/patient safety coordinator or clinical 
colleagues for quality-related information. The other most common cited places managers learn 
about quality and safety are from national guidance/drivers and alerts, often from the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) or National Institute for Health & Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidance, 
and from on-the-job experience.  Other sources mentioned included: HSJ (Health Services Journal 
magazine), internet search engines, the Department of Health website, the intranet, and networking 
with other organisations. Due to the lack of research, managers again mostly rely on clinicians for 
evidence based best practices, although some described collecting evidence when writing business 
cases. 
 
”I probably wouldn’t unless I was doing a business case on something..Or if, for example, we were looking at a 
new piece of equipment” (B6, general manager, surgery, DGH)  
 
“To be honest there’s probably more I could do in terms of looking at literature and being made aware of what’s 
being done from a research point of view.  It is an operational job so you kind of deal with the issues as they arise 
rather than perhaps being as proactive about implementing new things as you’re made aware of them.” (I15, 
service delivery manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
“I think actually within the middle management there is a need to have further education and training” (I1, 
service manager, surgery, DGH) 
 
Trust or service-specific information was preferred to academic findings, as local data on safety 
issues and risk assessment were perceived as more important and relevant than empirical 
generalised findings. This may be why the interviewees at the teaching Trust offered no increased 
reports of research use than the DGH.  
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“Being an academic in health sciences we should have access to more sort of research and resources and experts I 
suppose on the field. But I think it's a bit harder to sort of find it which is always a bit of a surprise. You just expect 
you should be able to find a Professor of something somewhere to help you address that and deal with it. But I 
don't think that the AHSCs have started to really deliver that sort of bench to bedside sort of research and 
implementing it quickly to support staff” (I3, service manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
“If you want to go down to the real nitty gritty, sort of the academic side of the patient safety and the different 
bits of research that *Professor’s name+ and the team are doing then you don’t need to get involved in that sort of 
thing to run it [a service], but you need to know where your risks are within the service if things don’t work 
and..make sure that those are being managed and being looked at regularly” (I15, service delivery manager, 
surgery, AHSC) 
 
A related constraint was that those without clinical backgrounds may not be as well suited as those 
with a clinical background to providing necessary knowledge on patient safety and in challenging 
issues on the topic. However, some perceived that those with a managerial background would have 
a better understanding of QI, systems and of “the bigger picture”.  
 
“I think there is always more that you can learn and actually being a non-clinical manager is probably quite a lot 
that I don’t know or that I wouldn’t necessarily perceive as being an issue. I mean, you can make assumptions 
about patient experience and that type of thing but in terms of clinical, specific clinical pathways and processes 
that are here, I wouldn’t have the knowledge to be able to question whether it was the best process or the best 
pathway for the patient to be on or the best method for, so if the consultant does a particular thing in a particular 
way I wouldn’t be best placed to challenge it, as I wouldn’t have that knowledge and I don’t think that I could 
learn that without becoming a clinician.” (I1, service manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
 
8.3.3 Choices  
This factor refers to the choices that the manager’s job offers on which quality and safety work is 
done, how it is done and when it is done. Part of this freedom of choice is job-determined and part 
of it belongs to the managers own choice to focus on certain work at the expense of other work on 
quality and safety. This section identifies key managerial activities that have been disclosed either as 
an activity that is an optional added extra to their work, that they wish to but do not spend time on, 
that they may or may not carry out without consequence or that is often delegated to their 
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employees. These are: volunteering for quality improvement initiatives, identifying patterns of 
quality and safety, changing processes and systems and planning long term strategies to improve 
quality, and creating the right patient safety culture. The section begins by considering the 
proportion of time that is spent on quality and safety work as a whole and the choices indicated by 
this.  
 
8.3.3.1 Time spent on Q&S work activities  
Managers’ reports varied on how much time they spent on quality and safety as a whole. Time spent 
ranged from very little to all of the time. These included those that said that they spent a lot of their 
time or that their job was underpinned by quality and safety, and those that conceded that they did 
not spent a lot of time on quality and safety or that it was indirect or inadequate time spent. Of 
those that gave percentages of their time, all were less than half of their time. The rest avoided 
answering the question, as they pointed out that it is difficult to judge how much time they spend 
because it is integrated into general work activities. However, many implied that quality and safety 
underpinned their job and accountabilities, and although a huge proportion of their time is spent on 
human resources and finance, the managers gave many examples where they spent significant 
amounts of time on quality and safety matters. Those that reported spending very little time, 
believed it was an issue more relevant to clinical staff and reported delegating much of the work or 
being accountable for it rather than playing an active role in the tasks related to it.  
 
“I think a considerable amount of time.  Because the reason why we’re trying to develop those processes is so we 
improve the patient experience” (I13, service delivery manager, surgery, AHSC)  
 
 “I don’t think a lot of time is spent every day because, I would say, measures are in place to ensure that risks and 
any incidents and things don’t happen.” (B13, service manager medicine, DGH)  
 
“It’s an area that does overlap massively between everyone’s responsibilities, because obviously, the lead clinician 
is responsible overall for the clinical quality of the service, but as the service manager you’re responsible for the 
overall quality of service” (I16, service manager, medicine, AHSC)   
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The managers articulated that, on quality and safety work, they would like to spend more time on 
strategic planning, creating the right culture, visiting clinical areas and building clinical staff 
relationships. At the same time they appealed that they would like to spend less time chasing others, 
doing other people’s work for them and on trouble shooting. This can be interpreted as a need to 
spend more time on proactive forward-planning tasks rather than reactive ad hoc tasks. The desired 
activities are clearly ones where the managers have more choice in whether they are undertaken or 
not and those that they wish to spend less time on appear to be a mixture of constraints and 
demands. 
 
8.3.3.2 Q&S Improvement initiatives & changing systems & processes 
A number of managers said they had been involved in a QI initiative in some way. Here, a QI 
initiative refers to an intervention introduced within the hospital that aims specifically to improve 
outcomes of care often by applying continuous QI techniques to change processes, structures and 
systems.[277] Of those who were involved in the QI initiatives, more volunteered themselves for the 
role, as opposed to a fewer number that said they were expected to be involved as it is part of their 
job, although in the latter case delegated much of the work.  The managers can decide when and 
where to improve their service suggested from their own evaluation that they may choose to carry 
out. 
 
They would participate or project lead the intervention, comprising activities of creating a project 
plan, deciding on who was involved, putting together a project board/team, identifying work stream 
leads, and ensuring that the project team was representative of everybody that was going to be 
involved in that pathway in order to increase the buy-in. Review of patient experience trackers and 
survey results, process mapping and reviewing a care pathway were activities to identify where 
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changes were needed. Indeed, streamlining care pathways or re-configuring services were 
frequently referenced by the interviewees. This has included anything from changing how patients 
register to physically redesigning whole clinical areas to improve efficiency of service. Care pathways 
that the managers intended to change were not only contained to the hospital; pathways between 
the hospital and Primary Care Trusts (PCT) were also referenced.  
 
“We do that in our pathway analysis as well, which we regularly review through just the processes to ensure that 
the patients are being seen as effectively as they can be.  And we'll go back and dissect it and say, 'Well, this 
patient waited four hours.  What went wrong?'  So insofar as that, that's more quality than, I suppose, safety in 
the pathway..we introduced a patient transit system.” (I7, service delivery manager, medicine, AHSC)  
 
“I'm not saying it's me personally, but we've just completely changed the pathway.  So we have now these one-
stop clinics.  So as opposed to the patients coming, new patient, have to come in another day for a flexible 
cystoscopy, another day for a follow up, they now come in and have everything done on one morning.  So you only 
have one appointment to the hospital.  Diagnosed on the same day; you're not waiting around so the treatment's 
a lot quicker.  So I would say that is an example of being directly involved in quality.” (I8, service manager, 
surgery, AHSC)  
 
 “I’m responsible for the waiting times targets for cancer, so I spend quite a bit of time working with the tracking 
team, looking at how patients are progressing through their pathway.  And one of the things that we’re trying to 
do at the moment is move that on from being about reporting whether a patient’s breached or not, and we’re 
trying to implement a process where if we think there looks something odd about a patient’s pathway, is 
contacting the lead clinician for that tumor group or that clinical area and saying, ‘We can provide you with some 
information on this patient’s pathway.  Would you please be able to discuss it in your M&M meetings?  We’re 
happy to either, come along and facilitate that discussion or we can hand over the information to you.” (B14, 
general manager, surgery, DGH)  
 
Named improvement projects included implementing a new prescribing system to better improve 
scheduling, an in-house recovery project, changing referrals, and amending quality score cards so 
that indicators more relevant at a specialty level. Other already research-established or hospital 
approved QI programmes were introduced, such as ‘Productive Ward/Theatres’, a choose and book 
system, pre-assessment clinics, a new surgical innovation centre, and a one-stop shop (same day 
investigations and discharge or date for surgery). Much of this work requires the manager to allocate 
resources, for example purchasing a registration ticket machine to avoid queuing at reception. In 
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addition to specific improvement projects as described, procedures, policies and processes are 
changed by the managers, sometimes in the form of creating standard operating procedures (SOPs):  
 
“I’ve written and implemented certain policies to do with nutrition for the trust; the malnutrition screening policy 
and the protected meal times policy, and there are tasks identified in there that the nurses are responsible for, as 
well as myself and my team.” (B13, service manager medicine, DGH) 
 
“it was declared as a Serious Untoward event, we sat down as a group, we’ve investigated it, and we’ve now 
written some very strong Standard Operating Procedures” (B1, general manager, medicine, DGH)  
 
 
8.3.3.3 Strategic planning for Q&S  
Strategic planning was not entirely optional for the managers but holds much more choice than their 
other work. Whilst many managers referenced strategy for quality improvement as an aspect of 
their job, they admitted that their work around quality and safety was more operational (e.g. 
capacity management demands previously described) and less strategic (e.g. forward visions on how 
to improve overall systems), despite believing that operational and strategic planning should be 
equal within their jobs. There were a few cases describing a balance between the two; but more 
complained that strategic work took a backseat. 
 
In anticipatory planning, the managers use existing data to identify the issues of the service and 
make changes corresponding to concerns raised. The choice afforded to the pre-emptive action may 
explain reports of insufficient actions on risks. However, the managers made a great number of 
references to the act of learning from incidents.  
 
“I think it goes back to the point that I made previously, that we will often identify quality and safety things and 
implement risk assessments or screens or things to prevent, to ensure that patients are safe and needs get 
identified, but those things don’t always get carried out.” (B13, service manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
“I take spot checks on monthly or quarterly basis and I'll look at a week's worth of all the incident reports that 
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come through to get a flavour of the quality, the types of incidences..So whereas I might not start off the agenda 
on a meeting say what are our safety and quality issues, I will identify issues that we're specifically focusing on. So 
pressure areas and falls would be our highest incidents.” (B17, divisional manager, medicine, DGH) 
 
“I will look at the maternity clinical metrics dashboard..we don’t look at metrics in isolation; we look at them in 
combination.  So, for example, we look at the relationship between instrumentation rates and caesarean section 
rates.  So, for example,  and I can show you real examples of this, I will look at that and I will say, ‘The benchmark 
the Clinical Director has set, and the team, is six of these, like third and fourth degree tears, based on whatever 
evidence, and we’ve got eight.’  So I’ll say, as Divisional Manager, ‘Why have we got eight, what’s happening?’  
But I look at activity as well and I can look at the midwifery ratios.” (B10, divisional manager, medicine, DGH)   
 
Those in higher middle management positions carried out more strategic planning, possibly moving 
this factor towards demand rather than choice status, especially as attendance is required at 
strategic meetings for most of the managers. Yet, managers in all positions wanted to undertake 
more strategic work. 
  
“I think the way the job role is designed and even though it was advertised it was very much a responsive way and 
I think a lot of sort of operational management roles are often designed to be responsive. But my interest is very 
much in strategy, creating things, designing things. And I think that probably comes from my background of being 
a graphic designer and solving problems. So I'm always looking to solve them not just for today but for next time 
and the future so that once we've designed something that works people don't have to panic about problems 
occurring..sometimes it feels quite unique. I'd love to do more of it and I think the ways some of the roles are 
designed they're just very separate. But I think they need to have a bit more of an overlap otherwise you can't 
really do anything.” (I3, service manager, surgery, AHSC) 
 
8.3.3.4 Creating a good patient safety culture  
Creating a patient safety culture was an additional role referenced by a few managers. Some 
managers believed it to be a key part of their job, but one that is not appraised by others. As such, 
there is a lack of concrete requests and evaluation of the safety culture, possibly because it is 
difficult to measure.  The activities most referenced was building an open safety culture through 
encouraging incident or near miss reporting. This is mostly carried out by the managers during 
meetings with clinicians for incidents, where the manager educates staff on both the importance of 
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errors and their responsibility to report them. The managers aim to create a no-blame culture by 
providing examples of similar events that resulted in patient care improvement where no one was 
punished. Also the managers avoid asking who made the mistake but still ensure lessons can be 
learned so that it doesn’t happen again. To ensure learning is sustained managers introduce incident 
case studies and reporting procedures into training.  
 
 “I don't really want to know who made the mistake; I just want to put something there to stop it happening again 
because the sheer quantity of work leads to error.  It's human error and you would expect a certain percentage of 
errors amongst the large amount of productivity that goes on there.  So no, I try to have a no-blame culture, just, 
'Let's put it right and let's not see it happen again.” (I4, service manager, medicine, DGH)  
 
“if there’s been an incident, I think it’s really important to encourage the staff to complete an incident form and 
sit with them and go through it, or if there’s been a PALS issue, to say, you know, ‘Let’s sit down, let’s talk about 
this.  Let’s get the patient in, let’s get the relatives in.  Let’s have an open and honest discussion about this.’  So 
they can start to see that that’s what’s important within your management remit.” (B14, general manager, 
surgery, DGH) 
 
Other activities reported were to add patient safety to meeting agendas to increase its profile, to 
respond seriously to reported safety issues themselves, and to provide feedback on bad outcomes to 
staff. However, a couple of managers highlighted that they perhaps do not spend much time on 
creating the right culture.  
 
“I see part of my role is to get the patient safety and quality on the agenda so that actually it’s embedded as part 
of the culture of what people see as important where the decisions are taken” (B10, divisional manager, medicine, 
DGH)   
 
 “I think I should spend more time developing the culture of the service, but it seems there is no time for this.” 
(B16, general manager, surgery, DGH)  
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8.3.4 Additional reflections on interviews  
In addition to what systematically emerged from the dataset, three more discoveries shone out from 
across the 36 interviews. These are inferences gained from managers’ responses at interview and 
from variations across the interviews rather than from their explicit self-reports. These were: the 
wide variation in the extent to which the interviewees considered patient safety as relevant to their 
work; their perceived limited choices to act out their appropriate parts in quality and safety; and 
their restricted power to make changes for quality improvement.   
 
Whilst the job positions of the middle managers differed, the variations in which they considered 
patient safety as relevant to their work was not due to divergence of specialist area, job title or 
Trust. In contrast to Mintzberg’s early suppositions, Stewart would make a case here that managers’ 
work is more varied than not and that it is these variations that inform us most about the manager’s 
job. The present study dataset indicates an inconsistency of opinions, choices or understanding of 
where and how much managers should be performing activities for patient safety. This suggests 
some ambiguity associated with the patient safety work required of managers at this level. The 
interviewees, sometimes unwittingly, revealed a particular detachment of their work from patient 
safety, because they are not in direct contact with patients and thus felt it was the job of the 
clinicians. In a few cases, the interviewers were asked by the interviewee whether their examples 
and points fit into the categories of patient safety or quality of care, illustrating some ambiguity of 
what actually is covered in quality and safety, despite being able to define it conceptually. In spite of 
this, some managers saw all their activities as potentially impacting on quality of care. This is likely 
due to the broad definition of quality of care, which offers another reason why quality was discussed 
more frequently and easily than the more specific topic of patient safety.  
 
There were also notable variations within the choices that managers perceived themselves to have 
in improving quality and safety. The interviews collectively reveal that managers must have more 
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flexibility in their choices, because others in the same positions describe engaging in them. This 
indicates that managers possibly underrate their choices and ascribe certain activities as demands 
that in reality are choices made by the managers themselves. Questions then that arise from our 
findings are whether or not the demands are demands at all and whether the choices being made 
are decided on perceived importance to themselves or to their seniors. That is, other factors may 
determine a choice to be misperceived as a demand. Time (often mentioned as a constraint) might 
be a variable that restricts the opportunity for individual managers to take up certain activities over 
others. Prioritisation for quality of care appeared genuine, which suggests that the choices that they 
make are less likely to result from their personal preferences than from a misunderstanding of their 
options to choose, or from other pressure sources. Among peers, comparisons of work activities are 
likely to focus on daily tasks that have visible short-term impact or tangible outputs, bearing less 
pressure on long-term improvements. The most noticeable choice made was between managers 
that spent more time on strategy than those that spent more time on responding to daily issues. 
Whilst there was a common pattern that those higher in the organisational hierarchy had more of a 
strategic role, strategy also manifested more amongst those that had a certain style of managing or 
unique professional background.  
 
Stewart suggests that variation of choice can exist from the extent to which change within the 
manager’s unit is possible. A number of constraints were identified to contribute to a limited power 
to lead and change quality and safety, including poor data access, financial constraints, conflicting 
targets, reactive work and opinions from clinical staff that the manager’s chosen actions are always 
finance-driven. The latter may expose a deeper issue of power balance between management and 
clinicians, above and beyond their work on quality and safety, particularly as the interviews imply 
that clinicians do not easily follow the manager’s directives.  The manager’s organisational position 
may be held accountable, because the organisational hierarchy does not place managers in a 
position of superiority above the clinicians.  
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8.4 Discussion  
Crucially the findings of this study have highlighted that hospital middle managers have a part to 
play in the day-to-day preservation of quality and patient safety and in its improvement. There was a 
distinct variability of how big a part the managers played in quality and safety. This may be due to 
illustrations of ambiguity of what it comprises, which in turn results from the broad definition of 
quality of care. This ambiguity however is unlikely to explain why quality was discussed more 
frequently and easily than patient safety, instead it appears that the detachment materialises from 
the distance of managers to patients in terms of the patients’ care. Nevertheless, all of the managers 
detailed a great amount of daily actions that impact directly and indirectly on quality and safety. The 
managers often described their main responsibility as ensuring that staff and patients are in “the 
right place, at the right time” and making sure care is delivered “in the right way, by the right 
people”; phrases that have had much use in the quality literature as the fundamental tenets of 
quality of care.[315, 316] The managers’ part in this involved demands to address patient 
complaints, waiting times and maintain capacity ratios between beds/theatres/staff and patients.  
These demands were reported as having a direct impact on patient experience. This has relevant 
implications at a time when the government are both threatening the existence of middle managers 
and demanding a focus on patient experience.[113] Our interviewees also reported an important 
impact on the clinical environment, processes and systems and care pathways, identification of 
patterns of error, and on maintaining a culture of openness for safety. However, these were 
indicated as a choice rather than a demand, most likely due to their intangible action-outputs. This is 
important when considering strong assertions that system changes and safety culture creation is an 
important role of managers.[145, 147] Our study identified managerial displays of commitment and 
demonstrations of a no-blame culture through promotion of open communications, responding to 
reported safety issues and feedback of safety-related information to staff. These behaviours have 
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been suggested as essential by management in determining safety culture,[142] and encouraging an 
open communication has been specifically advocated for middle managers.[100]  
 
The demand for staff competency was also raised as a more indirect impact on quality and safety, 
from benefits gained by competent staff appropriate skill mix and numbers, in minimizing 
administration errors and offering the right equipment. Competency, development and staff 
numbers have been shown to affect patient safety and outcomes.[317, 318] 
 
Despite an often finance and target driven role, the managers reported a genuine and strong priority 
of patient care over finance, in line with literature suggesting that hospital managers value quality 
over finance.[319] They also described the challenging decisions that they have to make when 
considering quality in light of financial resources available. Limited resources is commonly noted to 
considerably constrain a manager’s decisions and actions.[320] Some managers in our study 
revealed that looking at the ‘bigger picture’ was not always fully understood by clinical staff and 
described the misconceptions that they believe managers are preoccupied with targets and money. 
Whilst clinicians may accept that a manager’s role is to provide resources for quality, they can view it 
as an unbalanced concentration on finance.[321] This is particularly important as the manager-
clinician relationship is crucial to patient care. Our interviewees identified clinical staff as one of the 
primary professions with whom they worked with on quality and safety issues, describing a variety 
of shared duties and decision-making on incidents/complaints, capacity/booking and 
resource/equipment allocation. The clinicians additionally provided managers with knowledge and 
evidence-base on quality and safety. Clinicians have been identified to use more research and 
evidence-base than managers.[210, 214] The interviewees conceded that they rarely carry out 
research on best practice and expressed that they would like the time to do more research, but that 
it is not part of their remit or demands. Besides conversations with their clinical colleagues, our 
interviewees mostly learnt about safety and quality from on-the-job learning and governmental 
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body guidance, such as NICE and the NPSA. Unfortunately, the government has decommissioned the 
NPSA, which will affect advice for management in the UK. The vast majority of managers in our study 
said that they would like to improve their knowledge on quality and safety. Although they felt well-
equipped with their personal competencies, they expressed an interest in further training on quality 
and safety, including learning on improvement tools and techniques. Training opportunities were 
shown to be either unavailable, unknown or difficult to attend due to time and work commitments.  
 
Our study found that although managers valued local evidence over scientific evidence base, their 
local data was difficult to source. Both data access and use were described as barriers for them to 
engage appropriately with safety issues within their service. Difficulty in accessing patient-safety 
related data were attributed to poor information systems and poor quality and coding of the data. 
This in turn may constrain data analysis to understand where problems lay, identified as one of the 
primary competencies listed by the interviewees as valuable for quality and safety work at their 
level.  
 
The managers use an interpersonal approach to influence and instigate change. They rarely 
described using their position to influence. Theories on power would suggest that they display 
‘referent’ power (that is power owed to charm and interpersonal skills used to build relationships) 
and little ‘position’ power (owed to their position of authority).[71, 76, 235]  
 
The operational nature of the job of a middle manager often emerged as reactive. Blame was 
apportioned to constant trouble shooting and impromptu events and a consequential reduction in 
their capacity to strategically plan and make changes to system and processes in order to achieve 
long term quality improvement. It is important here to be clear that this is not to say that the middle 
managers in our study were not involved in system change and quality improvement activities; many 
of the activities that the managers engaged in intended to improve quality and safety over time. 
 190 
These comprised of reviews and analyses of patient safety data in order to identify patterns leading 
to errors and quality inefficiencies, writing business cases for innovative improvement ideas, writing 
standard operating procedures, ensuring an open culture for reporting, leading or participating in 
improvement initiatives, risk assessments and measuring quality and safety. However, the managers 
were involved far less than they were involved in responding to impromptu events and involved far 
less than they wanted to be. The managers conveyed that if they had the option they would engage 
more in pre-emptive activities. This finding is most representative of Mintzberg’s managerial role of 
the ‘disturbance handler’.[43, 47] Certainly, handling disturbance is an important role to play, 
without management intervening to act as an independent mediator on complaints and incidents or 
in managing an inadequate ratio of consultants to patients, patients would be on the receiving end 
of a poorer service and one that may result in avoidable harm. However, in playing the part of the 
disturbance handler over other parts, a detrimental constraint on forward planning occurs, as 
perceived by the managers in this study, which may hold important implications for the contribution 
that is asked of the middle manager towards sustainable improvement.  
 
8.4.1 Limitations 
The findings of the work and perceived relevance on quality and safety are likely to be biased to 
some extent as they are predominantly based on managers’ own accounts of their actions and 
contributions. Research now needs to ascertain whether others in the organisation share the 
managers’ views on their role, impact and influence on quality and safety. Inferences based on the 
managers’ accounts determined whether managerial work activities were depicted as a demand or a 
choice; a final stage of confirmation/amendment of the framework with the interviewees would 
have helped to substantiate these assertions. Lastly, the choice of middle managers was challenging 
due to variations in job titles, organisational positions and perceptions held on who is a true middle 
manager. Incorrect choices were mitigated by strict inclusion criteria and confirmation from others 
in acute care.  
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8.4.2 Conclusion  
The findings show that acute care middle managers play an important role in the day-to-day 
preservation of quality and patient safety and in its improvement.  This Chapter details specific 
quality and safety-related work activities, their demands, constraints and choices and impact on 
patient experience, service efficiency and error prevention. Implications of limited research use and 
evidence-based practice on quality and safety and modest position power combined with poor 
access to relevant data, financial constraints, conflicting targets, reactive work and negative staff 
perceptions, may hamper managerial influence of quality and safety. Facilitators would be easy 
access to accurate and relevant quality-related incident data and training alongside clarity of role 
and demands for preventative approaches. 
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CHAPTER 9 - THE DAILY ROLE & ROUTINE OF MIDDLE MANAGERS IN 
QUALITY & SAFETY: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous exploratory interview study that examined the role of middle managers in quality and 
patient safety in Chapter 8 offered insight into managers’ general activities pertaining to quality and 
safety, their demands and choices and potential impact. It additionally identified how they learn 
about quality and safety, variations on time spent, and the part played by relevant contextual 
factors. Next a quantitative study is required in order to confirm and quantify these findings with a 
bigger sample population to draw statistical significance and use theory to explain what roles the 
managers play and what influence they have in quality and safety. The interviews specifically 
identified constructs of managerial power and work roles relevant to those proposed by Mintzberg’s 
(1973) managerial roles and French & Raven’s (1959) power bases, both well-established within the 
fields of social sciences and management.[43, 76] This Chapter describes a survey study that has 
utilised the categories offered by the interviews to answer a set of specific aims that could not be 
sufficiently answered at interview. 
 
9.1.1. Research questions & aims 
The research questions are: (i) How and how much do middle managers attend to quality and 
patient safety? and (ii) What is the potential of middle managers to influence quality and safety? 
 
In order to answer these research questions, I aim to identify and quantify: 
 
 How much time middle managers report to spend on quality and safety 
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 Where and how often middle managers learn about quality and safety (raised by the 
interviews as important) 
 The work activities of middle managers in quality and safety and how often they engage in 
them, and use Mintzberg’s managerial roles to identify what roles these activities comprise  
 The power that middle managers have in quality and safety, and use French & Raven’s 
framework of powerbases to categorise types of power 
 Which variables predict higher patient safety attitudes/actions 
 
9.2 Methodology 
 
9.2.1 Survey design 
Survey design considerations were made based on the tailored design method cited by Dillman et al 
(2009) [322]. The considerations specifically made for this study are presented in Table 15 and 
actions to minimise each survey error is provided in Table 16. 
 
There is no clear empirical agreement on which provides a better response rate between web mail 
and air mail surveys. Some indicate that they can produce comparable rates [323] and others 
suggest that air mail provides a bigger response rate.[324] As the time and cost implications for 
distributing airmail surveys are a lot higher than web mail surveys and because the survey 
population of middle managers use email at work on a daily basis, the primary version of survey 
distribution was decided to be in online form. However, a hardcopy version of the survey was also 
offered to those who preferred. 
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Tailored Design Considerations Associated actions taken 
Establish trust 
Ensured confidentiality and anonymity 
Mentioned highly respected professors supervising project and their related 
prestigious universities: Imperial College London and Oxford University 
Mentioned established funding body: Health Foundation UK 
Mentioned ethical approval obtained on topic 
Increase benefits of participation 
Explained purpose of study 
Explained benefits to organisational group (middle management) 
Offered personalised benefits of feedback report 
Offered chance of winning a £100 Amazon voucher 
Gratitude provided in advance 
Decrease cost of participation 
Shortened questionnaire to four pages and 10-15minutes completing time 
Minimised request for personal information that would identify the respondents, 
e.g. initials asked for instead of name 
Avoided technical/complicated and ambiguous language 
Provided online version that is convenient for respondents to respond to 
Self addressed envelope included with hardcopy version of survey for convenience 
and to remove economic cost to respondents 
Table 15 Design based on tailored design method  
 
 
Error Minimising Strategy 
Coverage Error  
(results from some segments of the target 
population excluded by the sampling 
frame)  
Checked emails were used by survey sample and chose online version of survey as 
the main method of distribution 
Scanned database for eligibility and ineligibility criteria, i.e. those who should and 
should not participate in the survey 
Non-response error 
(occurs when respondents who complete 
the survey differ substantially from those 
who do not) 
Survey design: 
Reducing sensitivity of questions 
Removing name as an identifier 
Response scale numbers in order to avoid participants 
being biased by response categories susceptible to social 
desirability bias 
Reverse scoring questions included in a section that is 
susceptible to social desirability bias 
Implementation: 
Offer of hardcopy version of survey 
Repeat reminders to take the survey until a response rate 
of at least 35% is achieved. 
Measurement error  
(occurs when inaccurate responses are due 
to question wording, question ordering, 
etc.) 
Short questions 
Same wording and similar presentation for both online and hardcopy versions of 
survey 
Simplified response tasks of ticking Likert scales or categories 
The same anchored scales where possible and same direction of strength of 
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anchors e.g. anchor 5 equals “strongly agree” and “a lot” etc. 
Sampling error 
(results from collecting data from a sample 
rather than all members of the survey 
population) 
Sample size was increased to include over 178 participants at 10 hospitals 
Power calculation made to ensure sample size will provide statistical relevance 
Table 16 Table of minimised survey errors  
 
 
9.2.1.1 Rationale for survey content: items  
The choice of nominal and defined categories were informed from the findings of the interviews. 
The decision to explore the managerial work and power roles in more depth determined much of 
the scales and items that were included within the survey. Appendix 12 illustrates these theory-
based aims along with their related items. Validated scales from Hospital Survey on Patient Safety 
Culture (HSOPSC) and Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) were used for what I am naming the 
safety attitudes/actions section. It should be noted that this survey section focused solely on safety 
and excluded quality because safety attitudes has well-established measures of which there are 
validated scales to use. It was further considered that the comparison of safety attitudes to work 
roles on both quality and safety would be informative in its own right.  Appendix 13 provides the 
original and modified items for this survey. In addition to the established survey scales, four self-
designed items (on impact, targets, budgets, line-managers) were included within this section, 
labelled in the table in Appendix 13 as ‘own’. These extra items were added in order to verify 
information that appeared to be important at interview. 
 
9.2.2 Survey measure categories & scales 
Section A: Demographics 
Respondents were asked for their: initials, gender, age, nationality, qualifications, clinical 
background, NHS Trust, speciality/ies, job title, tenure in current position, tenure as a manager in 
the NHS. 
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Section B: Time, attitudes/actions & research in quality and safety 
Respondents were asked ‘Within the last year, how often have you accessed information on quality 
and safety in the following places?’ on 6 items on the following scale: 1 ‘Never’, 2 ‘Once’, 3 ‘3-4 
times/year’’, 4 ‘Monthly’, 5 ‘Weekly’, and 6 ‘Daily’. Items included journals and websites. They were 
also asked: ‘What proportion of your total time do you think is spent on quality & safety work?’ on a 
scale comprising of the following: 0-10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, 51-90%, 91-100%. In order to see trend 
data, the respondents were asked to rate their time: currently, 2 years ago and in 2 years time.  On 
their safety attitudes and actions, respondents were asked to rate the extent of their agreement or 
disagreement on 13 statements on an agreement scale ranging from: 1 ‘disagree strongly’ to 5 
‘agree strongly’. Items include: ‘I seriously consider staff suggestions for improving patient safety’ 
and ‘I do not knowingly compromise the safety of patients’.  
 
Section C: Work roles in quality and safety 
Under the topic of work roles in quality and safety, respondents were asked to ‘rate the extent to 
which you carry out each function throughout the year in your managerial position’ 30 items (3 
items per work role construct) were presented with a scale comprising of anchors: 1 ‘Never’, 2 ‘Once 
or twice’, 3 ‘3-4 times/year’, 4 ‘Monthly’, 5 ‘Weekly’, and 6 ‘Daily’. An example of an item measuring 
‘resource allocator’ is ‘I determine where financial resources are best applied to maintain quality and 
safety within my department(s)’ and an example measuring ‘entrepreneur’ is: ‘I initiate and write 
business cases for innovations to improve my service’. 
 
Section D: Influence style in quality and safety 
Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they have certain influences in your managerial 
position on 18 items (3 items per power base construct), using the agreement scale. An example of 
an item measuring ‘legitimate’ power is: ‘I can tell others what to do on quality and safety solely 
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because of my position within the organisation’, and an example of an item measuring ‘coercive’ 
power ‘I could make things difficult for those that do not adhere to safety practices’. Please see 
Appendix 14  for a hardcopy of the survey (constructs measured presented in red) and visit the 
following link for an online version of survey: 
www.surveymonkey.com/s/qualityandmiddlemanagement  The survey measure was approved by an 
expert on psychometric design, Paul Heron from Oxford University, and the plans for the approach 
for statistical analysis was approved by a statistician, Joseph Eliahoo at Imperial College.   
 
9.2.3 Ethical considerations 
All ethical considerations made have been attended to in the design section, particularly those 
outlined in Table 16 on the section decrease cost of participation. Ethical approval for all documents 
and study design was sought and approved by The North London Research Ethics Committee 2 
(ethics reference number: 10/H0724/51). Because this study is a service evaluation, it did not 
require research and development approval at each participating site.  
 
9.2.4 Sample & setting 
The purposive sample consisted of middle managers only, please see previous Chapter for the 
definition of this. Participant eligibility criteria was the same as the interview study, most notability 
they had to fit the definition of a middle manager without their primary official role being in quality 
or safety improvement.  A power calculation, carried out with GPower, determined a necessary 
response rate of at least 100 in order to carry out robust statistical tests on the dataset.  To 
maximise response rates, the survey was sent to middle managers in acute hospitals under the 
South Central Strategic Health Authority (SC SHA). 178 potential survey respondents were sent the 
survey and a 100 surveys were completed (a response rate of 56%). 
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9.2.5 Procedure 
A pilot study was first carried out on the survey, with seven managers completing the survey, and 
seven others (a mixture of researchers and managers) providing their feedback on the survey 
without completion. Please see Table 17 for the mixture of pilot respondents’ job positions and 
organisations. Approximately half of the pilots completed the online version and half completed a 
hardcopy version of the survey. All were asked to give their opinions on the design and layout of the 
survey, the length of the survey, whether they understood the items, whether they believed it 
answered the research questions, and if it was appropriate for acute care middle managers. 
Amendments were made based on feedback, particularly simplification of items that were unclear to 
the respondent.  
 
 Job Title Organisation 
 Pilots completing survey  
1 General manager Guy's & St Thomas' Hospital 
2 General Manager Great Ormond Street 
3 Head of operations Imperial NHS Trust 
4 Associate Director for Performance Wandsworth Primary Care Trust 
5 Lead nurse Imperial NHS Trust 
6 Service manager Imperial NHS Trust 
7 General manager Guy's & St Thomas' Hospital 
 Feedback after reviewing survey  
1 Research psychologist Imperial College London 
2 Research psychologist Imperial College London 
3 Management researcher The University of Oxford 
4 Professor of Clinical Safety Research Imperial College London 
5 Professor of organisational behaviour, with expertise 
and experience of NHS management 
The University of Oxford 
6 Chief Nurse  South Central Strategic Health Authority 
7 Head of organisation & management group Imperial College London 
Table 17 Pilot participants’ position and organisation 
 
Authorisation of access to emails from acute hospitals under the SC SHA were sought via a contact at 
the SHA (Associate Director of Patient Safety) [JP]. JP initially contacted Directors at each hospital, 
and these Directors, their Personal assistants and HR personnel helped to identify the middle 
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managers at their Trust, in accordance with the eligibility criteria. These potential participant names 
were then verified for eligibility through organisational hierarchy charts and searches on the hospital 
websites. Once the full list of middle managers and their contact details were complete and verified, 
a recruitment email with the online survey link was sent to all (some hospitals were sent this first 
email by the Directors/Pas). Please see Appendix 15 for the survey distribution email; the signature 
of the Associate Director of Patient Safety was also attached to the bottom of the email to increase 
the response rate. Data collection started 31st June 2011 for an eight week collection period. Email 
reminders were sent at approximately fortnightly intervals after the initial distribution email. 
 
9.2.6 Data analysis 
Data analysis was carried out using version 20 of the BMW SPSS Statistics (Statistical Packages for 
the Social Sciences). As the majority of variables are categorical/ordinal, normality tests are not 
relevant for this data set and, therefore, non-parametric data were used because the median is 
more representative of the categorical/ordinal data than using tests that explore means, which are 
more appropriate for continuous scales.[325-327] Alpha was set to 0.05, as this is the most common 
alpha used and well-established by statisticians.[328] Two-tailed P values are reported due to the 
lack of hypothesis, which was a decision based on the exploratory nature of this survey and the small 
sample of interviews that informed it. 
 
The items that had reverse scoring were transformed in order to assess their internal consistency. 
Cronbach’s alpha[329] was performed to test for internal consistency on all of the items that were 
designed to measure the same construct. The alpha (coefficient of reliability) for each subscale can 
be found in Appendix 16. The safety attitudes and actions scale had a moderate (0.50-0.80) 
collective aggregate of .555, therefore the aggregated (composite) scores were used as the main 
outcome measure of safety attitudes/actions. This outcome measure comprised of 13 items, with a 
range of 1-65. Both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality showed that the data 
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were normally distributed (P=.07 and P=.13 respectively). Please see Appendix 17 for the measure’s 
histogram and Normal Q-Q plot. This scale was treated as a continuous variable, justified by the rule 
that it has over four values and wide-ranging aggregated scores.[330]  The subscales measuring each 
of the 10 work roles and each of the 6 power bases (3 items per construct) all had moderate 
Cronbach’s alphas, apart from the subscale for the role of Monitor, and two power subscales, 
legitimate and reward, which also scored low (<.50) Cronbach alphas. The aggregated scores were 
used in all statistical tests with recognition of the three low reliability scores. 
 
Prior to analysis, Speciality was recoded into the following five categories: ‘Women, children & 
sexual health’, ‘Medical specialties’, ‘Surgical specialties’, ‘Support services & Allied Professions’, and 
‘Multiple’ (i.e. managers that specified more than one specialty). Variations of different terms used 
for job titles and names of NHS Trusts were renamed for consistency of use of terms, e.g. acronyms 
of Trusts renamed to their full title and Chief Pharmacist and Head of Physiotherapy were 
categorised under ‘Head of Services’. 
 
Descriptives were produced for the whole sample and by grouping variables. Spearman correlations 
were performed to examine the associations between ordinal scales. Mann-Whitney U 
nonparametric test of two independent samples were performed to examine the differences 
between two independent group variables where the dependent variable was ordinal. Kruskal Wallis 
nonparametric test of independent samples for those that have more than two values, were 
performed to check for significant differences between more than two groups. If significance was 
found, post hoc Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to identify which groups have a significant 
difference. Due to the percentage and nature of missing data (at random), missing cases in all 
nonparametric tests were excluded with pairwise deletion, i.e. excludes single missing values from 
analysis.[331] 
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While it is acknowledged that there may be familywise error produced by multiple comparisons, a 
Bonferroni correction was not used to reduce this error, because although it reduces the likelihood 
of Type I error, it increases the likelihood of Type II errors.[332]  Pergener (1998) further states that 
the biggest weaknesses of Bonferroni is in its assumption that the interpretations of P values 
depends on the number of other tests performed. Instead, Pergener proposes that the most 
appropriate method of dealing with multiple comparisons is to simply describe what tests have been 
executed.[332] 
 
An exploratory multiple linear regression analysis (ordinary least squares estimation) was performed 
to investigate potential predictors of the outcome variable of aggregated scores of safety 
attitudes/actions. Whilst a multiple regression does not require the data to be normally distributed, 
the residuals of the dependent variable should be approximately normally distributed,[333] which 
was  checked with a histogram plot. The Stepwise method was chosen due to the lack of previous 
relevant research and theory on this topic making a hierarchical method inappropriate. The stepwise 
method is also based on statistical computation which is advantageous over the forced entry 
method. The variables that were previously found to be statistically significantly correlated with the 
outcome variable were inputted into the regression model as predictors, these were: those that 
most have referent power, least have coercive power and reward power, and most undertake the 
roles of Disseminator and Leader. The output was checked for significance of the model, significance 
of the individual variables with the outcome variable, multi-collinearity through correlations table 
and VIF/Tolerance scores, difference in residuals with the Durbin score, standardised residuals and 
influential cases.  
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9.3 Results  
The results section is structured by the demographics and the two research questions: (i) ‘how and 
how much do middle managers attend to quality and patient safety?’ and (ii) ‘what is the potential 
of middle managers to influence quality and safety?’ The first question is answered through 
investigation of how much time middle managers report to spend on quality and safety, where and 
how often they learn about quality and safety and their work activities in quality and safety. The 
second question is answered through identification of the power that middle managers have in 
quality and safety and of which variables predict higher patient safety attitudes/actions. Because of 
missing data, valid n for the statistical comparisons varied and are noted in the results tables. Tables 
and figures summarise the key patterns of the data; for small demographics tests, all significant 
results are mentioned in the text. 
 
9.3.1 Demographics/Participant characteristics 
The demographics show that the majority of survey respondents comprise of managers that are 
females (72%) and have a clinical background (67%). The most common job titles are service 
managers (25%) and general managers (17%). Almost half are aged between 41-50, and more than 
half have been in their current position for less than 2 years, although the large majority have been a 
manager in the NHS for 6 years or over. The specialties with the largest number of respondents are 
the medical specialties and women, children and sexual health. The data is skewed by NHS Trust, 
with one Trust accounting for 30% of the responses and another only accounting for 2% of the 
sample. Therefore, the total sample from all Trusts is used in all data analysis, and there is only one 
significant finding by Trust. Respondents’ characteristics are presented in Table 18.  
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Table 18 Respondent characteristics/demographics   
Demographics n (100) 
Gender  
Male 28 
Female 72 
Age  
18-30 6 
31-40 21 
41-50 46 
51-70 27 
Nationality  
British 88 
Other 11 
Qualifications  
No degree 27 
Undergraduate 18 
Postgraduate 55 
 
Other professional qualifications 
 
55 
(RGN)         (39) 
(Diploma)       (4) 
(MCSP) 
(Other) 
missing 
      (2) 
      (3) 
3 
Clinical Background  
Clinical 67 
Non-clinical 
Missing 
32 
1 
NHS Trust  
A 10 
B 7 
C 7 
D 7 
E 2 
F 3 
G 12 
H 11 
I 10 
J 30 
Speciality  
Women, children & sexual health 21 
Medical specialties 28 
Surgical specialties 20 
Support services & Allied Professions 12 
Multiple 
Missing 
11 
98 
Job Title 
Service manager 
Service delivery manager 
General manager 
Divisional manager 
Matron/Lead nurse 
Operations manager 
Head of services 
Missing 
 
29 
5 
17 
11 
12 
15 
10 
1 
Tenure in current position  
0-11 months 26 
1-2 years 32 
3-5 years 16 
6-9 years 13 
10-20 years 10 
21 or more years 3 
Tenure as a manager in NHS  
0-11 months 0 
1-2 years 6 
3-5 years 21 
6-9 years 32 
10-20 years 31 
21 or more years 10 
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9.3.2 How and how much attention do acute care middle managers give to quality of care? 
 
The majority of managers spend between 26-50% of their time on quality and safety, with almost 
two-thirds of managers (64%) stating that they currently spend less than half their time on quality 
and safety. Promising findings reveal that there appears to be a slight increasing trend of more time 
spent on quality and safety perceived to be spent over time, displayed in Figure 10. Approximately 
half (51%) reported that they spend more time currently than they did two years ago, and 
approximately a third (37%) said their time spent stayed the same. Only 14% said that they currently 
spend less time. Even more strikingly, most (71%) predicted that they would spend the same or 
more time on quality and safety in two years time.  
 
Nonparametric tests of difference showed that other variables play a factor in time spent on quality 
and safety, including gender and NHS Trust. Mann-Whitney U tests showed that females (mean rank 
53.58) currently spend more time than males (mean rank 40.93) on quality and safety, U=740.000, 
P<0.05. Kruskal-Wallis tests determined that significant differences exist among the means between 
NHS Trusts (H=30.479, df 9, P<0.001). Post hoc comparisons revealed that those at Trust 10 reported 
less time spent on quality and safety than those at four other Trusts (U ranged between 3.000 and 
66.000, all P<0.05). Spearman’s rho tests showed that more time spent was positively correlated 
with more frequent use of learning methods reported, r(76)=.342, P<0.05.  
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Figure 10 Percentage of time managers spend on Q&S at work 
 
 
All the responding managers reported to learn about quality and safety from their colleagues, more 
than a third of which reported that they do so on a daily basis. This is a stark contrast compared with 
only 2% reporting daily use of journals and 18% reporting never to use them at all (Figure 11). 
However, the breakdown by clinical background presented in Table 19 shows that clinical managers 
use journals, websites and conferences/workshops more than non clinical managers. This 
collectively results in clinical managers learning about quality and safety more (mean rank 42.45) 
than non-clinical managers (mean rank 30.09), U=434.500, P<0.05. Although interestingly clinical 
and non-clinical managers equally learnt from their colleagues; both groups reported 41% daily 
learning from colleagues. 
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Figure 11 Where managers learn about Q&S  
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Source of Learning Background N Mean Rank Mann-Whitney U P Value 
Journals 
Clinical 65 54.02 
**714.000 .010 
Non-clinical 32 38.81 
Total 97 
 
Magazines 
Clinical 55 44.49 
743.000 .431 
Non-clinical 30 40.27 
Total 85 
 
Websites 
Clinical 61 50.57 
**636.000 .015 
Non-clinical 30 36.70 
Total 91 
 
Conferences/Workshops 
Clinical 56 47.52 
**559.000 .013 
Non-clinical 29 34.28 
Total 85 
 
Short Courses/Training 
Clinical 62 49.22 
823.500 .235 
Non-clinical 31 42.56 
Total 93 
 
Colleagues 
Clinical 59 47.02 
884.000 .600 
Non-clinical 32 44.13 
Total 91 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table 19 Where managers learn about Q&S by clinical background     
 
 
Table 20 displays the median frequencies of activities ordered by high (daily, weekly), moderate 
(monthly, quarterly) and low (once or twice, never); item percentages are presented in Appendix 18. 
The most reported daily and weekly activities were: encouraging teamwork on quality and safety 
improvement, monitoring quality and safety targets, taking corrective action to manage adverse 
situations/operational breakdowns, and assigning staff to address capacity issues that may 
compromise quality or safety. Those that were hardly ever undertaken, if at all were the three items 
that measured the role of figurehead: acting as an organisational representative by greeting or 
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escorting external quality safety assessors, performing symbolic duties by representing my 
department(s) at quality and safety events and acting as a figurehead by attending external quality 
and safety events on behalf of my department. Figure 12 displays the medians for the aggregated 
quality and safety work roles of the managers, further demonstrating that a low overall median of 
work on quality and safety as a figurehead or spokesperson, along with high overall medians for 
leader, disseminator and disturbance handler roles. 
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A six-point Likert scale ranged between 1 (Never) and 6 (Daily) 
Table 20 Medians of managerial work activities  
 
 
 
Q&S work activity 
Valid n 
(n=100) 
Median 
(range) 
Frequency 
category 
I encourage teamwork on quality and safety improvement  95 5 (4) 
High 
(daily, 
weekly) 
monitor quality and safety targets (e.g. waiting time targets)  95 5 (5) 
I take corrective action to manage adverse situations/operational breakdowns  95 5 (4) 
I assign staff to address capacity issues that may compromise quality or safety  94 5 (5) 
I take corrective action when I face important, unexpected patient safety crises  97 4 (5) 
Moderate 
(monthly, 
quarterly) 
I ensure staff are updated with  information relevant to them to deal appropriately with patients' safety  96 4 (5) 
I investigate adverse incidents  97 4 (4) 
I take action when unexpected work pressure in my department(s) is too great to ignore 95 4 (5) 
I engage staff in quality improvement activities  95 4 (5) 
I determine where financial resources are best applied to maintain quality and safety within my department(s)  97 4 (5) 
I interact with colleagues to develop professional activities and duties related to patient safety  96 4 (5) 
I negotiate with others outside my department(s) (e.g. suppliers, estates) in order to achieve a good standard of quality and safety within my 
department(s)  
95 4 (5) 
I maintain a network of contacts and information sources outside the department that help with quality and safety  95 4 (5) 
I attend meetings with other departmental managers to exchange information and requirements on quality and safety  93 4 (5) 
I  negotiate with those involved to come to an agreement on a patient safety issue  94 4 (5) 
I design and improve service processes (e.g. changing steps in a care pathway)  94 4 (5) 
I share figures on quality key indicators with staff  93 4 (5) 
I share information received from patients on adverse incidents or complaints with the appropriate individuals  95 4 (4) 
I speak to individuals outside my hospital about quality & safety  95 3 (4) 
I research quality and patient safety best practices  93 3 (4) 
I share information on quality targets to people outside my hospital  95 3 (4) 
I relay quality and safety-related information between my department(s) and external bodies  93 3 (4) 
I write standard operating procedures to improve patient safety or quality of care  93 3 (5) 
I pass on information on quality and safety achievements to outside groups  93 3 (5) 
I procure equipment to improve the quality of procedures or improve safety  92 3 (5) 
I resolve patient safety-related problems that develop with other units  93 3 (5) 
I initiate and write business cases for innovations to improve my service  95 3 (5) 
I act as an organisational representative by greeting or escorting external quality safety assessors  94 2 (5) Low (Never, 
once or 
twice) 
I perform symbolic duties by representing my department(s) at quality and safety events  94 2 (3) 
I act as a figurehead by attending external quality and safety events on behalf of my department  93 2 (5) 
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A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), 3 items aggregated constitute the range of (1-15) 
Figure 12 Q&S work roles performed by managers 
 
 
Other variables played a factor in certain quality and safety work roles: the manager’s tenure in the 
NHS, age, their academic qualifications and managerial position according to their job titles. Overall, 
these show that managers with more experience at work and in education and are older play out 
more of the roles of figurehead and entrepreneur. Specifically, those with 21 or more years as a 
manager in the NHS report the role of Figurehead more (i.e. a significant difference between those 
with tenure in the NHS between 21+yrs and all other tenure categories (U ranged between 59.000 
and 66.500, all P<0.05). Those with an academic degree are more likely to play out the role of 
Entrepreneur than those without a degree, i.e. frequency ratings on the role of Entrepreneur 
showed a significant difference between those that had a postgraduate degree (42.16) and no 
degree (30.07), U=415.500, P=0.027, as well as between those that had an undergraduate degree 
(25.00) and no degree (17.17), U=119.000, P=0.037.  
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The position of the middle manager (i.e. service manager, general manager, etc) is another variable 
of the type of quality and safety roles more undertaken. Post hoc tests showed that service and 
service delivery managers undertake significantly lower figurehead roles compared with most of the 
other managerial positions (U ranged between 4.000 and 60.500, all P<0.05).  
 
Overall, good patient safety attitudes/actions scores were reported by the managers, yet there were 
some informative findings (see Table 21). For example, there was almost a third (27%) in agreement 
(who agree/agree strongly) that they would get involved only after an incident and that when 
pressure builds up, they ‘sometimes understand staff taking shortcuts to make sure the work gets 
done’ (32%). Additionally, more managers agreed (43%) than disagreed (33%) that patient safety 
problems haven’t been dealt with, and 21% disagreed that safety overrides finances on a number of 
occasions. Due to the wording of ‘number of occasions’ this implies that 21% think that safety rarely 
overrides finances. Perhaps somewhat related to this, 16% agreed that other targets compromise 
safety. Positively, no one disagreed that they did not ‘support the daily efforts of staff to maintain 
safety standards for patients’  
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   Frequency (Valid percentage) 
 Valid n 
(n=100) 
Median 
(Range) 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Agree 
strongly 
I often get involved in patient safety only after an incident happens. (reverse scoring)  100 2(4) 15(15.0%) 42(42.0%) 16(16.0%) 24(24.0%) 3(3.0%) 
My actions always show that patient safety is a top priority  100 4(4) 1(1.0%) 3(3.0%) 9(9.0%) 59(59.0%) 28(28.0%) 
I provide a work climate that promotes patient safety  100 4(4) 1(1.0%) 0(0.0%) 5(5.0%) 65(65.0%) 29(29.0%) 
I praise and reward when I see a job done according to established patient safety procedures  100 4(4) 1(1.0%) 1(1.0%) 13(13.0%) 60(60.0%) 25(25.0%) 
Whenever pressure builds up, I sometimes understand staff taking shortcuts to make sure the 
work gets done (reverse scoring)  
99 2(3) 17(17.2%) 34(34.3%) 16(16.2%) 32(32.3%) 0(0.0%) 
I seriously consider staff suggestions for improving patient safety  100 4(2) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%) 2(2.0%) 57(57.0%) 41(41.0%) 
I know there are patient safety problems that haven't been dealt with (reverse scoring)  99 3(4) 5(5.1%) 28(28.3%) 23(23.2%) 37(37.40%) 6(6.10%) 
I support the daily efforts of staff to help maintain safety standards for patients  100 4(2) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%) 1(1.0%) 63(63.0%) 36(36.0%) 
I do not knowingly compromise the safety of patients  98 5(4) 1(1.0%) 1(1.0%) 7(7.1%) 34(34.7%) 55(56.1%) 
The way I undertake my work sometimes has an adverse impact on quality and patient safety 
(reverse scoring) 
100 2(3) 28(28.0%) 55(55.0%) 10(10.0%) 7(7.0%) 0(0.0%) 
There have been situations where I have felt forced to compromise patient safety to make sure 
other targets were met (reverse scoring) 
100 2(4) 27(27.0%) 38(38.0%) 19(19.0%) 13(13.0%) 3(3.0%) 
Safety has overridden financial constraints on a number of occasions 100 4(4) 3(3.0%) 18(18.0%) 14(14.0%) 53(53.0%) 12(12.0%) 
My line manager provides a work climate that allows me to promote patient safety 100 4(4) 2(2.0%) 4(4.0%) 17(17.0%) 50(50.0%) 27(0.0%) 
A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
Table 21 Descriptives of managers’ self-reported safety attitudes/actions  
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9.3.3 What is the potential of middle managers to influence quality and safety? 
 
Table 22 displays the medians and frequencies associated with each item measuring power. On 
closer examination, only three respondents disagree that they have referent power. In contrast, 
there were many disagreements on all three items pertaining to coercive power. Almost half (46%) 
disagreed (23%) and disagreed strongly (23%) that ‘I could give undesirable assignments to those 
that resist service improvement’. In response to ‘I could make things difficult for those that do not 
adhere to safety practices’ 27% disagreed (disagree/disagree strongly); and 25% disagreed that ‘I 
could get others into trouble by complaining to higher management if they do not adhere to best 
practices’. Similarly, all three items pertaining to reward power found much disagreement: 19%, 37% 
and 50% disagreed on these items. Two other items that had many disagreements included an item 
measuring legitimate power with 25% disagreeing that they ‘can tell others what to do on quality 
and safety solely because of my position within the organisation’. The other item measuring expert 
power showed 47% disagreement on the statement ‘I probably know more about overall quality of 
care and patient safety issues than the doctors and nurses do’. Overall, Referent, Information and 
Legitimate power were the highest reported medians (12), and reward and coercive power had the 
lowest medians of 9 and 9.5 (see Figure 13). 
 
214 
 
Item 
Valid n 
(n=100) 
Median 
(Range) 
Frequency 
Category 
Frequency (Valid percentage) 
 
  
 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree Agree 
strongly 
I have information that others need to do their work effectively and safely  91 4 (4) 
Agree 
2(2.2%) 7(7.7%) 22(24.2%) 48(52.7%) 12(13.2%) 
I can offer information on quality improvement that enables others to understand it  91 4 (4) 1(1.1%) 0(0.0%) 11(11.0%) 65(65.0%) 14(14.0%) 
I could get others into trouble by complaining to higher management if they do not adhere to best 
practices 
91 4 (4) 8(8.8%) 16(16.0%) 11(12.1%) 43(43.0%) 13(14.3%) 
I can help others to get ahead in my organisation in order to engage them in quality improvement  91 4 (4) 1(1.1%) 16(17.6%) 26(28.6%) 43(47.3%) 5(5.5%) 
I have the authority to give others tasks on patient safety  91 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 2(2.2%) 4(4.4%) 49(53.8%) 36(39.6%) 
I have the ability to use facts and logic to present a case to make changes that improve quality & 
safety  
91 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 2(2.2%) 3(3.3%) 61(67.0%) 25(27.5%) 
I can request that others do their work in a particular way that will maintain standards  90 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 1(1.1%) 4(4.4%) 67(74.4%) 18(20.0%) 
I have the expertise to make good decisions about whether others’ work is safe for patients or not  90 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 4(4.4%) 18(19.8%) 50(54.9%) 19(20.9%) 
I could offer direction on patient safety that is trusted by others  89 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 2(2.2%) 19(21.3%) 59(66.3%) 9(10.1%) 
I am looked upon as someone that others can work with on safety and quality issues  91 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 2(2.2%) 21(23.1%) 58(63.7%) 10(11.0%) 
I am respected and thought highly of by others  90 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 1(1.1%) 34(37.8%) 48(53.3%) 7(7.8%) 
I have an enthusiastic and optimistic attitude that makes people more likely to take my 
recommended actions on quality  
91 
4 (2) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%) 6(6.6%) 57(62.6%) 28(30.8%) 
I can tell others what to do on quality and safety solely because of my position within the 
organisation  
91 3 (4) 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
5(5.5%) 18(19.8%) 26(28.6%) 37(40.7%) 5(5.5%) 
I could make things difficult for those that do not adhere to safety practices  91 3 (4) 9(9.9%) 16(17.6%) 24(26.4%) 37(40.7%) 5(5.5%) 
I could give undesirable assignments to those that resist service improvement  90 3 (4) 21(23.3%) 21(23.3%) 26(28.9%) 21(23.3%) 1(1.1%) 
I could help others to get a promotion if they showed that they prioritised quality of care  90 3 (4) 16(17.8%) 17(18.9%) 36(40.0%) 17(18.9%) 4(4.4%) 
I probably know more about overall quality of care and patient safety issues than the doctors and 
nurses do  
91 3 (4) 10(11.0%) 33(36.3%) 37(40.7%) 8(8.8%) 3(3.3%) 
I could help others receive special benefits for taking part in quality improvement  90 2 (3) Disagree 12(13.3%) 33(36.7%) 29(32.2%) 14(15.6%) 1(1.1%) 
A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
Table 22 Medians of managerial Q&S power bases
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A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), 3 items aggregated constitute the range of (1-15) 
Figure 13 Power bases held by managers 
 
 
Several variables factor in to what quality and safety power bases the managers hold, including 
gender differences, their specialities, the NHS Trust they work at, tenure and age. Males reported 
higher legitimate power (mean rank 54.90) than reported by females (mean rank 41.68) (U=587.500, 
P<0.05), as did those in those in surgical specialties (mean rank 18.26) compared to those in support 
services & allied professions (mean rank 8.80), (U=33.000, P<0.05); and between surgical specialties 
(mean rank 27.00) compared to those in medical specialties (mean rank 19.00), U=152.000, P<0.05. 
 
Counter-intuitively, managers with more experience (6-9 years and 10-20 years in current position) 
reported less reward power (mean rank 13.88, mean rank 7.83) than those who had been in their 
current position for less than a year (mean rank 21.46) U=88.500 P<0.05, (mean rank 20.98) 
U=25.500 P<0.001 respectively. Likewise, those who had been in a managerial position within the 
NHS for 10-20yrs reported less coercive power (mean rank 21.02, mean rank 19.10) than those who 
had been in a managerial position within the NHS for 6-9yrs (mean rank 33.09), U=200.500 P<0.05 
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and 3-5yrs respectively (mean rank 28.74), U=152.500 P<0.05.  Expert power was rated higher by 
older managers aged between 41-50yrs (mean rank 24.21) or 51-70 (mean rank 17.66) than those 
aged 18-30 (mean rank 9.08, mean rank 11.67), U=33.500 P=0.034, U=49.000, P=0.022 respectively.  
 
Spearman’s rho correlations showed aggregate safety (attitude/action) scores positively correlated 
with those that have referent power (r(88)=.250, P<0.05) and information power (r(89)=.220, 
P<0.05) and most undertake the roles of Disseminator (r=(90)-.276, P<0.01) and Leader (r=(90)-.270, 
P<0.01). The safety scores negatively correlated with coercive power (r=(88)-.371, P<0.001) and 
reward power (r(88)=-.291, P<0.01). This means that those that reported owning more referent and 
information power and carrying out more disseminator and leader roles and less reinforcement 
(reward and coercive) powers, reported more positive safety attitudes/actions. There were no 
significant correlations between aggregate safety scores and the sources where the managers learn 
about quality and safety. Please see Appendix 19 for all Spearman’s correlations on the safety 
outcome variable. The non-parametric tests showed no significant differences in means between 
groups on the safety outcome variable.  
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if five predictors (disseminator and leader roles, and 
coercive, reward and referent powers) significantly predicted respondents safety attitude/action 
scores. Two predictors explained almost a quarter of the variance, R2=.204 Adjusted R2=.184, 
F(2)=10.02, P<.05 (using the stepwise method). More frequent disseminator role use predicted 
higher safety scores (B=.228, P<0.05) and lower coercive power owned predicted higher safety 
scores (B=-.351, P<0.001). Please see Table 23 below. 
 
Final Model β t-value P-value R2 R2 adj. 
P-value for 
R2 
(Constant) 
 
16.792 .000 
.204 .184 .029 
Aggregated Power base Coercive -.351 -3.423 .001 
Aggregated Role Disseminator .228 2.220 .029 
Table 23 Final regression model 
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9.4 Discussion 
The results reveal that most managers spend less than half of their time on quality of care and 
patient safety. This is surprisingly low considering earlier findings mentioned within this thesis that 
have suggested that quality and safety is integral to the manager’s job and should be prioritised. The 
systematic review in Chapter 4 showed that insufficient time was spent by senior managers. This 
study similarly presents that this may also be the case for mid-level managers, supported by the 
interviews in the previous chapter that exhibited a number of managers who felt that they spent 
little or inadequate time on quality and safety. More objective study of time spent would be able to 
test whether time estimated by managers is accurate. The results additionally demonstrate 
perception of a slight increasing trend of more time spent on quality and safety over time. The trend 
reported is most likely due to the increasing focus on patient care over recent years from relevant 
funding bodies and the government,[334] and perhaps from future time affected by the 
redundancies planned at the middle management level.  
 
Another illuminating finding on time spent by managers is that there exists a significant difference of 
time spent among NHS Trusts. Notwithstanding the confounding variables unaccounted for, this 
implies an organisational proponent that defines managers’ time. Organisational characteristics can 
affect managerial attention to quality and safety, especially the safety culture and relevant training 
provided by the organisation.[148] Indeed, the present study demonstrates that more time spent 
positively correlates with more frequent use of learning methods. It further confirms that managers 
mostly learn from their colleagues rather than from training or journals. The interview study in 
Chapter 8 identified that the managers mostly learn about quality and safety from clinical staff. 
Providing a possible explanation for this, the surveys showed that clinical managers are significantly 
more likely to use journals, websites and conferences/workshops compared with non-clinical 
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managers and reported more frequent learning. It is likely the case that clinical staff are more 
accustomed to scientific learning, reading and writing peer-reviewed articles due to their medical 
training. Based on these findings, recommendations for organisations are to formalise and present 
opportunities for networking between managers and clinicians on quality and safety, particularly for 
non-clinical managers.  
 
The most reported daily and weekly managerial activities were encouraging teamwork on quality 
and safety improvement, monitoring quality and safety targets, taking corrective action to manage 
adverse situations/operational breakdowns, and assigning staff to address capacity issues that may 
compromise quality or safety. Conversely they rarely performed spokesperson or figurehead roles 
involving symbolic duties and acting as a representative.  These results support the interview study 
findings, emphasising that actions related to ‘fire-fighting’ are frequent, i.e. corrective action and 
capacity issues, and that the focus on targets is one of the most common proactive activities. Other 
responses similarly portray their role as reactive, with almost a third agreeing that they would get 
involved after an incident. Interestingly, leading and encouraging teamwork was not detailed a great 
deal in comparison with the other activities within the interviews, however they did show that this 
involved putting together improvement project teams and offering team direction. Additionally 
team support has been promoted to be a managerial activity for quality and safety.[90, 335] 
 
Those in certain job positions undertook certain work roles more often. For example, those in higher 
positions were less likely to serve the role of disturbance handler. This supports inferences perceived 
at the interviews that those in higher managerial positions carried out more proactive and strategic 
behaviours than more junior middle managers. Theorists have set out the importance of middle 
management becoming more involved with strategy,[92, 93, 336] identified facilitators of it, such as 
identifying social networks,[337] and demonstrated its contributions (championing ideas and 
synthesising data for senior management) to organisational change in healthcare.[211]   
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The managers reported owning higher referent, information and legitimate power and lower 
reward, coercive and expert power. These findings may be due to managers being in an 
organisational position of control and having capabilities such as charisma and knowledge on how to 
present logic and facts, but are not provided with the power to positively or negatively reinforce 
clinical staff on quality and safety. Although lower coercive power owned does not appear to be 
problematic in light of findings that it predicted higher safety scores.  Lower expert power is likely to 
be linked to their low reports of formal learning, although age also factored in the levels of 
agreement of expert power. Both legitimate and reward power constructs scored low internal 
reliability, therefore, the singular items may be more revealing than the aggregated scores. Whilst 
legitimate power was rated comparatively highly overall, almost a quarter of managers disagreed 
that they can tell others what to do solely because of their organisational position. The 
interpretation of this construct is unclear and further examination is required, especially as it was 
inferred from the interviews that the managers are limited in their influence due to their position. 
 
Other potential managerial influences are in their choices of where to focus their work. A majority 
disagreed that other targets compromise safety, however a much smaller number disagreed that 
‘safety overrides finances on a number of occasions’, implying that they believe that safety rarely 
overrides finances. The NHS is currently financially overburdened from a growing population and an 
economic recession, and it appears that a cost of this is that quality of care could suffer. This may be 
why more managers agreed than disagreed that there remain patient safety problems that have not 
been dealt with and why almost a third agreed that they sometimes understand shortcuts taken by 
staff when pressure builds up. These results are all in spite of those that demonstrate that the 
managers hold appropriate attitudes towards patient safety. 
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9.4.1 Limitations  
There were some limitations from the design of the survey. Firstly, some of the items taken from 
validated safety culture surveys were rephrased into the first person, which may invalidate the 
subscales used. Secondly, there were only three items per construct and most had moderate rather 
than high Cronbach’s alphas. The subscales for the constructs of monitor role and legitimate and 
reward power scored low internal reliability. Thirdly, the outcome variable of safety scores focused 
solely on safety and excluded quality, a decision made to guarantee the robustness of the outcome 
scale.  
 
Other limitations were born from the sample size and statistical tests. Due to the small sample size, 
for certain tests with grouping variables there were less than five cases per group. This reduces the 
validity of the results for those tests, however the majority of the results were based on the whole 
sample. As part of the analysis it is impossible to account for all possible confounding variables; 
statistical checks were conducted to see if there were any across the collected variables. More 
research is required before a hierarchical multiple regression model can be carried out, which would 
offer a more stringent model than the exploratory stepwise method used in this study. 
 
Finally, reports of time spent on quality do not provide us with a complete understanding of what this time 
constitutes nor do they offer an objective measure, but instead they present an indication of the priorities that 
managers appear to have within their work. 
 
9.4.2 Conclusion 
This Chapter has presented a survey study that aimed to quantify the results from the interviews 
that informed it. The majority of managers reported a low percentage of time spent on quality of 
care and patient safety, little formal learning and low reinforcing powers. They had high referent and 
information powers and displayed good safety attitude/actions to quality and safety, but reveal 
221 
 
some indications of frequent reactive and fraught work on quality and safety. The most commonly 
reported actions were taking corrective action to manage adverse situations/operational 
breakdowns, encouraging teamwork on quality and safety improvement, monitoring quality and 
safety targets, and assigning staff to address capacity issues that may compromise quality or safety.  
These results confirm the results from the interview findings in Chapter 8, although muddy the 
understanding of managerial position power. Clinical staff views are required to substantiate these 
self-reports and are presented in the following Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 10 - THE DAILY ROLE & ROUTINE OF MIDDLE MANAGERS IN 
QUALITY & SAFETY: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY WITH CLINICAL STAFF 
 
10.1 Introduction  
Clinical staff have a close working relationship with the managers in daily work and in quality and 
safety. In Chapter 8, middle managers articulated that they were involved in a number of shared 
activities with clinical staff, such as addressing complaints and adverse events. The managers also 
claimed that they had much impact on quality and safety through clinical staff by ensuring their 
competency and providing training and equipment. The survey study in the previous Chapter 
solicited more concrete and theory-driven responses from middle managers on their own role in 
quality and patient safety. Collectively, they reported to frequently engage in encouraging 
teamwork, monitoring and reactive work and to hold good safety attitude/actions. They showed 
that their formal learning and time spent is low and that they often engaged in information 
dissemination.  To confirm these accounts, it is important to ask those that will have first-hand 
insight in activities that often involve or at least impact on them. This Chapter presents a survey 
study with clinical staff from the NHS Trust with the largest sample size from the previous 
quantitative study. The aim of this study was to quantitatively explore the role of middle managers 
in quality and safety and to compare clinical staff perceptions with manager perceptions. 
 
10.1.1 Research questions & aims 
The research questions are: (i) How and how much do middle managers attend to quality and 
patient safety? (ii) What is the potential of middle managers to influence quality and safety? and (iii) 
how do clinical staff ratings compare with managers’ ratings on how much and how they attend to 
quality and safety and their potential to influence it? 
 
223 
 
In order to answer these research questions, I aim to identify and quantify: 
 
 How much time middle managers report to spend on quality and safety 
 The work activities of middle managers in quality and safety and how often they engage in 
them, and use Mintzberg’s managerial roles to identify what roles these activities comprise  
 The power that middle managers have in quality and safety, and use French & Raven’s 
framework of powerbases to categorise types of power 
 Which variables predict higher patient safety attitudes/actions 
 How clinical staff and managers’ ratings compare on time spent, frequencies of activities and 
powers held 
 
10.2 Methodology 
 
10.2.1 Survey design & rationale for survey content: items 
The same survey distributed to managers in Chapter 9 was amended for the target population of 
clinical staff. The initial survey design and rationale for items were described in Chapter 9. The 
survey items included in this survey were identical to those of the previous survey apart from the 
phrasing from first to third person so that staff would be answering on their managers not on 
themselves. The demographics section was also amended for clinical staff, for example they were 
not asked whether they had a clinical background or what their qualifications were. The section on 
where the managers learn was deleted, as it was considered that the staff would not have this 
knowledge. For the same reason, two other items were removed: an item on the line manager’s 
provision of a work climate that allows promotion of patient safety and the trending question on 
rating time spent two years ago and in two years time. 
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The single question added was at the start of the survey asking the respondent to think of a typical 
middle manager in their clinical area and to answer all questions with this person in mind. This 
question was devised so that the respondent would be able to answer the questions based on one 
manager and would provide the position of the middle manager that they were answering on. An 
example and definition of a middle manager were provided. Finally, the order of section C and 
section D were swapped around to improve the response rate, as it was decided that section D on 
power was easier to answer. 
 
10.2.2 Survey measure categories & scales 
Section A: Demographics 
Respondents were asked for their initials, gender, age, nationality, NHS Trust, job title, and 
tenure in current position. This was followed by the questions: ‘please think of a typical 
middle manager in your clinical area and answer all questions with this person in mind’ and 
‘please write this manager’s job title (e.g. service manager)’. 
 
Section B: Time, attitudes/actions & research in quality and safety 
Respondents were asked ‘What proportion of your manager’s total time do you think is spent on 
quality & safety work?’ on a scale comprising of the following: 0-10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, 51-90%, 91-
100%. On their safety attitudes and actions, respondents were asked to rate the extent of their 
agreement or disagreement on 12 statements on an agreement scale ranging from: 1 ‘disagree 
strongly’ to 5 ‘agree strongly’.  Items included: ‘My manager does not knowingly compromise the 
safety of patients’ and ‘My manager’s actions always show that patient safety is a top priority’.  
 
Section C: Influence style in quality and safety 
Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which their manager has certain influences in their 
managerial position on 18 items (3 items per power base construct), using the agreement scale. An 
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example of an item measuring ‘expert’ power is: ‘My manager has the expertise to make good 
decisions about whether others’ work is safe for patients or not’, and an example of an item 
measuring ‘reward’ power is: ‘My manager can help others to get ahead in my organisation in order 
to engage them in quality improvement’. 
 
Please see Appendix 20 for a hardcopy of the survey and visit the following link for an online version 
of survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ClinicalStaffViews. 
 
Section D: Work roles in quality and safety 
Under the topic of work roles in quality and safety, respondents were asked to ‘rate the extent to 
which you consider your manager to carry out each function throughout the year in his/her 
managerial position.’ 30 items (3 items per work role construct) were presented with a scale 
comprising of anchors: 1 ‘Never’, 2 ‘Once or twice’, 3 ‘3-4 times/year’, 4 ‘Monthly’, 5 ‘Weekly’, and 6 
‘Daily’. An example of an item measuring ‘negotiator’ is: ‘My manager negotiates with those 
involved to come to an agreement on a patient safety issue’ and an example measuring ‘monitor’ is: 
‘My manager monitors quality and safety targets (e.g. waiting time targets)’. 
 
10.2.3  Ethical considerations 
All ethical considerations made have been attended to in the previous Chapter. Ethical approval for 
all documents and study design was sought and approved by The North London Research Ethics 
Committee 2 (ethics reference number: 10/H0724/51) and Research and Development approval was 
achieved. 
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10.2.4  Sample & setting 
The NHS Trust with the largest sample size from the previous quantitative study in Chapter 9 was 
chosen as the setting to obtain clinical staff perspectives. This was a large teaching Trust with five 
hospitals. 150 potential clinical staff survey respondents were given the survey across the hospitals. 
Sixty eligible surveys were completed (a response rate of 40%). Those eligible were staff that had a 
clinical position within the chosen Trust, and were not middle managers themselves but had contact 
with middle managers. Examples of those who fit the criteria were: consultants, senior specialist 
registrars; pharmacists, senior nurses, and therapists. 
 
10.2.5  Procedure 
A pilot conducted with four clinical staff within the chosen Trust resulted in minor amendments to 
the survey items, such as adding a ‘don’t know’ column. It was also concluded that the majority of 
junior doctors would not have a great deal of contact with middle managers and therefore will 
struggle to answer the questions. On this basis, these junior healthcare professionals (e.g. registrars) 
were first asked whether they had contact with a middle manager before they were handed a 
questionnaire.  
 
Hardcopies of the survey were hand delivered to clinical areas (eg. wards, intensive care unit) within 
one of the largest hospitals within the Trust. Permission by the duty manager was provided before 
distributing the surveys to the staff. Surveys were either handed directly to the staff or left in the 
staff rooms within envelopes, along with a poster explaining the survey. For the other hospital sites, 
a recruitment email (please see Appendix 21) was sent with the hardcopy version of the survey and 
the online survey link. This was also sent to medical professions that were more likely to have 
regular access to a computer at the larger hospital. Data collection was carried out between January-
April 2012. Visit and email reminders were sent at monthly intervals from the initial distribution. 
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10.2.6 Data analysis 
As described in the previous Chapter, non-parametric data analysis was chosen because the median 
is more representative of the categorical/ordinal data than using tests that explore means, and 
missing data was handled in the same way. The items that had reverse scoring were transformed in 
order to assess their internal consistency. Cronbach’s alpha was performed to test for internal 
consistency on all of the items that were designed to measure the same thing. The alpha (coefficient 
of reliability) for each subscale can be found in Appendix 22.  
  
The safety attitudes and actions scale had a moderate (0.50-0.80) collective aggregate of .743, 
therefore the aggregated scores were used as the main outcome measure of safety 
attitudes/actions. This outcome measure comprised of 12 items, with a range of 1-60. Both 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality showed that the data were normally 
distributed (P=.20 and P=.17 respectively). Please see Appendix 23 for the measure’s histogram and 
Normal Q-Q plot. The subscales that measured each of the 10 work roles and each of the 6 power 
bases, (3 items per construct) all had moderate or high Cronbach’s alphas, apart from the subscale 
for the role of ‘monitor’, which had a low alpha of .353.  
 
Prior to analysis, variations of different terms used for job titles were renamed for consistency of use 
of terms, e.g. acronyms of job positions were renamed to their full title and Executive Lead 
Pharmacist and Lead Therapist were recoded under the job title ‘Head of Services’. 
Frequencies/descriptives were produced for the whole sample and by grouping variables. 
Spearmans correlations were performed to examine the associations between ordinal scales. Mann-
Whitney U nonparametric test of two independent samples were performed to examine the 
differences between two independent group variables where the dependent variable was ordinal. 
Kruskal Wallis nonparametric test of independent samples for those that have more than two 
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values, were performed to check for significant differences between more than two groups. If 
significance was found, post hoc Mann-whitney U tests were carried out to identify which groups 
have a significant difference. Alpha was set to 0.05 for all tests apart from the alpha level set to 
choose predictors for the multiple regression. The rationale for not adjusting the alpha level to 
reduce familywise error produced by multiple comparisons is explained in Chapter 9. 
 
An exploratory multiple linear regression analysis (ordinary least squares estimation) was performed 
to investigate potential predictors of the outcome variable of aggregated scores of safety 
attitudes/actions. The Stepwise method was again chosen due to the lack of previous relevant 
research and theory on this topic. Due to the rule of no less than 10 respondents per predictor,[338]  
only the correlations that were significant at the highest possible level of .000 were entered into the 
regression model. These five predictors were: those that most have referent power, informational, 
expert and referent power, and most frequently undertake the roles of Disseminator and Leader. 
The statistical output diagnostics were checked as described in Chapter 9.  
 
Finally, a comparison was performed between the present survey’s clinical staff responses and the 
middle managers’ responses collected in the previous survey in Chapter 9. Mann-Whitney U 
nonparametric test of two independent samples examined the differences between two respondent 
groups. The dependent variables were the individual items and aggregated scores of the power 
bases, work roles and safety attitudes/actions, and time spent. Only the middle managers that were 
from the same NHS Trust as the clinical staff were compared. 
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10.3 Results 
The results section is structured by the demographics and the two research questions: (i) ‘how and 
how much do middle managers attend to quality and patient safety?’ and (ii) ‘what is the potential 
of middle managers to influence quality and safety?’ The first question is answered through 
investigation of how much time middle managers report to spend on quality and safety and their 
work activities in quality and safety. The second questioned is answered through identification of the 
power that middle managers have in quality and safety and of which variables predict higher patient 
safety attitudes/actions. A comparison of self-reports and staff perceptions are performed to 
provide further insight into confirmations and disconfirmations of the above findings. Because of 
missing data, valid n for the statistical comparisons varied and are noted in the frequency tables. 
Tables and figures summarise the key patterns of the data; for small demographics tests, all 
significant results are mentioned in the text. 
 
10.3.1 Demographics/Participant characteristics 
The respondents characteristics presented in Table 24 show that the majority of survey respondents 
are females, of British nationality and aged between 31-40. Over half of the respondents were 
Senior Nurses (28%) and Consultants (23%). The majority have been in their current position for less 
than 5 years. The most common middle managers chosen to answer on were Service Managers and 
Matrons/Lead Nurses. Importantly, there were no significant differences between the chosen middle 
managers’ positions on answers to survey items.  
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Demographics n (60) n % 
Gender   
Male 25 41.7 
Female 35 58.3 
Age   
18-30 7 11.7 
31-40 30 50.0 
41-50 16 26.7 
51-70 7 11.7 
Nationality   
British 46 76.7 
Other 14 23.3 
Job Title   
Consultant 14 23.3 
Registrar 4 6.7 
Specialist registrar 3 5.0 
Nurse 4 6.7 
Senior nurse 17 28.3 
Clinical research fellow 1 1.7 
Pharmacist 1 1.7 
Senior lead pharmacist 3 5.0 
Ward/area manager 2 3.3 
Senior house officer 3 5.0 
Physiotherapist 2 3.3 
Senior/lead physiotherapist 3 5.0 
Dietician 1 1.7 
Healthcare assistant 
missing 
1 
1 
1.7 
1.7 
Managers Chosen 
Matron/lead nurse 
General manager 
Service manager 
Service delivery manager 
Head of services 
Operational manager 
Theatre manager 
missing 
 
19 
3 
18 
1 
10 
5 
2 
2 
 
31.7 
5.0 
30.0 
1.7 
16.7 
8.3 
3.3 
3.3 
Tenure in current position   
0-11 months 14 23.3 
1-2 years 12 20.0 
3-5 years 14 23.3 
6-9 years 9 15.0 
10-20 years 8 13.3 
21 or more years 3 5.0 
Table 24 Respondent characteristics/demographics  
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10.3.2  How and how much attention do acute care middle managers give to quality of 
care? 
The majority of staff (61%) reported that their manager spends half or less than half of their time on 
quality and safety (see Figure 14). Nonparametric tests of difference did not show any other 
variables play a factor in time spent on quality and safety.  
 
 
Figure 14 Percentage of time managers spend on Q&S at work  
 
 
Table 25 displays the median frequencies of activities ordered by high (daily, weekly), moderate 
(monthly, quarterly) and low (once or twice, never); item percentages are presented in Appendix 24. 
The most reported daily and weekly activities were: ensuring staff are updated with information 
relevant to them to deal appropriately with patients’ safety, negotiating with others outside his/her 
department(s) in order to achieve a good standard of quality and safety within the department(s), 
and maintaining a network of contacts and information sources outside the department that help 
with quality and safety. The least frequent activity (with a median of 2) was of their manager writing 
standard operating procedures to improve safety or quality. Figure 15 presents the medians of the 
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aggregated quality and safety work roles performed by the managers. This reveals that the staff 
perceive their managers to most enact the role of disturbance handler and least enact the role of 
entrepreneur. Of the 30 items on individual work activities, there were 1153 responses on the 
regularity of the activity, plus a large number (481) of ‘don’t know’ responses. Table 25 shows that of 
the ten with the most don’t know responses, seven of them were related to work external to the 
department/organisation or symbolic/figurehead duties.  Despite this, two of the three items with a 
median of 5 (daily frequency) were that their manager negotiates with others outside his/her 
department(s) in order to achieve a good standard of quality and safety within the department(s) 
and that their manager maintains a network of contacts and information sources outside the 
department that help with quality and safety. The other frequently rated item was that their 
manager ensures staff are updated with information relevant to them to deal appropriately with 
patients’ safety. 
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A six-point Likert scale ranged between 1 (Never) and 6 (Daily) 
Table 25 Medians of managerial work activities 
  
Valid n  
(total n=60) 
Missing 
(Don’t Know 
response) 
Median 
(range) 
Frequency 
My manager ensures staff are updated with information relevant to them to deal appropriately with patients’ safety 47 5 (8) 5 (5) 
High 
(daily, weekly) 
My manager negotiates with others outside his/her department(s) (e.g. suppliers, estates) in order to achieve a good standard of 
quality and safety within the department(s) 
42 5 (13) 5 (5) 
My manager maintains a network of contacts and information sources outside the department that help with quality and safety 37 5 (18) 5 (5) 
My manager monitors quality and safety targets (e.g. waiting time targets) 46 6 (8) 4.5 (5) 
My manager takes corrective action when s/he faces important, unexpected patient safety crises 40 5 (15) 4 (5) 
My manager takes action when unexpected work pressure in his/her department(s) is too great to ignore 46 5 (9) 4 (5) 
My manager engages staff in quality improvement activities 47 5 (8) 4 (5) 
My manager determines where financial resources are best applied to maintain quality and safety within his/her department(s) 42 5 (13) 4 (5) 
My manager interacts with colleagues to develop professional activities and duties related to patient safety 48 6 (6) 4 (5) 
My manager speaks to individuals outside my hospital about quality & safety 26 5 (29) 4 (5) 
My manager shares information received from patients on adverse incidents or complaints with the appropriate individuals 41 7 (12) 4 (5) 
My manager negotiates with those involved to come to an agreement on a patient safety issue 38 6 (16) 4 (5) 
My manager relays quality and safety-related information between his/her department(s) and external bodies 33 6 (21) 4 (5) 
My manager encourages teamwork on quality and safety improvement 42 7 (11) 4 (5) 
My manager investigates adverse incidents 42 6 (12) 4 (4) 
My manager attends meetings with other departmental managers to exchange information and requirements on quality and safety 39 5 (16) 4 (4) 
My manager takes corrective action to manage adverse situations/operational breakdowns 43 7 (10) 4 (5) 
My manager assigns staff to address capacity issues that may compromise quality or safety 40 6 (14) 4 (5) 
My manager shares figures on quality key indicators with staff 47 6 (7) 4 (5) 
My manager resolves patient safety-related problems that develop with other units 40 6 (14) 4 (5) 
My manager performs symbolic duties by representing his/her department(s) at quality and safety events 36 5 (19) 3.5 (5) 
Moderate 
(monthly, 
quarterly) 
My manager acts as an organisational representative by greeting or escorting external quality safety assessors 29 5 (26) 3 (5) 
My manager researches quality and patient safety best practices 33 5 (22) 3 (5) 
My manager shares information on quality targets to people outside the hospital 27 6 (27) 3 (5) 
My manager procures equipment to improve the quality of procedures or improve safety 39 7 (14) 3 (5) 
My manager act as a figurehead by attending external quality and safety events on behalf of his/her department(s) 29 6 (25) 3 (4) 
My manager designs and improves service processes (e.g. changing steps in a care pathway) 40 6 (14) 3 (4) 
My manager assigns staff to address capacity issues that may compromise quality or safety 21 6 (33) 3 (4) 
My manager initiates and writes business cases for innovations to improve his/her service 36 6 (18) 3 (4) 
My manager writes standard operating procedures to improve patient safety or quality of care 37 6 (17) 2 (5) 
Low (Never, 
once or twice) 
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A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), 3 items aggregated constitute the range of (1-15) 
Figure 15 Q&S work roles performed by managers 
 
 
10.3.3 Safety attitudes/actions  
Staff highlight a disquieting number of issues around the safety management of their managers 
(Table 26).  The majority agreed that their manager knows that there are patient safety problems 
that have not been dealt with and 41% of staff believed that the way their manager undertakes 
his/her work sometimes has an adverse impact on quality and safety (and 19% neither agreed nor 
disagreed).  Almost a third agreed that their manager often gets involved in patient safety only after 
an incident happens. A third disagreed (or neither agreed nor disagreed) that their manager does 
not knowingly compromise the safety of patients and less than a third disagreed that whenever 
pressure builds up, their manager sometimes understands staff taking shortcuts to make sure the 
work gets done.  
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Perhaps the most striking finding is that almost half of the healthcare professionals disagreed (47%) 
or neither agreed/disagreed (37%) that, due to their managers’ decisions, safety has overridden 
financial constraints on a number of occasions.  Similarly many respondents (42%) agreed that there 
have been situations where their manager has felt forced to compromise patient safety to make 
sure other targets were met. Yet, approximately half agree that their manager’s actions always show 
that patient safety is a top priority. Other positive results included the majority of respondents 
believing that their manager provides a work climate that promotes patient safety, supports the 
daily efforts of staff to help maintain safety standards for patients and seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety. Half believe their manager praises and rewards when 
she/he sees a job done according to established patient safety procedures. 
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   Frequency (Valid percentage) 
 Valid n 
(n=60) 
Median 
(Range) 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Agree 
strongly 
My manager often gets involved in patient safety only after an incident happens. 60 3(4) 5(8.3%) 21(35.0%) 15(25.0%) 17(28.3%) 2(3.3%) 
My manager’s actions always show that patient safety is a top priority 59 3(3) 0(0.0%) 13(22.0%) 17(28.8%) 22(37.3%) 7(11.9%) 
My manager provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 60 4(4) 2(3.3%) 7(11.7%) 16(26.7%) 31(51.7%) 4(6.7%) 
My manager praises and rewards when s/he sees a job done according to established patient 
safety procedures 
60 3.5(4) 4(6.7%) 10(16.7%) 16(26.7%) 25(41.7%) 5(8.3%) 
Whenever pressure builds up, my manager sometimes understands staff taking shortcuts to 
make sure the work gets done 
60 3(3) 3(5.0%) 15(25.0%) 25(41.7%) 17(28.3%) 0(0.0%) 
My manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety 60 4(3) 0(0.0%) 6(10.0%) 20(33.3%) 29(48.3%) 5(8.3%) 
My manager knows there are patient safety problems that haven’t been dealt with 60 4(4) 1(1.7%) 6(10.0%) 16(26.7%) 34(56.7%) 3(5.0%) 
My manager supports the daily efforts of staff to help maintain safety standards for patients 60 4(4) 1(1.7%) 6(10.0%) 17(28.3%) 31(51.7%) 5(8.3%) 
My manager does not knowingly compromise the safety of patients 60 4(3) 0(0.0%) 8(13.3%) 12(20.0%) 28(46.7%) 12(20.0%) 
The way my manager undertakes his/her work sometimes has an adverse impact on quality and 
patient safety 
59 3(4) 8(13.3%) 16(27.1%) 11(18.6%) 23(39.0%) 1(1.7%) 
There have been situations where my manager has felt forced to compromise patient safety to 
make sure other targets were met 
60 3(4) 8(8.3%) 11(18.3%) 19(31.7%) 20(33.3%) 5(8.3%) 
Due to my manager’s decisions, safety has overridden financial constraints on a number of 
occasions 
60 3(3) 6(10.0%) 22(36.7%) 22(36.7%) 10(16.7%) 0(0.0%) 
A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) 
Table 26 Descriptives of managers’ safety attitudes/actions  
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10.3.4 What is the potential of middle managers to influence quality and safety? 
Figure 16 presents the medians for the quality and safety aggregated power base constructs held by 
managers. This shows that the staff believed that their managers’ most hold information power to 
influence quality and safety and least hold reward power.  
 
Closer examination of medians and frequencies by item, presented in Table 27, shows those with 
lower medians of 3 included two items measuring referent power, two items measuring reward 
power, and two items measuring coercive power.  Of the items measuring referent power, 80% 
disagreed (i.e. disagreed or neither agreed/nor disagreed) that their manager has an enthusiastic 
and optimistic attitude that makes people more likely to take their recommended actions on quality. 
Similarly, over half (59%) disagreed that their manager is respected and thought highly of by others. 
For both items measuring coercive power, 66% staff disagreed that their manager could give 
undesirable assignments to those that resist service improvement and that they could make things 
difficult for those that do not adhere to safety practices. Of the items measuring reward power, only 
24% agreed that their manager could help others get a promotion if they showed that they 
prioritised quality of care. Equally low, only 17% agreed that their manager could help others receive 
special benefits for taking part in quality improvement. The construct of expert power also had an 
item with a low median; the majority disagreed or were undecided (69%) that their manager 
probably knows more about overall quality of care and patient safety issues than clinical staff.  
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Valid n  
(n = 60) 
Median 
(Range) 
Frequency  
category 
Frequency (Valid percentage) 
    
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Agree 
strongly 
My manager could offer direction on patient safety that is trusted by others 59 4 (4) 
Agree 
1(1.7%) 4(6.8%) 18(13.5%) 34(57.6%) 2(3.4%) 
My manager is looked upon as someone that others can work with on safety and quality 
issues 
59 4 (4) 1(1.7%) 10(16.9%) 15(25.4%) 26(44.1%) 7(11.9%) 
My manager could get others into trouble by complaining to higher management if they do 
not adhere to best practices. 
59 4 (4) 1(1.7%) 12(20.3%) 8(13.6%) 31(52.5%) 7(11.9%) 
My manager can help others to get ahead in my organisation in order to engage them in 
quality improvement 
59 4 (4) 1(1.7%) 3(5.1%) 25(42.4%) 26(44.1%) 4(6.8%) 
My manager has information that others need to do their work effectively and safely 59 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 5(8.5%) 10(16.9%) 42(71.4%) 2(3.4%) 
My manager has the expertise to make good decisions about whether others’ work is safe 
for patients or not 
59 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 8(13.6%) 17(28.8%) 30(50.8%) 4(6.8%) 
My manager has the ability to use facts and logic to present a case to make changes that 
improve quality & safety 
59 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 6(10.2%) 13(22.0%) 28(47.5%) 12(20.3%) 
My manager can tell others what to do on quality and safety solely because of their position 
within the organisation 
59 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 11(18.6%) 18(30.5%) 27(45.8%) 3(5.1%) 
My manager can offer information on quality improvement that enables others to 
understand it 
59 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 8(13.6%) 12(20.3%) 35(59.3%) 4(6.8%) 
My manager can request that others do their work in a particular way that will maintain 
standards 
59 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 5(8.5%) 13(22.0%) 36(61.0%) 5(8.5%) 
My manager has the authority to give others tasks on patient safety 59 4 (3) 0(0.0%) 4(6.8%) 6(10.2%) 38(64.4%) 11(18.6%) 
My manager probably knows more about overall quality of care and patient safety issues 
than the doctors and nurses do 
58 3 (4) 
Neither 
agree/ 
disagree 
4(6.9%) 18(31.0%) 18(31.0%) 17(29.3%) 1(1.7%) 
My manager is respected and thought highly of by others 59 3 (4) 2(3.4%) 13(22.0%) 20(33.9%) 18(30.5%) 6(10.2%) 
My manager could help others receive special benefits for taking part in quality 
improvement 
59 3 (4) 2(3.4%) 18(30.5%) 29(49.2%) 9(15.3%) 1(1.7%) 
My manager has an enthusiastic and optimistic attitude that makes people more likely to 
take my recommended actions on quality  
59 3 (3) 0(0.0%) 17(28.8%) 13(50.8%) 21(35.6%) 8(13.6%) 
My manager could give undesirable assignments to those that resist service improvement  59 3 (3) 0(0.0%) 11(18.6%) 28(47.5%) 17(28.8%) 3(5.1%) 
My manager could help others to get a promotion if they showed that they prioritised 
quality of care 
59 3 (3) 2(3.4%) 18(30.5%) 25(42.4%) 14(23.7%) 0(0.0%) 
My manager could make things difficult for those that do not adhere to safety practices 59 3 (3) 0(0.0%) 15(25.4%) 18(30.5%) 24(40.7%) 2(3.4%) 
A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)  
Table 27 Medians of managerial Q&S power bases 
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A five-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), 3 items aggregated constitute the range of (1-15) 
Figure 16 Q&S power held by managers  
 
 
Spearman’s rho correlations showed aggregate safety (attitude/action) scores positively correlated 
with time spent and with those that have all types of power apart from coercive power (r(57)=-.184, 
P=.170) and reward power (r(57)=.193, P=.151). This means that, with the exception of the 
reinforcement (reward and coercive) powers, the more time and power the participants reported, 
the higher the positive safety attitudes/actions they reported. Similarly, apart from three roles 
(monitor, negotiator and liaison), all roles were positively correlated with the safety scores, 
indicating the more these roles are carried out the higher the positive safety attitudes/actions 
reported. Please see Appendix 25 for all Spearman’s correlations on the safety outcome variable. 
The non-parametric tests showed no significant differences in means between staff grouping 
variables or middle manager job titles on the safety outcome variable. 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if 5 predictors (aggregated disseminator and leader 
roles; and informational, expert and referent powers) significantly predicted respondents 
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aggregated safety attitude/action scores. Two predictors explained approximately 70% of the 
variance, R2=.713 Adjusted R2=.694, F(2)=38.45, P<0.001 (using the stepwise method). More 
frequent leader role used predicted higher safety scores (B=.833, P<0.001) and higher referent 
power owned predicted higher safety scores (B=.903, P<0.01). The Beta weights of each predictor 
are both high, representing their individual considerable contributions to the variance of the 
outcome. Please see Table 28 below presenting the final model. 
 
Final Model β t-value P-value R2 R2 adj. 
P-value for 
R2 
(Constant) 
 
7.735 .000 
.713 .694 .000 
Leader Role .833 4.442 .000 
Referent Power .903 2.812 .008 
Table 28 Final regression model  
 
 
10.3.5 Comparison of clinical staff perceptions and manager self-reports 
Sixty clinical staff and 30 managers from the same Trust had some significantly different opinions on 
survey items (see Table 29). Nonparametric comparison showed that clinical staff rated their 
managers’ aggregated safety (attitudes and actions) score significantly lower (mean rank = 33.32) 
than the safety score from the managers rating themselves (mean rank = 66.12), U=221.500, 
P<0.001. This shows that the clinical staff disagreed more than the managers on items presented on 
positive managerial safety attitudes and actions. 
  
The clinical staff also reported managers to play less of an entrepreneurial role (mean rank = 25.93) 
than was stated by managers (mean rank = 35.07), U=313.00, P<0.05. In contrast, the clinical staff 
perceived more performance of liaising (mean rank = 33.85) and figurehead roles (mean rank = 
37.76) than was rated by the managers (mean rank = 23.87, mean rank = 18.75), U= 251.000 P<0.05, 
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U= 97.500 P<0.001 respectively. From comparison at the item level, clinical staff believed their 
managers to perform activities more often than the managers reported to perform them. On items 
where there was a significant difference between the two groups, 8 of the 12 items/activities were 
rated by clinical staff to be performed more often.  
 
Although not significantly different (U= 660.000 p=0.072), clinical staff reported managers to spend 
more time (mean rank = 47.42) than the managers reported themselves (mean rank = 37.50) 
However, both groups reported a low median of time spent on quality and safety (3 and 2.5), both 
averaging under 50% of time spent. 
 
Similarities between the reports from the two groups showed no significant differences between the 
types of power ratings between the two groups, with the exception of referent power. Clinical staff 
believed that their managers hold less referent power (mean rank = 40.14) than the managers 
reported to hold (mean rank = 54.55), U=598.500, P<0.05.  
 
  
242 
 
 
Table 29 Differences between managers’ self-reports and staff perceptions on survey items 
Items Population N Mean Rank Mann-Whitney U P Value 
Time Spent Currently 
Clinical staff 57 47.42 
660.000 .072 Managers 30 37.50 
Total 87 
 
Aggregated Safety Attitudes/Actions 
Clinical staff 58 33.32 
**221.500 .000 Managers 30 66.12 
Total 88 
 
Roles (aggregated scores) 
     
Disturbance Handler 
Clinical staff 34 31.54 
477.500 .660 Managers 30 33.58 
Total 64 
 
Disseminator 
Clinical staff 38 31.34 
450.000 .135 Managers 30 38.50 
Total 68 
 
Monitor 
Clinical staff 30 33.90 
348.000 .126 Managers 30 27.10 
Total 60 
 
Leader 
Clinical staff 39 31.31 
441.000 .080 Managers 30 39.80 
Total 69 
 
Resource Allocator 
Clinical staff 28 29.30 
414.500 .931 Managers 30 29.68 
Total 58 
 
Negotiator 
Clinical staff 30 31.47 
421.000 .666 Managers 30 29.53 
Total 60 
 
Liaison 
Clinical staff 26 33.85 
*251.000 .022 Managers 30 23.87 
Total 56 
 
Spokesperson 
Clinical staff 17 27.09 
202.500 .241 Managers 30 22.25 
Total 47 
 
Figurehead 
Clinical staff 23 37.76 
**97.500 .000 Managers 30 18.75 
Total 53 
 
Entrepreneur 
Clinical staff 30 25.93 
*313.000 .041 Managers 30 35.07 
Total 60 
 
Power bases (aggregated scores) 
     
Legitimate 
Clinical staff 59 43.51 
797.000 .433 Managers 30 47.93 
Total 89 
 
Coercive 
Clinical staff 59 46.57 
 
.416 Managers 30 41.92 792.500 
Total 89 
  
Reward 
Clinical staff 59 48.17 
 
.100 Managers 30 38.77 698.000 
Total 89 
  
Information 
Clinical staff 59 41.61 
 
.073 Managers 30 51.67 685.000 
Total 89 
  
Expert 
Clinical staff 58 46.27 
 
.360 Managers 30 41.08 767.500 
Total 88 
  
Referent 
Clinical staff 59 40.14 
 
.012 Managers 30 54.55 *598.500 
Total 89 
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10.4 Discussion  
The results show that the healthcare professionals believe that their managers spend on average 
less than half of their time on quality and safety but collectively reported them to engage in all but 
one of the quality and safety activities at least monthly or quarterly. The staff also judged their 
managers to perform activities more often than the managers reported and had higher estimations 
of time spent. However, the number of ‘don’t know’ responses on the regularity of activities that 
managers engaged in was high, suggesting that these staff are unaware of managerial activities on 
quality and safety or at least are unaware of how often they are performed. This could be because 
the respondent does not work closely with their chosen manager on quality matters, although one 
would assume that respondents would have chosen a manager that they know most about. Many of 
the items rated highly were those that are unlikely to be seen by staff, that is where managers work 
outside of the organisation or as an external representative, indicating that there may be some 
estimation of these activities, especially as there were also a high number of ‘don’t know’ responses 
on these items. Both the unawareness and the over-assumption of management activity could 
explain clinical staff negative attitudes towards managers on their priorities on quality and safety, 
identified in Chapter 8. If the managerial activities are not visible to the staff, they may perceive 
their manager’s activities as unessential.  On the other hand, if they assume that they are spending 
more time and more activities that the managers report to, they could perceive managers’ 
inefficiency on those tasks.  
 
On managerial activities, staff supported earlier suppositions that the manager’s work in quality and 
safety is more reactive than proactive. Specifically, the disturbance handler role was reported by 
staff as the most frequently performed, and the managers’ entrepreneurial work was rated as the 
least frequent role. Moreover, the staff rated a statistically lower frequency of performance on the 
entrepreneurial role than managers, which could be seen as important in quality improvement 
innovations. A bias of this finding is the potential of it to be due to the type of work that the staff see 
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the most, yet it presents an objective measure and demonstration of what and perhaps how certain 
attitudes towards managers are formed.  
 
The results confirm the managers’ indirect impact on safety through clinical staff. The respondents 
agreed that managers often pass on information that is relevant to keeping staff up-to-date in order 
to deal appropriately with the patients’ safety, and that their managers support the daily efforts of 
staff to help maintain safety standards, seriously consider staff suggestions for improving patient 
safety, and produce a work climate that promotes it. The implications are that middle management 
play a notable part in assisting staff to perform well for patient safety, suggesting that a huge part of 
their role in quality and safety is how they supervise and support clinical staff.  
 
Regarding managers’ attitudes and decisions on safety, the results seem more negative. The 
majority think that their manager is aware of remaining patient safety problems and that, in certain 
situations, they have compromised patient safety in favour of other targets. Many agreed that their 
managers sometimes knowingly compromise the safety of patients, and implied that their manager’s 
decisions have often overridden safety due to financial constraints. The staff are torn on whether 
the manager’s actions always show that patient safety is a top priority. These contradicting results 
may be explained by opinions from many that their managers generally show that patient safety is a 
top concern but that there are specific situations where it cannot be prioritised, such as when 
financial pressures take hold. Overall, the clinical staff rated their managers’ safety attitudes and 
actions scores significantly lower than the managers rated. This may be explained by social 
desirability bias in the self-reports, or again may support explanation of staff attitudes towards their 
managers. The fact that many staff believe that the way their manager undertakes their work 
sometimes has an adverse impact on quality and safety illustrates acknowledgment that 
management can have an impact on quality and safety and that this may not always be a positive 
one.  
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Staff findings do corroborate other reports from managers, such as their relatively little 
reinforcement power. Whether it is the case that the managers have little reward or coercive power 
or just that they do not use it, rewarding behaviour for safety has been established within the 
behavioural sciences as an important tool of influence, and research has shown successful leaders 
reward safety more.[339] Collectively however, the reports present weak associations between 
these powers and safety attitude/action scores, which should be investigated further. Also, in line 
with the manager’s self-reports, staff similarly stated a high percentage of disagreement that their 
manager knows more about quality and safety issues than those in their clinical profession. This will 
undoubtedly act as a barrier for managers to use expert power in influencing staff and supports 
earlier indications that managers would gain from further knowledge and training on the topic.  
 
Another barrier for managers is that many staff did not concur that their managers are respected or 
have a positive attitude that would help with staff engagement, and felt that their managers hold 
significantly less referent power than the managers believed. It is likely that this will be an obstacle 
to the most cited form of influencing by the managers. Yet, despite this, referent power was one of 
the two predictors that explained a large variance of the safety scores, supporting its importance. 
The multiple regression model revealed the scores on managers’ referent power and leader role 
explained approximately 70% of the variance of safety scores. The leader role comprises of 
encouraging teams for QI, developing professional activities and duties related to patient safety, and 
creating an environment in which staff will work effectively. All of these again involve helping staff 
rather than carrying out work for quality and safety themselves, and suggest great potential for 
indirect impact on safety by management. 
 
In both multiple regression models performed on the results of the staff reports and the manager’s 
self-reports, three out of the five predictors initially inputted in to the model (due to high statistical 
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correlation with the safety outcome variable) were the same. These are the leader and disseminator 
roles and referent power. The implications are that these power and role constructs are the most 
predictive of the safety attitudes/actions of managers, suggesting that managers should pay greater 
attention to these within the context of safety. 
 
10.4.1 Limitations  
Some of the same survey design issues exist as highlighted in Chapter 9. Tests of internal consistency 
showed strength in the construct measures, however the subscale measuring the monitor role 
scored a low Cronbach alpha. As this subscale also had a low alpha in the previous survey, the scores 
based on this construct should be considered with caution. The present study sample size is small 
and, although they belonged to five different hospitals, the respondents all belong to one Trust, so 
wider generalisations are difficult. Only the middle managers that were from the same Trust as the 
clinical staff were compared, therefore there was an imbalance of sample size and some of the 
managers, especially lead nurses, that the staff identified were not properly represented in the 
middle managers sample. Due to the problematic definition of the middle manager, it was an 
important finding that there were no significant differences between the middle managers’ positions 
that the staff chose to base their answers on. This provides more strength to the argument of 
assessing the various types of middle managers as one group. 
 
An ideal design would have been to ask staff to answer the survey based on pre-identified managers. 
Anonymity however was crucial for this survey, as was sensitivity to managers who had 
confidentially completed the previous version of the survey. Instead, a question was added asking 
the respondent to think of a typical middle manager in their clinical area and to answer all questions 
with this person in mind. This may have biased the findings, because more than one person may 
have been thinking about the same manager. It is also impossible to assert whether the managers 
chosen are the same managers that completed the self-reports in the same Trust, which presents a 
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limitation for the comparison of the two surveys. Moreover, due to this design other managerial 
variables such as their clinical background or age that may play a factor in certain quality and safety 
work roles or powers held.  
 
Lastly, the activities reported may just be the type of work that most affects clinical staff or that they 
see the managers carry out most. Although this itself is an important finding, as is the number of 
respondents that were entirely unaware of managers’ quality and safety actions. The high number of 
‘don’t know’ responses however resulted in a high number of missing values, which reduces the 
strength of the tests carried out with the section on work roles, particularly for the multiple 
regression, which relies on a larger sample. 
 
10.4.2 Conclusion 
This Chapter investigated the clinical staff perspective on the middle manager’s role by asking 
clinical staff the same questions that were asked of middle managers. The respondents 
substantiated a number of findings revealed by the managers’ self-reports. They confirmed frequent 
reactive work, low time spent on quality and safety, and little reward power. Additionally, the results 
show managers’ indirect impact on safety through clinical staff. However, staff held more negative 
views on managers’ attitudes and decisions on safety than the managers reported, on how much 
they are respected, hold an influential positive attitude, and have referent power. There was also 
differing perception of most common work carried out and a lack of awareness by staff on their 
manager’s work.   
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CHAPTER 11 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This final chapter begins with a summary of the key findings from each of the empirical chapters. 
The themes from the entire thesis are then presented and linked to relevant literature and theory. 
Next, methodological limitations/strengths, future research and implications are considered and the 
section ends with concluding remarks. 
 
11.1  Summary of chapter key findings 
This thesis intended to answer the overarching research question ‘what is the role of the acute care 
manager in quality of care and patient safety?’ In answering this question it drew upon a mixture of 
methods. The introductory literature review provided the background context of quality of care and 
patient safety and of management theory and non-empirical research on the role of managers in 
quality and safety. The systematic literature review study illustrated a case for further research 
studies on this topic and offered areas of further investigation. Interview studies with CEOs and MDs 
examined their work within a well-defined quality improvement initiative (SPI). This was followed 
with staff views on the work of CEOs and MDs in SPI to offer another perspective and to verify the 
emerging critical dimensions of CEO/MD involvement in SPI.  Next, in order to investigate a 
neglected tier of management within the acute setting, interviews with the middle managers 
explored the perceived demands, choices, constraints and impact of their quality and safety work.  
This informed a follow-up survey with a wider sample of middle managers, which was then adapted 
to investigate the views of clinical staff on the same items. 
 
11.1.1. Key findings from the systematic literature review  
A systematic review of the literature has shown that there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the 
topic of acute care managerial work and influence in the context of quality of care and patient 
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safety.  In particular, there is little on the relevant managerial activities, on the tier of middle and 
lower management and on managers outside of the US. The literature indicates that managers are 
involved in activities that are highly important to the quality and safety of their patients. Frequent 
activities included Board strategy, priority and goal setting, public reporting of quality strategies; 
driving improvement culture; commitment/engagement and promotion of quality and safety. The 
review also reveals some evidence that managers’ time spent, engagement and work can influence 
quality and safety clinical outcomes, processes and performance. Significant positive associations 
were found with management engagement; establishing goals and strategy to improve care; 
managers’ involvement in setting the quality agenda; a Board quality committee; a specific agenda 
item on quality; a quality measurement report and dashboard with national quality and safety 
benchmarks; compensation attached to quality; appropriate and standardised quality and safety 
measures; and good communication and involvement with staff. However some studies failed to 
demonstrate this impact while others have not examined it at all. For example, there are unclear 
benefits of management knowledge and training on quality and safety.  The literature suggests 
inadequate prioritisation of quality and patient safety on the Board agenda and of subsequent time 
spent at Board meetings, for example, a majority of Boards spent 25% or less on quality and less 
than half of them did so consistently at all meetings. A model (Figure 7) was presented to frame the 
inputs, processes and outputs that comprise the activities, impact and contextual factors of 
management work in quality and safety.  
 
Overall, the review findings support other narrative literature review conclusions that senior leaders 
have a role in quality improvement but that the empirical evidence is scarce and weak with few 
research-based descriptions of senior or Board actions to lead quality improvement.[242] Our 
review verifies that this is the case not only for leaders in improvement but also for management 
(CEOs, the Board, nurse middle managers) in improvement and in routine quality and safety. In this 
thesis I have aimed to address the gaps in the evidence with empirical examination of actual senior 
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and middle managerial actions across quality improvement and routine daily quality and safety in 
acute care within the UK. 
 
11.1.2. Key findings from the CEO’s role in QSI case study – self-reports  
This study addressed the call for more research-informed guidance on the role of senior 
management in quality and safety improvement by identifying critical dimensions of CEO 
involvement within the Safer Patients Initiative considered to significantly contribute towards the SPI 
programme. Five critical dimensions of involvement were identified: 1)resource provision; 2)staff 
motivation & engagement; 3)commitment & support; 4)monitoring progress; and 5)embedding 
programme elements. Resource provision comprised of securing funding at the beginning and end of 
the formal programme and allocating resources such as time allowed for SPI work and support 
personnel for data collection and analysis and coordination. The CEOs motivated and engaged 
others by highlighting the programme strategies and targets, empowering staff to authorise 
resources, and keeping a constant stream of communication with staff. Manifestations of 
commitment and support ranged from attending SPI learning sessions and leadership walk rounds to 
prioritising safety on the Board agenda and stating purpose and approval for programme practices. 
Monitoring of SPI was frequently carried out at Board meetings, through reviewing SPI outcome 
measures, and reading progress reports. The CEOs believed they helped achieve sustainability of SPI 
by embedding its activity and procedures into existing strategies and processes, such as Board 
agendas, mission statements, strategic objectives, lines of accountability, and introducing reporting 
mechanisms associated with programme outcomes. Queries raised include the tangible benefits of 
executive involvement in the practical steps to creating the “right” environment for QI and the 
follow-up actions from monitoring.  
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11.1.3. Key findings from the MD’s role in QSI case study– self-reports  
Interviews with MDs provided additional rigor to identification of the role of senior management in 
the specific case study of the Safer Patients Initiative. This study adds to the previous enquiry into 
the role of the CEOs by both confirming the model and adding to it. The MDs provided a similar 
contribution to the SPI programme with many shared roles with the CEOs, but appeared to be more 
closely involved in the groundwork and the reports delivered to the Board. Contrasting to the CEOs 
reports, they did not mention distribution of internal resources or creation of the right safety 
culture. Instead they mentioned more information on feedback of SPI data to staff, examples of 
engaging clinical staff and building capacity of knowledge of SPI/QI, and of creating the project 
structure. Despite many MDs demonstrating a closer working relationship with the frontline than 
the CEOs, some MDs reported that they were similarly detached from the daily SPI work.  Barriers to 
their involvement included high SPI workload and their own clinical work and crises. Their clinical 
background was reported to help identify arising issues.  Finally, MDs offered further insight into the 
CEO role in SPI, suggesting that the CEOs are committed to SPI but less involved in the details of the 
daily programme work.  
 
11.1.4. Key findings from the senior manager’s role in QSI case study – staff 
perceptions 
The two previous studies were based on subjective self-reports on work on SPI. This study 
attempted to offer another perspective on the senior managers’ key participation considered to 
significantly contribute towards the programme. These reports confirm the main dimensions of 
involvement and raise additional points for CEOs and MDs to focus on when engaging in a similar 
intervention. The most essential activities included intervening to engage resistant medical staff; 
visible commitment through walking round the hospital; offering recognition and awareness through 
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monitoring/feedback; delivering organisation-wide messages; and liaising with external 
organisations.  
 
The interviewees stated that more involvement from senior management would be beneficial and 
that the support received was sometimes limited. Staff believed the managers to be preoccupied 
with other priorities and admitted hesitation on their part to request further contribution. The staff 
did not emphasise managerial activities to embed SPI into organisational processes or 
secure/allocate resources.  Instead they divulged their need for recognition, praise, and awareness. 
Their reports revealed that a delicate approach is required by managers when empowering staff, as 
there is a difficult balance for managers to afford staff the power to address their own problems 
whilst also following-up actions themselves to solve staff issues. Constant communication between 
management and staff was hailed again as a vital facilitator. 
 
11.1.5. Key findings from the middle manager’s role in Q&S - interview study  
Interviews with middle managers showed that they play an important role in the day-to-day 
preservation of quality and patient safety and in its improvement.  The findings revealed their 
specific quality and safety-related work activities, their demands, constraints and choices, and their 
impact on patient experience, service efficiency and error prevention. Demands included 
performance target demands, capacity demands, demands to respond to quality and safety failures, 
to allocate funds, and to maintain clinical staff competency.  The managers reported a genuine and 
strong priority of patient care over finance but described the difficult balance between quality and 
resource availability. 
 
A variety of factors evidently hampered managerial influence over quality and safety. These included 
limited research use and evidence-based practice; poor access to relevant data; financial constraints; 
conflicting targets; negative views of intentions by staff; ambiguous definition of quality and safety; 
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and reactive work reducing time for strategically planning. The managers mostly displayed referent 
power and portrayed little legitimate (position) power. In addition to these constraints there were 
far fewer perceived choices compared with demands. Managers had more control over whether to 
engage in QI programmes and change processes, to strategic plan for quality and safety, and to 
create a good patient safety culture; the majority of which are proactive activities. However, 
inferences are that they may have more choices than they expressed, due to much variation 
between the described demands and choices of managers in the same position. 
 
Lastly, the managers shared many duties and decisions on quality and safety matters with clinical 
staff, who additionally provided managers with knowledge and evidence-base on quality and safety, 
particularly owing to the fact that the managers preferred local hospital evidence to scientific 
evidence.  
 
11.1.6. Key findings from the middle manager’s role in Q&S – self report survey 
study 
A survey study with middle managers quantified the results from the interviews that informed it. 
The majority of managers reported low reinforcing powers, little formal learning, and low time spent 
on quality and patient safety. They predicted an increasing trend of more time spent on quality and 
safety over time and had high scores on safety attitudes to quality and safety. Responses showed 
that finance sometimes overrides safety and exposed some indications of frequent reactive and 
fraught work on quality and safety. The most commonly reported actions were corrective actions to 
manage adverse situations/operational breakdowns, encouraging teamwork on quality and safety 
improvement, monitoring quality and safety targets, and assigning staff to address capacity issues 
that may compromise quality or safety.  Conversely they rarely performed spokesperson or 
figurehead roles involving symbolic duties and acting as a representative. These results confirm the 
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findings from the interviews in the previous chapter that highlights reactive work and indicates that 
their target focus is their predominant proactive activity. Also aligned with the interview findings, 
those in lower middle management positions undertook more reactive ‘disturbance handling’ work. 
The survey results additionally emphasises managerial work on leading teams and dissemination of 
information. As expected from the interviews the managers reported high ownership of referent 
power yet also unexpectedly reported high legitimate power.  These findings are further explored by 
the follow-up survey with clinical staff. 
 
11.1.7. Key findings from the middle manager’s role in Q&S – survey study of 
staff perceptions 
This survey investigated the clinical staff perspective on the middle manager’s role in quality and 
safety by asking them the same questions that were asked of middle managers. Staff consolidated 
the managers’ reports that they displayed good safety attitudes and undertook many actions related 
to quality and safety. They confirmed low time spent and little reward powers owned and that 
managers’ financial considerations sometimes override safety. Also in line with managers’ reports, 
the staff agreed that managers do not know more than clinicians on quality and safety. The findings 
further supported the supposition of reactive work superseding proactive work, as the role of 
‘disturbance handler’ role was reported by staff as the most frequently performed, and the 
managers’ entrepreneurial work was rated as the least frequently performed role. The results 
verified the managers’ indirect impact on safety by clinical staff, through passing on information to 
keep staff up-to-date, producing a work climate and supporting the daily efforts of staff to help 
maintain safety standards. 
  
However, the staff perceived significantly more negative views concerning their managers’ attitudes 
and decisions on safety than the managers reported. These comprised of reports that their manager 
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is aware of remaining patient safety problems and that they have sometimes compromised patient 
safety in favour of other targets. Collectively, the staff were undecided as to whether their 
manager’s actions always showed that patient safety is a top priority. Furthermore, many did not 
feel that their managers were respected or held a positive attitude that makes others more likely to 
listen to them. They also rated significantly less referent power than the managers reported. 
Nevertheless, referent power was one of the two predictors (along with the leader role) that 
explained 70% of the variance of safety attitudes/actions scores.  The inputted predictors for this 
survey and the self-report survey shared three out of the five predictors: the leader and 
disseminator roles and referent power.   
 
The high number of ‘don’t know’ responses demonstrates an unawareness of managerial activities 
on quality and safety. This may be why the staff judged their managers to perform many activities 
more often than the managers stated. They also viewed their manager’s work in quality and safety 
as one of negotiating and networking and perceived significantly more liaising and figurehead role 
activities than the managers reported.  
 
11.2  Overarching emerging themes  
11.2.1 Time spent on quality and safety 
A manager outside of the healthcare sector would unquestionably focus on their end product, the 
quality of the goods and customer satisfaction. Take for example a manager in a paper factory, the 
manager would be interested in the quality of the paper, whether his workers are influencing this 
quality and the feedback from the customer. The studies collectively indicated that, regardless of 
managerial position, the acute care managers do not spend sufficient time on quality and safety. 
Specifically, the findings reveal that most middle managers spend less than half of their time at work 
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on quality and safety. Similarly, CEO and MD prioritisation of quality is perceived insufficient by staff 
within their improvement initiative, supporting the systematic literature review findings on lower 
levels of time spent by senior management on quality improvement. The question then is why is 
patient safety not a complete priority of all acute care managers? Staff wanted their CEOs and MDs 
to spend more time on the QI programme and middle managers openly reported that they wished 
to spend more time on QI and in their daily work. Our findings appear to explain this in a number of 
ways: they perhaps do not hold sufficient knowledge on the matters as they infrequently formally 
learn about the topic and best practice; they view safety as more pertinent to clinical staff; they are 
not/do not believe that they are given the choice due to other work demands; or they do not have 
governing power to contribute more. The following sections explore these points in more depth.  
 
11.2.2 Influence and power 
 
11.2.2.1 Quality and safety activities 
The activities that acute care managers perform in relation to quality and safety represents where 
managers may begin to influence. If we revisit Vincent et al’s framework of contributory factors 
influencing clinical practice, presented within the introduction in      Table 4,[152] we can see that 
the findings confirm that acute care managers contribute to most of the outlined factors. 
Additionally, we found that involvement in these contributory factors/work activities varied by 
management level; while senior managers meet those from other organisations in a bid to share 
lessons for quality improvement, middle management do not play a part in institutional contributory 
factors. In fact, the self-reports showed that external liaison and acting as a figurehead were their 
least performed quality and safety activities at middle management. Instead, these managers are 
particularly responsible for individual staff factors (e.g. competency) and team leadership. Even 
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between the different positions of middle management, there are differences in strategic 
management and fire-fighting, as those in higher positions (e.g. general managers) carry out more 
strategic work and less fire-fighting than those in lower positions (e.g. service delivery managers).  As 
expected, senior and middle managers demonstrated that they influence management and 
organisational factors (financial resources and constraints; organisational structure; policy, standards 
and goals, safety culture and priorities).  However, the senior and middle managers appear to follow 
goals and policies rather than influencing them and although creating a safety culture for 
improvement and of openness were reported and inferred across the tiers of management, the 
participants were not clear about what this involved. Work environmental factors on the other hand 
were regularly influenced by senior and middle managers, through setting staffing levels, allocating 
resources and recruiting a good skill mix. While there was some mention by middle managers to 
checking patient lists to reduce human errors, task and technology factors were not reported. 
 
These findings fit with some propositions of managers’ responsibility for staffing and skill mix,[153], 
staff well-being and performance,[155, 156] leading teams,[157] and adequate resource provision 
and staff professional development.[159] They reveal that managers are in a position where they 
can contribute to factors across the spectrum. 
 
11.2.2.2 Impact on quality and safety 
The studies additionally show that the most impacted areas from routine middle managerial work on 
quality and safety are on patient experience and clinical staff standards. The work for other areas of 
reported impact (on the clinical environment; processes and systems and care pathways; 
identification of patterns of error; and on maintaining a culture of openness for safety) were 
portrayed as choices rather than demands.  Consequently, it is left up to managers to decide what 
and when they wish to impact on these areas. It has been suggested that it is this dependence on 
managers to produce improvements and engage in the quality of clinical work that presents the 
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biggest challenge for healthcare managers and staff.[340] While having the opportunity to choose is 
important for managers, perhaps the choice should be for the way they undertake quality and safety 
tasks, not whether they do it at all. The fact that actions to impact on important areas of quality are 
choices (or at least perceived as choices) is likely to inhibit the managers’ efforts to affect these 
areas. Actions that influence these areas should be outlined as a demand, for example in training. 
Such tangible action-outputs would help make these areas a more viable area for managers to 
impact. In addition to our findings, there is burgeoning literature supporting that these areas of 
impact require contribution from managers. The theory of safety culture has now been accepted as 
applicable to the healthcare setting, supporting the concept of patient safety culture and the 
important impact that management has on it.[161, 341, 342] Professional development has both 
been supported as a leadership activity relevant to patient outcomes,[317] and reported to be on 
par with patient outcomes for improving quality.[343] Managers need to make judgements on the 
clinical competency of nurses and in assigning them accordingly,[153] underlining the importance of 
the impact of decisions on staffing levels on patient safety.[318, 344] Links have also been found 
between HR, training and teamwork and acute care mortality.[227] Our systematic review further 
identified other statistically significant associations between management and impact on processes 
and clinical outcomes of care.  
 
11.2.2.3 Limited power and the management-clinician 
relationship  
We have established that managers are in a position to contribute and impact on an array of facets 
of safe and high quality care. However, our findings also suggest that mid-level managers have 
limited powers to make changes. Theorists have described the importance of power roles in change 
and influence,[71, 76, 235] and the thesis findings have responded to Willmott’s request for an 
understanding of managers’ actions shaped by their power and authority.[59]  Power type possessed 
259 
 
varied by management level; middle managers seem to have lower reinforcing (reward and coercive) 
powers and position power, in contrast to senior managers who often used these powers. For 
example, the CEOs and MDs intervened when doctors resisted SPI practices purely because of their 
position of authority and power to reinforce the doctors’ behaviours. CEOs and MDs used coercive 
power by threatening disciplinary action, and used praise to reinforce staff engagement with the 
programme. Conversely, the middle managers and their staff reported low position, reward and 
coercive powers. The importance of reinforcement as a tool to change behaviour has been long 
established as an important tool for management.[339, 345-347] More unanimously, referent power 
was highly referenced by all managers. Senior and middle managers believe they possess a 
successful interpersonal approach, however clinical staff have a different opinion on this, perceiving 
significantly lower referent power for their managers than managers reported.   
 
Kotter suggested that middle managers build networks and attempt to influence rather than 
instructing.[53] Much literature has asserted that building relationships are essential to good 
practice,[53, 317] and trust has been suggested to hold a positive relationship with quality of care 
[348, 349] and between management and clinicians.[154] An earlier study showed that staff nurses 
are more responsive to personal rather than position power used by hospital managers,[350] and 
personal power has been shown to be more influential than position power in relation to managerial 
effectiveness.[71, 351]  Middle management referent power within the present surveys studies 
showed positive associations with managerial safety scores, unlike their reinforcement powers.  At 
the same time, other research on middle managers’ power in influencing compliance with quality 
policies provides contradictory findings that show position power and reward to be most effective 
for staff and suggest referent power as a relatively ineffective base of power.[235] In the latter 
rather than the former cases, the implications for senior managerial power are encouraging, but for 
middle managerial power are concerning, as they seem to have low reinforcement and report higher 
referent power. The hospital has an extremely hierarchical system with many instances of junior 
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staff afraid to speak up to senior staff, even in life or death situations.[352] These may explain some 
of the influences held by senior managers in granting to over-turn certain bureaucratic procedures 
or allowing staff decisions and actions to make changes. It also explains why MDs were particularly 
involved in engaging medical resistors and provides one reason for why middle managers do not 
hold as much power with clinicians as MDs. Unlike in other organisations, managers in NHS 
organisations rarely hold a greater hierarchical position over many of the staff that they intend to 
influence, such as consultants and nurses. While middle managers hold responsibilities to ensure the 
competency of clinical staff within their service, often direct where and even how they work, control 
what equipment they may have and provide them with resources, they are not their line managers. 
They sit outside of the framework of hierarchy. Even clinical managers are uncertain of their 
authority over other professionals.[236] Our findings indicate that both the clinical and non-clinical 
managers may have little position power. Griffiths (1983) noted this in his early management review 
and advocated methods to encourage position power for managers.[2] Whilst leverage has since 
been gained through managerial control of resources, auditing and enforced targets,[353] it is still 
considered difficult for managers to easily challenge doctors, especially in light of research showing 
that clinicians do not like sharing their power with managers,[354] or do not accept it.[237] Since the 
theoretical concept of relative power is based on the premise that it is relative (that is, one party has 
to be powerless), there could be a power struggle between clinicians and managers, unless some 
quality-related tasks are more distinctly defined as belonging to one party or the other. Within the 
context of quality, there may be managerial role ambiguity,[178] as managers in our studies had 
different ideas to one another on what was in their remit and what work belonged to the clinicians. 
Literature suggests that clinicians believe they are responsible for medical incidents, QI, its definition 
and assessment and that the manager’s job is to allocate resources.[272, 355] A further qualitative 
study with clinical staff would provide further answers to these questions. The managers are in a 
position that fits ‘Instrumental Power’[178, 356] whereby they could use clinical staff power through 
their compliance to influence quality. This is indicated from their impact on quality and safety 
261 
 
indirectly through clinicians as well as their examples of engaging clinician champions to influence 
other staff. This would be a challenge to measure, but could reveal another relevant power base for 
managers in this context and setting. It may not however be a lack of power that deters clinicians 
from following instruction on quality; research shows that clinicians believed hospital managers to 
have higher power but lower professional status.[238] It could instead be the perception of the 
managers’ power base rather than its actuality, for example, in this same study, the managers felt 
that the clinicians had higher power.  
 
 
11.2.2.4 Staff perceptions of managerial intentions  
As shown by our findings and by other studies, it is evident that the manager-clinician working 
relationship is to be essential to the process of delivering good care,[309] and that a difficult working 
relationship can hinder managers’ work and contributions.[83, 239]  Clinical staff view managers as 
preoccupied by finance and targets. This was suggested by both self-reports and peer reports of 
middle and senior management. For example, some middle managers felt that they had to prove 
that they are interested in the safety of patients and not just in keeping down costs, and almost half 
of the clinical staff did not agree that their middle managers’ decisions for safety has overridden 
financial constraints on a number of occasions. Also, some staff thought that CEOs and MDs 
prioritised other financial work over their quality initiative. This supports suggestions that  clinicians 
can view managers to hold an unbeneficial focus on  financial resources over good quality care,[321] 
leading to negative perceptions of managers on financial aid and hidden motives.[272]  Indeed, the 
balancing act of finance and quality was described frequently, which may explain one reason behind 
this perception. A limited budget forced a difficult choice between an individual patient’s safety and 
the overarching benefits for safety for all patients within the service. This can be referred to as 
managerial intentions for the ‘greater good’ of all patients. Other damaging perceptions that differ 
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from middle manager’s own are that staff perceive less managerial respect, optimism, referent 
power, and poorer safety attitudes/actions. These negative perceptions may diminish power held by 
managers, as theory explains that in order to influence, person A (in this case the manager) requires 
person B (staff member) to recognise a quality in the manager which would motivate staff to change 
in the way the manager requests.[76] Constant communication was reported across our studies as 
the biggest facilitator between management and staff. For example, two-way exchanges at 
leadership walk rounds were found helpful by both CEOs, MDs and the staff involved. This is 
supported by evidence illustrating the contribution of frequent open communication between 
managers and staff towards good organisational safety, as well as indications within healthcare that 
the two groups are particularly disconnected, despite their many joint responsibilities.[86, 147] 
More formal communication strategies are discussed within the implications and recommendations 
below. 
 
11.2.2.5 Knowledge, training & access 
The findings expose a weakness in quality and safety knowledge, research, training and access to 
quality and safety information across the board, despite a call for managerial knowledge on this. The 
systematic review revealed expertise and training in quality at the Board to be linked with high 
performing hospitals.[194] Whilst not all the studies showed a link between knowledge at the Board 
and outcomes of care,[201] other empirical studies implied the benefits of improving quality 
expertise of senior managers and the need for it.[193, 195] Our studies showed that managers use 
minimal scientific research or evidence-based practice. For example, only 2% of middle managers 
reported daily use of journals and 18% reporting never to use them at all. Moreover, colleagues 
supply middle managers with information on quality and safety rather than the other way around, 
and MDs make efforts to teach Board managers QI principles. Clinical colleagues use more evidence-
base and are considered more knowledgeable on quality and safety than middle managers. This may 
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explain why MDs rather than CEOs (the large majority of whom were non-clinicians) referenced 
bringing the evidence on QI to Board meetings. In line with this, clinical middle managers access 
more frequently avenues to learn about quality and safety (i.e. conferences/workshops, websites, 
and journals). The role of the middle manager in the implementation of evidence-based healthcare 
practices has been suggested to be a less influential one than that of clinical staff.[210]  This 
supports earlier assertions that managers cannot use research as well as clinicians,[214] and a 
general reflection in the literature that managers have been slow on the uptake of the evidence-
based approach.[216, 217] According to our findings, this applied to hospital managers’ work in the 
context of quality and safety.  This finding is a significant one, as the important area of evidence-
based practice by middle managers within acute care has been highlighted for some time.[93] 
Researchers have advocated management adoption of evidence-based practices as a solution to 
dealing with management poor practices [215]  and have proposed that managers should encourage 
a research culture.[214] Few studies offer guidance on the quality and safety literature available for 
managers [357] or help to improve the relevance and transferability of research to healthcare 
managers.[358-360] Leaders are not always equipped to manage system changes[8] and 
professionals state that healthcare managers are not provided with the correct tools to play out 
their crucial role for safety and quality improvement efforts.[209] Others go as far as to state that 
some NHS managers lack the analytical skills, motivation and time to manage and interpret 
performance.[361] Experts agree that managerial leaders need to be well informed of what is 
required of them for QI,[285] and recommend learning fundamental skills including knowledge of 
improvement methodology, establishing clear goals compatible at the strategic level, knowledge of 
where to invest resources and the ability to foster the right culture.[209] It is not enough that 
managers learn from staff, especially as clinicians themselves do not necessarily have a good 
understanding of QI.[272] 
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Managers value local evidence on safety issues within their service, yet data access, usability and 
information are inadequate. The access has too many layers, is not user-friendly and the systems 
vary by hospital site. The information can be inaccurate, irrelevant or misleading, over-detailed, or 
out-of-date, often due to poor data coding. The data is quantitative only and the managers are 
reliant on others to send on data. The IOM Quality chasm report defined that accessibility to 
information is one of the key aspects of an effective micro-system,[8] and later reasserted that 
access and sharing of clinical data and patient safety events need to improve and be better 
understood, through enhancement of information infrastructures and data standards used.[362] The 
thesis findings suggest this is still in need of improvement and detrimental to managers’ work on 
quality. Better information systems and coding of the data will enable better informed managers to 
flag issues.  
 
11.2.3  Reactive management versus proactive long term improvement  
 
11.2.3.1 Reactive work  
The middle managers work on quality of care and patient safety is illustrated as reactive, fraught and 
unplanned. This finding is akin to both Stewart’s Type 1 work pattern and to Mintzberg’s managerial 
role of the ‘disturbance handler’, which comprises of behaviours such as taking corrective action to 
cope with adverse situations or operational breakdowns. It supports other findings that managers’ 
jobs are characteristically fragmented and varied,[43, 54, 88, 89] fast paced,[49] and reactive to 
circumstance.[55] It further complements propositions that managers might have a choice to carry 
out work in this way.[47] The difficulty may lie in a recognition that the effective manager’s work is 
often a reaction to initiatives by others as opposed to plans made by managers.[53] Theorists have 
presented it as commonplace for managerial work to be responsive to circumstances and self-
defined.[52, 55] Yet our studies indicate that reactive work may reduce the time managers can 
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spend on long term solutions, preventative methods, generally reducing their capacity to 
strategically plan and make changes to system and processes for long term quality improvement. 
 
11.2.3.2 Strategic planning  
The hospital manager has a responsibility to plan strategic change of medical policies and address 
issues after rather than before they have occurred.[153] Planning for the long-term development of 
patient safety has been defined in the current literature as an important managerial behaviours for 
safety,[160, 363] and for continuous quality improvement.[277, 321] From the thesis literature 
reviews, strategic functions were plentiful at the Board level, but little was found on lower 
management strategic planning.[87] Our studies mirror this pattern of findings, with CEOs and MDs 
often involved in strategic decision making, advising staff on the directions to take, ensuring that 
they are keeping to plans, and considering to embed lessons learnt and practices for future 
sustainability of the programme. While there was a host of forward-thinking on quality and safety by 
the middle managers, a large proportion of this appears to be target-driven or a choice rather than a 
demand. For example, many of the managers that were involved in QI efforts, volunteered to do so. 
A recent report has identified that middle managers are not involved in high profile organisation-
wide improvement initiatives,[364] and accusations exist of insufficient substantiation of adept 
managerial strategising or devising policies.[88] In short, more prescribed strategy work is required. 
 
11.3  Methodological Issues 
In addition to the specific limitations presented per Chapter, the following section presents the key 
limitations and strengths that are both substantive and relevant across multiple studies within this 
thesis. 
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11.3.1 Theoretical lens 
Stewart’s framework has provided us with a useful lens to analyse managerial work within the 
context of quality and safety. It is an approach that enables a structured comparison of different 
aspects of the manager’s work and explains the divergence of how various managers see their job. 
The model takes into account options and flexibility and whether the manager’s position 
accommodates desired contributions by the manager. Aside from Stewart’s own work, little 
application of the model has been published over the last 30 years since its inception. While there 
has been some use of the framework to explore the managerial work of company managing 
directors and self-employed managers,[365, 366] Lowe emphasises that most academic research on 
manager’s work have ignored the implications that can be drawn from Stewarts model.[367] 
Management research in healthcare would benefit from employment of this helpful framework to 
elucidate managers’ work. In retrospect I would have retrieved more explicit confirmation that 
certain work is considered a choice or a demand, however the work has since been presented to 
middle managers and clinicians in the form of a talk and the audience concurred with the findings 
presented.  
 
Similarly, Mintzberg’s roles and French and Raven’s power bases, have allowed us to examine 
managerial work and power with deep-rooted theoretical grounding. There may be an argument for 
using more recent theories, but the ones chosen were both well-established, peer-reviewed and 
facilitated measurement of categories of power and work roles. They further offered a pragmatic 
approach which is relevant to the thesis aims to offer practical recommendations to managers. 
Consequently, the work-activity group theories have helped to elucidate what acute care managers 
actually do and how they may influence.[46, 53, 55] 
 
This work has further responded to critique of work-activity theory by offering context and 
environmental factors that have been previously overlooked.[49, 55] However, while true that 
267 
 
before we can understand rationale for managers’ actions we need to identify what they are, future 
research could investigate some missing tenets, such as investigating the organisational factors that 
are affected by managerial actions.[59] Similarly, using another unit of analysis, that of the 
organisation rather than the managers, may also offer new findings. For example, the case hospitals 
may be organisations with ‘Technocratic power’ ruled by expert power.[368] Collection of case study 
documentation may have further revealed relevant information,[369] yet upon consideration of the 
existing documentation, it was decided that it would not add great value to this specific topic. 
 
11.3.2 Mixed-methods approach & design 
This thesis has drawn upon a mixture of methodologies, including a robust review of the literature, 
use of qualitative methods for depth and has employed quantitative methods to quantify the issues 
raised. The spectrum of populations used additionally helped provide further dimension to the 
overall thesis, i.e. senior managers, middle managers and clinicians. As did the focal points of 
investigation: daily quality and safety and a specific improvement initiative case study.  The choice of 
including two levels of management and QI and routine quality work may appear segmented, 
however it has enriched the findings on managers’ work in situational contexts relevant to quality 
and safety, as intended. It also offers a starting point for further study on both areas of investigation. 
Time allowing, studies on senior management contributions to quality in their everyday work would 
have been examined. 
 
The studies were cross-sectional in their designs, which is restrictive to the point in time the data 
was collected. An experimental design would have provided a more robust case for suppositions 
made from the data, but was considered not yet appropriate for such a novel topic on which little 
exploratory work exists. Some may argue that the sample sizes are small, however when considering 
triangulation of samples and the number of CEOs, MDs and middle managers in the wider 
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population, the study samples represent a reasonable proportion for generalisations to be made. 
The sample of clinical staff respondents would have been more robust had they been recruited 
across all ten NHS Trusts as were the managers’ self-reports. 
 
11.3.3 Subjective reports  
Whilst some studies alone suffer from biases connected with self-reports, in all instances they have 
been balanced with peer reports, additionally providing extra rigor through synthesis of data.  
However, reports generally suffer from inaccuracy, especially as the peer reporters have shown to 
be unaware of many aspects of the managers’ work. Observations for example would have helped to 
provide a more objective reality of the work of the manager. Moreover, during the time of this 
project, the UK has been steeped in a political context that is likely to have exacerbated the 
managers’ desire to appear as though they are managing more than they are. The interview period 
started five months after the government white paper announced that a significant number of 
hospital managers, especially at the middle tier, will be made redundant over the next four years.  
The socio-political situation may have caused higher levels of self-protective bias than would have 
been present at other times. 
 
11.3.4 Retrospective data analysis  
Part of the analyses for this thesis was carried out retrospectively on data that originally did not 
intend to focus on this question alone. Due to this, an hour interview comprised of questioning on 
topics central to SPI rather than on the senior management involvement alone. Consequently, the 
richness of the data was less than the interviews with middle managers. Additionally, the term “we” 
used by CEOs and MDs was not always questioned, which resulted in slightly less information around 
the topic of senior management than designing from fresh would have offered. That said, a strength 
of the analysis on these transcripts was that the participants were less conscious that the questions 
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on their involvement and on SPI generally would form a study concentrating entirely on their part in 
the programme.  This should have reduced biases to portray themselves in the best light possible. 
 
11.4  Future research 
 
The design limitations outlined present some direction for future research. Improvements would 
include longitudinal designs and larger samples sizes and better matched sample populations. 
Observations shadowing managers at work in their hospital would substantiate time spent and 
activities actually undertaken rather than reported. Experimental designs to see which power bases 
are effective in quality and safety work would complement our data showing which reported powers 
the managers have. Examination of the power struggle between middle managers and clinical staff 
and the ambiguity surrounding their different perceptions of power, could be extended in order to 
understand which professional group best use particular powers to influence quality. This would 
expose which powers to enhance for clinicians and which to develop for managers and allow for 
more certainty and consistency in recommendations. These studies could pair up clinicians with 
specific managers, which would help highlight individual variables associated with the specific 
manager.  
 
The research for this thesis did not aim to link the time, power and work performed on quality and 
safety with objective outcome measures. This was due to the aims of the research and the nature of 
the case study examined. The challenge for follow up studies would be to strive to make these links 
by accounting for the host of confounding variables that may be responsible for success or good 
performance outcomes at some Trusts/departments over others. Further work could also explore 
patterns of the types of managerial work, demands and choices and time spent in organisations that 
have been recognised as high achievers in quality and safety (targets, clinical outcomes, awards and 
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audits) and compared with those that are struggling with these achievements. The model presented 
for the senior management involvement in SPI could provide the foundation for a quantitative 
examination that could potentially be linked to patterns in processes and outcomes.  
 
Finally, to offer both a greater awareness of quality and safety to managers and to assess whether 
they would improve their knowledge through training on quality and safety, findings-based 
workshops for managers would be a suitable translational project from these findings. The Head of 
Leadership Management (DB) at Imperial College NHS Trust and I used the findings from the middle 
manager interviews in Chapter 8 to add a quality and safety competency to the ‘Imperial College 
Healthcare NHS Trust Management Competency Framework’, which acts as a continued professional 
development training for managers. Alongside this was developed an example seminar schedule 
(Appendix 26) that could be used with pre and post knowledge assessment to identify any 
improvement in managers’ understanding and use after the training.  
 
11.5  Implications 
The following outlines overarching implications based on the findings of the work within this thesis. 
These comprise of governmental and organisational policy implications and managerial practice 
implications.   
 
11.5.1 Governmental policy implications 
The UK government should give due consideration to the consequences of hospital middle manager 
redundancies on quality of care. This thesis has presented clear evidence that middle managers are 
involved in a variety of activities that have an undeniable impact on quality and patient safety. The 
cuts may reduce patient experience, identification of quality failures and process/system changes to 
avoid them. It is also likely that pressures associated with trouble shooting capacity issues are likely 
to worsen. Arrangements should be made to re-distribute important patient safety and quality-
related managerial tasks to others that have the time to manage them. Indirect activities that impact 
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quality through clinical staff or that rely on safety knowledge might be well redistributed to senior 
clinical staff. Examples of both are actions to ensure clinical competence, up-to-date training and 
qualifications, and quality and staff safety knowledge. The findings show that senior management 
already take control of much of the strategic planning and are in the best position to establish an 
appropriate patient safety culture. Therefore, less middle managers would result in a need for 
greater senior management responsibilities on these areas. Departmental/speciality budgets and 
targets would ideally stay in the hands of the remaining middle managers, because a distance from 
clinical ground work may be beneficial in making choices for the greater good of the patients. In this 
instance, the number of targets may need to be reduced to avoid managers becoming over-
burdened by them. Further exploration of which acute care professionals may be best placed to 
assume certain mid-managerial responsibilities would be welcome.  
 
In light of an obvious lack of quality and safety information resources used by managers, the 
Department of Health should contemplate developing avenues of guidance for managers on quality 
and safety, especially after sources cited to be used by managers are disbanded, such as the NPSA 
website. This information source can be used as a starting basis of what information and design 
managers find useful, and a portal entrance to the website can be designed exclusively for 
management. For example, the content should be aimed at managers, with more information 
relating to practical examples of learning across hospitals, and less scientific technology jargon. Our 
findings also show that MDs use national guidance and governmental papers to enlighten Board 
managers on QI. Alerts sent to MDs and CEOs by the DoH on crucial papers on quality improvement 
would further encourage this behaviour. 
 
In one of the latest white papers from the DoH on patient safety, they vowed that success will no 
longer be measured through bureaucratic process targets.[334] Considering the priority placed on 
governmental mandatory targets, this may go some way to undo the focus that appears to be 
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specifically motivating managers on their quality and safety work and prioritisation. The government 
should re-evaluate their national bureaucratic process targets to identify what does and does not 
help managers. They should make an effort to address conflicting targets, specifically finance and 
quality, and assert the importance of approaches for longer term improvement. On the other hand, 
successful strategic planning by managers comprises of setting objectives and goals and planning to 
attain considered outputs. A less instructed centralised format of target guidance may reduce the 
difficulties of irrelevant and excessive targets, but still retain encouragement from the national body. 
 
 
11.5.2 Organisational policy implications 
One pertinent question raised from the examination of senior and middle managers’ work in quality 
is where are the quality and safety role models? If time spent on quality by all managers is 
constrained and their knowledge is not up-to-date, surely staff cannot look to them as exemplars. 
From findings on MD knowledge and research, and their authority due to clinical chain of command, 
they may be best placed to champion staff. Staff also value the importance placed on quality by 
CEOs and their displays of commitment and communication on QI. Therefore senior management 
should invest in regular walk rounds and deliver quality-related presentations, regardless of whether 
they have taken up an improvement programme. As all managers greatly referenced their financial 
priorities/work, senior management should offer clear direction on the priorities of quality versus 
finance. In consideration of this, one recommendation is to approach quality in a more articulated 
way, as possibly finance is expressed.  
 
Forward and strategic planning should be clarified as a demand rather than a choice; a more 
formalised approach on long term issues could be facilitated by protected time for planned work on 
resolving reoccurring/systemic problems.  Lessons could to be taken from research on organisational 
learning and applied systems approaches. These actions towards reducing fire-fighting would 
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especially help those at the lower levels of middle management. Converting perceived choices to 
demands on many of the managerial activities for quality improvement could be accomplished by 
adding these to the manager’s training. Closer examination could identify which perceived choices 
would be most beneficial to quality if articulated as a demand, and show how or where this should 
be conveyed. 
 
In response to managers’ inadequate formal education on quality and safety and their wish to 
perform more research and take advantage of evidence-based best practice, the managers should 
be supplied with more compulsory and optional training. At minimum, induction training should 
include a section dedicated to quality and patient safety. This could better define quality and explain 
the manager’s contribution to it.  To reduce the ambiguity derived from the broad definition of 
quality of care, a set of manager-led examples of actions classified under each of the well-known 
dimensions of quality (i.e. safe, efficient, accessible, patient centred, equitable) could help clarify 
patient safety and quality and the manager’s role in it and, if formalised, could avoid the mixed 
perceptions of limited choices. Quality improvement techniques should also be taught within the 
curriculum and a clear distinction should be made between health and safety for staff and safety for 
patients. Such information could be added to existing vocational training, alongside clinical staff.  
 
Internal data access to incident alerts and complaints should be improved, particularly in respect to 
streamlining and de-layering the complex information technology systems that currently exist. 
Simple steps could ensure that managers view the incidents relevant to them more often, such as 
clearer defined categories on what is an administrative issue and what is a potential safety issue and 
stricter coding of data. Data input personnel should be taught the importance of accurate 
information and of removing out-of-date entries. A feedback loop from management could allow 
them to state why certain information is misleading, so that the protocol for logging can be changed. 
Where relevant, qualitative information should be added to the quantitative data to offer richness 
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on incidents. Particularly in the event of hospital mergers, IT systems should be integrated where 
possible, yet the organisation should be careful to avoid a centralised approach that does not offer 
sufficient detail at the specialty level.  
 
Better information access could also enhance middle managerial influence by enabling utilisation of 
their high information power. Their influence would be further strengthened by senior management 
announcements that aim to emphasise the authority of middle managers and by affording them 
with more reinforcing powers. However, more research is needed to understand the effect of these 
restricted powers and how to empower managers with them.  
 
11.5.3 Managerial practice implications 
 
The findings from this thesis have provided research-based illustration of the type of activities and 
impact that senior and middle managers presently can have. This could act as a guide for managers 
on their daily work and for those thinking of carrying out structured improvements. The implications 
are that the leader and disseminator roles and referent power are the most predictive of safety 
attitudes and actions of managers, suggesting that managers should pay greater attention to these 
within the context of safety.   
 
Stronger clinician-management communication is necessary at all management levels. Presently, 
clinical staff are not fully aware of many of their managers’ actions on quality and safety or on 
quality improvement. They believe that managers are less respected and optimistic, have worse 
safety attitudes/actions than perceived by managers, and hold perceptions of managers as more 
finance-driven than quality-driven. Recommendations are for better visibility of certain actions that 
may be hidden from the frontlines, such as integrating improvement practices into organisational 
systems. Additionally, separate findings suggest that constant communication acts as a facilitator of 
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work on QI and that recognition, praise, and awareness should be regularly expressed by the senior 
managers on frontline improvement work.  A better structured arrangement for feedback from staff 
following their discussions with managers could help narrow their difference of opinions. Managers 
could formalise opportunities for networking between managers and clinicians on quality and safety, 
(particularly for non-clinical managers) through official pairing and joint learning on quality and 
safety. Opportunities may also be sought for forums to listen to the views of clinical staff on how 
managers’ work on quality and safety is perceived. The managers could in turn respond with case 
study examples of their contributions and present their philosophy for the greater good of the 
patients. Such exchanges would aim to provide a better transparency and reduce any 
misperceptions there may be of managerial intentions, as well as offer managers an understanding 
of the reasoning behind clinical views of best practice for their patients. Regular routine visits to the 
clinical areas could further aid the manager-clinician relationship and assist identification of safety 
risks and equipment needs, particularly for those working on a number of sites.  
 
Literature on power resolution and shared care models provide some suggestions for healthcare 
managers to overcome hierarchical and inter-professional power imbalance.[370-372] In recognition 
that present hospital professional powers and structures lessen managers’ control, managerial 
actions to improve change management include attainment of trust and equilibrium between 
altruism and self-interest. Specifically, managers should openly express that, in addition to patient 
centeredness, they respect the importance of professional self-development and protection. 
Managers can then explain how quality of care responsibilities and competencies can enhance 
these. Considering that different autonomies (clinical, practice and organisational) are important at 
different times, the manager should attempt to change the most relevant one to their situation. 
Political managerial behaviour can assist the clinician-manager balance of autonomy protection and 
resource-dependence (i.e. the need for one another’s resources), through careful negotiations and 
considered and reserved use of owned powers.[370] 
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At the time of submission of this thesis, the official report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Public Inquiry was published.[6] In this report, management action and inaction was confirmed 
as culpable for much of the safety and quality failings at the hospitals. Pertinent conclusions are of 
the financial pressures that overshadowed managerial decisions at the expense of quality, and 
mismatched and under-allocated resources for staffing surpassed by a prioritisation of finance and 
Foundation Trust status. Inattention to poor care was put down to a lack of priority at the Board, 
with no effective action taken by them in response to staff and patient dissatisfaction. The report 
recommends leaders to set examples, ensure staff comply with set standards, and research best 
practice. Proposals are that they should also be held accountable for quality and safety, along with a 
code of standards for all managers and a list of leader competencies.  These accord with the findings 
and implications set out within this thesis and illustrate the current relevance and importance of the 
present work. 
 
11.6  Concluding remarks 
The studies within this thesis collectively enhance our understanding of the work of acute care 
managers in the context of quality and patient safety. The research indicates that managers can 
hugely contribute to quality and safety and its improvement, but only if they are given the tools and 
powers to do so and make the right choices. Managers should be provided with explicit guidance on 
quality and safety activities as illustrated in this thesis. There is a need for better access to 
information and education together with protected time for research and proactive strategies to 
improve quality. Regular communication with clinicians on quality and safety matters is vital at all 
management levels and middle management may further benefit from additional position and 
reinforcing powers.  I believe and hope that this work will provide a starting foundation for further 
work on this neglected topic.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 Systematic review search strategies 
Key: /=MeSH term; ti=title; ab=abstract; $=truncation; *=focus of search & substitution; exp=explode; adj=adjacent to  
 
MEDLINE SEARCH  
Step Search strategy formula 
1 
((safe$.ti,ab. or exp Safety/ or Err$.ti,ab. or Adverse.ti,ab.) and (exp *Risk Management/ or exp medical Errors/ or 
Safety Management/ or Medical Audit.mp.)) or exp Health Care Quality/ or patient centred care/ or length of stay/ 
or exp consumer satisfaction/ or patient readmission/ or exp evidence based medicine/ or exp "outcome and 
process assessment (health care)"/ or exp Quality Indicators, healthcare/ or quality assurance, health care/ or exp 
clinical audit/ or exp program evaluation/ or guideline adherence/ or (patient centred care or length of stay or 
customer satisfaction or patient satisfaction or medical audit or clinical audit or clinical effectiveness or 
performance measurement or outcome assessment or process assessment or guideline adherence or compliance to 
practice$1 or benchmarking or patient centred care or incident report$ or infection control or patient readmission 
or evidence based medicine or (evidence based adj2 practice) or waiting times or patient experience or complaints 
or target$1 or clinical excellence or service excellence or quality).ti,ab. 
2 
exp Hospital/ or (hospital$ or secondary care or acute care or health care organi*ation$1 or healthcare 
organi*ation$1 or infirmar$).ti,ab. 
3 
exp Health Facility Administrators/ or Governing board/ or (Manager$1 or Matron$1 or CEO$1 or executive$1 or 
director$3 or board$1 or middle management or senior management or lower management or frontline 
management or leader$4 or president$1 or head of department$1.ti,ab. or department head$1.ti,ab. or head of 
nursing or administrator$1 or healthcare administration or (chief adj4 officer$1) or (chief adj4 nurs$) or (chief adj4 
operation$1) or (chief adj4 service$1) or chief of staff).ti,ab. 
4 1 and 2 and 3 
5 limit 4 to (human and English language and yr=”1983-Current”) 
 
 
EMBASE SEARCH 
Step Search strategy formula 
1 
((exp Safety/ or Safe$.ti,ab. or Err$.ti,ab. or Adverse.ti,ab.) and (Health Care Quality.mp. or exp Health Care 
Organization/ or Health$.ti,ab.)) or exp Health Care Quality/ or clinical effectiveness/ or incident report/ or nursing 
outcome/ or performance measurement system/ or quality of nursing care/ or length of stay/ or hospital 
readmission/ or evidence based medicine/ or exp outcome assessment/ or quality control/ or medical audit/ or 
patient satisfaction/ or (patient centred care or length of stay or customer satisfaction or patient satisfaction or 
medical audit or clinical audit or clinical effectiveness or performance measurement or outcome assessment or 
process assessment or guideline adherence or compliance to practice$1 or benchmarking or patient centred care or 
incident report$ or infection control or patient readmission or evidence based medicine or (evidence based adj2 
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practice) or waiting times or patient experience or complaints or target$1 or clinical excellence or service 
excellence or quality).ti,ab. 
2 
exp Hospital/ or Health care organization/ or (hospital$ or secondary care or acute care or health care 
organi*ation$1 or healthcare organi*ation$1 or infirmar$).ti,ab. 
3 
exp manager/ or (Manager$1 or Matron$1 or CEO$1 or executive$1 or director$3 or board$1 or middle 
management or senior management or lower management or frontline management or leader$4 or president$1 or 
head of nursing or head of department$1.ti,ab. or department head$1.ti,ab. or administrator$1 or healthcare 
administration or health care administration or (chief adj4 officer$1) or (chief adj4 nurs$).ti,ab. or (chief adj4 
operation$).ti,ab. or (chief adj4 service$).ti,ab. or chief of staff).ti,ab. 
4 1 and 2 and 3 
5 limit 4 to (human and English language and yr=”1983-Current”) 
 
 
PSYCHINFO SEARCH 
Step Search strategy formula 
1 
((exp Safety/ or Safe$.ti,ab. or Err$.ti,ab. or Adverse.ti,ab.) and (Health Care Quality.mp. or risk management/ or 
Health$.ti,ab.)) or exp quality of care/ or quality control/ or Quality of Services/ or Treatment Duration/ or exp 
consumer satisfaction/ or exp client satisfaction/ or exp evidence based medicine/ or clinical audit/ or (patient 
centred care or length of stay or customer satisfaction or patient satisfaction or medical audit or clinical audit or 
clinical effectiveness or performance measurement or outcome assessment or process assessment or guideline 
adherence or compliance to practice$1 or benchmarking or patient centred care or incident report$ or infection 
control or patient readmission or evidence based medicine or (evidence based adj2 practice) or waiting times or 
patient experience or complaints or target$1 or clinical excellence or service excellence or quality).ti,ab. 
2 
Hospitals/ or (hospital$ or secondary care or acute care or health care organi*ation$1 or healthcare organi*ation$1 
or infirmar$).ti,ab. 
3 
exp Management Personnel/ or exp Hospital Administration/ or (Manager$1 or Matron$1 or CEO$1 or executive$1 
or director$3 or board$1 or middle management or senior management or lower management or frontline 
management or leader$4 or president$1 or head of department$1.ti,ab. or department head$1.ti,ab. or head of 
nursing or administrator$1 or healthcare administration or (chief adj4 officer$1) or (chief adj4 nurs$) or (chief adj4 
operation$1) or (chief adj4 service$1) or chief of staff).ti,ab. 
4 1 and 2 and 3 
5 limit 4 to (human and English language and yr=”1983-Current”) 
 
 
HMIC SEARCH 
Step Search strategy formula 
1 
((exp Safety/ or Safe$.ti,ab. or Err$.ti,ab. or Adverse.ti,ab.) and (Health Care Quality.mp. or Health$.ti,ab.)) or exp 
quality assurance in health services/ or patient centred care/ or hospital stay duration/ or exp consumer 
satisfaction/ or patient readmission/ or exp evidence based medicine/ or exp outcomes/ or benchmarking/ or 
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(patient centred care or length of stay or customer satisfaction or patient satisfaction or medical audit or clinical 
audit or clinical effectiveness or performance measurement or outcome assessment or process assessment or 
guideline adherence or compliance to practice$1 or benchmarking or patient centred care or incident report$ or 
infection control or patient readmission or evidence based medicine or (evidence based adj2 practice) or quality 
improvement or waiting times or patient experience or complaints or target$1 or clinical excellence or service 
excellence or quality).ti,ab. 
2 
Acute Hospitals/ or hospital care/ or (hospital$ or secondary care or acute care or health care organi*ation$1 or 
healthcare organi*ation$1 or infirmar$).ti,ab. 
3 
exp managers/ or "middle and lower management"/ or senior managers/ or top management/ or (Manager$1 or 
Matron$1 or CEO$1 or executive$1 or director$3 or board$1 or middle management or senior management or 
lower management or frontline management or leader$4 or president$1 or head of department$1 or department 
head$1 or head of nursing or administrator$1 or healthcare administration or (chief adj4 officer$1) or (chief adj4 
nurs$) or (chief adj4 operation$1) or (chief adj4 service$1) or chief of staff).ti,ab. 
4 1 and 2 and 3 
5 limit 4 to (human and English language and yr=”1983-Current”) 
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Appendix 2 Kappa descriptives for inter-rater reliability on inclusion of 
systematic review articles 
 
 
 
 AR rater 
Total Yes/Maybe No 
AP rater Yes/Maybe 18 53 71 
No 109 2887 2996 
Total 127 2940 3067 
Kappa value = .157    p = 0.00 (95% agreement) 
AP rater by AR rater crosstabulation at title/abstract stage 
 
 
 
 DG rater 
Total Yes/Maybe No 
AP rater Yes/Maybe 17 10 27 
No 164 1343 1507 
Total 181 1353 1534 
Kappa value = .137    p = 0.00 (89% agreement) 
AP rater by DG rater crosstabulation at title/abstract stage 
 
 
  
 
AR rater 
Total Yes No Maybe Non-empirical 
AP 
rater 
Yes 7 2 2 0 11 
No 0 10 1 0 11 
Maybe 1 2 0 0 3 
 Non-empirical 0 0 0 5 5 
Total 8 14 3 5 30 
Kappa value = .615    p = 0.00 (73% agreement) 
AP rater by AR rater crosstabulation at full text stage 
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Appendix 3 Inclusion/exclusion criteria for systematic review
 
      
Population sample 
 
Type of paper Country Language 
Study 
design 
Aims or focus Setting 
Population group 
reported on 
Types of managers Level of management 
Inclusion Empirical Data Any English Any (e.g. 
qualitative, 
quantitative 
or mixed 
methods) 
Aim to identify, 
describe or test 
types of managerial 
activities (i.e. 
behaviours, actions, 
role) relating to  
Q&S and QSI 
 
Acute care Acute care 
Managers 
Clinical & operational managers  
(E.g. general managers, service managers, 
service delivery managers, directorate 
managers, Matrons, Ward managers, chief 
operating officer, chief executive officer or 
clinical directors or board executives or  US 
administrators) Q&S managers: case 
managers, quality managers, risk managers, 
quality improvement managers (mark as QM) 
Includes any levels of 
management (e.g. 
senior or middle 
management) 
Exclusion Commentary/opinion 
papers; literature 
reviews; editorials; 
conference 
proceedings; books 
guides; manuals; 
leaflets; conference 
proceedings; seminar 
proceedings; meeting  
notes; internal 
letters;  Single case 
studies;  and case 
studies that have no 
methods description. 
 
None Non-
English 
None Managers’ 
perceptions, 
knowledge, 
attitudes, 
awareness, 
competencies, 
leadership styles, or 
contextual issues 
(e.g. system barriers 
to involvement) of 
Q&S. Quality of cost 
of care. 
All other 
non acute 
care 
healthcare 
settings 
and all 
other 
industries 
Managers from 
other settings (e.g. 
governmental 
Boards, primary 
care);  Senior 
clinicians (e.g. 
Clinician leaders 
such as 
consultants)  
Those whose main position is to deal with 
financial management responsibilities 
 
Other very specialist managers, e.g. materials 
specialist manager or information manager  
                                                   
Managers whose official role is quality and 
safety, e.g. quality manager 
none 
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Appendix 4 Full review screening for systematic review 
 
 
Article ID:  
 
Stage 1 
A Aim: Is the aim of the article to investigate work activities/engagement/time? yes no unclear 
B Context: Are the work activities in the context of Quality & Safety? yes no unclear 
C Setting: Is the setting in acute health care (i.e. hospitals)? yes no unclear 
D Sample Described: Are the work activities described those of managers? yes no unclear 
 
If no to any of the above then exclude and do not proceed to stage 2.  
If yes to all, proceed to Stage 2. 
 
Proceed to stage 2 yes  no 
 
Stage 2 
Type: Is it an empirical study? yes no unclear 
 
If yes, tick box Yes 
If unclear, tick box Maybe 
If no tick box Yes commentary 
Yes   
Maybe  
Yes commentary  
 
Terms to identify the inclusion criteria 
 
A) Role Definition: Any activities carried out at work 
Key Terms: Role, tasks, work, responsibilities, activities, function, duties, undertaking, briefs, 
assignments, projects, errands, jobs, etc. 
Not: impact on quality & safety, managers competencies or knowledge on quality & safety etc 
B) QUALITY &/or 
SAFETY 
Definition:  Safe, effective, patient-centred, timely efficient and equitable care.  
Key Terms Quality: Health Care Quality or length of stay or mortality or hospital readmission or 
exp evidence based medicine or evidence based practice or exp outcome assessment or quality 
control or medical audit or patient satisfaction or patient centred care or length of stay or 
mortality or customer satisfaction or patient readmission or evidence based medicine or or 
waiting times or patient experience or complaints or target(s) or clinical excellence or service 
excellence or quality or patient safety or medical errors or adverse events  
Not: Cost 
C) ACUTE CARE Definition: Organisations that are involved in short term medical care for severe injury/illness or 
recovering from surgery, usually in a hospital 
Key Terms: hospital(s) or acute care or acute care or health care organisation(s) 
Not: All other non acute care healthcare settings and all other industries 
D) POPULATION 
MANAGEMENT 
Definition: A manager is a person that manages staff and has budgetary and service 
responsibilities. All levels of management are included (frontline managers, middle managers, 
senior managers, Board) 
Key Terms: General managers, service managers, service delivery managers, directorate 
managers, divisional managers, manager(s) or matron(s) or CEO(s) or executive(s) or director(s) 
or board(s) or middle management or senior management or leader(s) or president(s) or head(s) 
of nursing or head(s) of department(s) or department head(s) or administrator(s) or healthcare 
administration or chief officer(s) or chief(s) of staff, etc. 
Not: Clinician leaders such as consultants that do not hold budgetary responsibilities, those with 
financial management responsibilities, those with an official role in quality & safety (e.g. clinical 
governance managers, quality managers, risk managers)/ 
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Appendix 5 Quality assessment for included systematic review articles 
 
  
1 
Baker 
et al, 
2010 
2 
Balding 
et al, 
2005 
3 
Bradely 
et al, 
2003 
4 
Bradely 
et al, 
2006 
5 
Braithwaite 
et al, 
2004 
6 Caine  
& 
Kenwrick, 
1997 
7 Fox 
et al, 
1999 
8 
Harris, 
2000 
9 Jha 
and 
Epstein, 
2010 
10 
Jiang 
et al, 
2008 
11 
Jiang 
et al, 
2009 
12 
Joshi 
& 
Hines, 
2006 
13 
Levey 
et al, 
2007 
14 
Mastal, 
2007 
15 
Poniatowski 
et al, 
2005 
16 
Prybil 
et al, 
2010 
17 
Saint 
et al, 
2010 
18 
Vaughn 
et al, 
2006 
19 
Weingart 
& Page, 
2004 
Qual. 
1 Question / objective 
sufficiently described? 
2 2 2 2 1 2 na na na na na 2 2 2 na na 2 na 1 
2 Study design evident 
and appropriate? 
2 2 2 2 2 1 na na na na na 2 2 2 na na 2 na 2 
3 Context for the study 
clear? 
2 2 2 2 2 2 na na na na na 2 2 2 na na 2 na 2 
4 Connection to a 
theoretical framework / 
wider body of 
knowledge? 
2 2 2 2 2 2 na na na na na 2 2 2 na na 2 na 2 
5 Sampling strategy 
described, relevant and 
justified? 
2 2 2 2 2 1 na na na na na 1 2 2 na na 2 na 2 
6 Data collection 
methods clearly 
described and 
systematic? 
1 0 2 2 1 2 na na na na na 1 1 1 na na 1 na 1 
7 Data analysis clearly 
described and 
systematic? 
1 0 2 2 2 2 na na na na na 0 0 0 na na 1 na 0 
8 Use of verification 
procedure(s) to establish 
credibility? 
2 0 2 2 2 0 na na na na na 0 0 0 na na 2 na 1 
9 Conclusions supported 
by the results? 
2 2 2 2 2 2 na na na na na 0 2 1 na na 2 na 2 
10 Reflexivity of the 
account? 
0 2 1 1 1 0 na na na na na 2 0 0 na na 0 na 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Quant. 
1 Question / objective 
sufficiently described? 
2 2 na 2 na na 2 1 2 2 2 2 na na 0 1 na 2 na 
2 Study design evident 
and appropriate? 
2 2 na 2 na na 2 2 2 2 2 2 na na 2 2 na 2 na 
3 Method of 
subject/comparison 
group selection or source 
of information/input 
variables described and 
appropriate? 
2 1 na 2 na na 2 2 2 2 2 1 na na 2 2 na 2 na 
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4 Subject (and 
comparison group, if 
applicable) characteristics 
sufficiently described? 
1 1 na 1 na na 1 2 2 2 2 2 na na 1 1 na 2 na 
5 If interventional and 
random allocation was 
possible, was it 
described? 
na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na 
6 If interventional and 
blinding of investigators 
was possible, was it 
reported? 
na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na 
7 If interventional and 
blinding of subjects was 
possible, was it reported? 
na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na 
8 Outcome and (if 
applicable) exposure 
measure(s) well defined 
and robust to 
measurement / 
misclassification bias? 
means of assessment 
reported? 
0 1 na 1 na na 2 na 2 2 2 na na na na 2 na 2 na 
9 Sample size 
appropriate? 
0 1 na 1 na na 0 0 2 2 2 2 na na 2 2 na 2 na 
10 Analytic methods 
described/justified and 
appropriate? 
0 2 na 2 na na 0 2 2 1 2 2 na na 2 0 na 2 na 
11 Some estimate of 
variance is reported for 
the main results? 
0 2 na 2 na na 0 na 2 0 0 1 na na na 0 na 2 na 
12 Controlled for 
confounding? 
1 0 na 0 na na 2 na 2 2 1 0 na na NA 0 na 1 na 
13 Results reported in 
sufficient detail? 
2 1 na 2 na na 0 2 2 2 2 2 na na 1 2 na 2 na 
14 Conclusions supported 
by the results? 
2 2 na 2 na na 2 2 2 2 2 2 na na 0 2 na 2 na 
(NB.The scores were combined for articles with more than one qualitative study or more than one quantitative study) 
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Appendix 6 Example of what constitutes rating criteria for quality assessment 
 
Rating Criteria to verify whether question or objective is sufficiently described 
Yes 
Is easily identified in the introductory section (or first paragraph of methods section). 
Specifies (where applicable, depending on study design) all of the following: purpose, 
subjects/target population, and the specific intervention(s) /association(s)/descriptive 
parameter(s) under investigation. A study purpose that only becomes apparent after 
studying other parts of the paper is not considered sufficiently described. 
Partial 
Vaguely/incompletely reported (e.g. “describe the effect of” or “examine the role of” or 
“assess opinion on many issues” or “explore the general attitudes”...); or some information 
has to be gathered from parts of the paper other than the 
introduction/background/objective section. 
No Question or objective is not reported, or is incomprehensible. 
N/A Should not be checked for this question 
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Appendix 7 Interview information sheet for SPI interviews 
 
 
Version 3-0 
Research information sheet:  
The Safer Patients Initiative - Understanding Safety and Quality Improvement in the NHS 
 
Imperial College in collaboration with the Health Foundation are undertaking work to capture the 
lessons learnt for UK healthcare from the experiences of organisations participating in the Safer 
Patients Initiative (SPI).  Our overall aim is to understand how whole healthcare organisations can 
make significant and sustainable improvements in the quality and safety of care delivered to 
patients, through development of their capability for process improvement and other internal 
changes and cultural factors. 
 
Method: 
Our principle aim is to investigate change in the organisation’s capability for care service 
improvement as a result of participating in the SPI programme. We will be using interviews with 
members of staff (no patients will be involved).  Semi-structured interviews with key SPI personnel 
will be undertaken during 1 or 2 day site visits at each organisation.  We will repeat the process at 
the end of the SPI programme to assess change and understand development over time.   
 
Data: 
Interviews will be recorded for reference purposes and transcribed for the purpose of qualitative 
analysis.  All information collected will be treated as confidential and will be aggregated to preserve 
anonymity of individual respondents.  Demographic information is recorded for the purposes of 
grouping respondents and no identifying information will be reported without the explicit consent of 
the individuals concerned. 
 
Ethical approval: 
Ethical approval for this study (ref. 07/H0402/69), including exemption from site specific 
assessment, was granted by Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Rutland Research Ethics 
Committee 2. 
 
Contact details for correspondence: 
Email:  mailto:ImperialSPI@imperial.ac.ukImperialSPI@imperial.ac.uk 
Tel:  020 7886 1820 (Sandra Iskander) or 020 7886 7656 (Anam Parand) 
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Appendix 8 Interview consent form for SPI interviews 
 
 
 
 
Research Interview Consent Form (Research Information Sheet 3-0 must accompany this form) 
 
The Safer Patients Initiative: Understanding Safety and Quality Improvement 
in the NHS 
 
 
Please consider the following statements before providing consent for participation in the above 
study by signing this form in the space provided below.  Please feel free to ask the researcher(s) 
present at the interview any questions concerning the consent process. 
 
 I have read and understood the research information sheet (Version 3-0) and give consent for 
my participation in this study and for the Imperial research team to use the data obtained from 
my participation, for the purposes of analysis guided by the aims set out for this research. 
 
 I understand that my participation in this research and the resulting data obtained will be 
treated confidentially.  Specifically:  
 
I give consent for this interview to be recorded and later transcribed.  The transcript will then 
be de-identified for the purposes of analysis.  No personally identifiable information will be 
reported from this study.  The Imperial research team will report non-identifiable research 
findings based upon the aggregated contributions of all participants, which may include 
anonymous representative quotes taken from the interviews. 
 
 
Signature: 
 
 
 
 
 
Print name: 
 
 
 
 
Organisation: 
 
 
 
 
Date: 
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Appendix 9 Interview information sheet for middle manager interviews 
Version 1.0 
Department of Surgery and Cancer 
Division of Surgery 
Imperial College London 
Room 503, 5
th
 Floor 
Wright Fleming Building, St Mary’s Campus 
Norfolk Place, Paddington, London W2 1NY 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 9726    
Fax: +44 (0) 020 7594 3127    
a.parand@imperial.ac.uk 
www.imperial.ac.uk 
  
Anam Parand 
 Research Psychologist 
 
Research interview information sheet 
Role of acute care managers in patient safety: The Role of the Middle Manager 
(Research Interview Consent Form 1-0 must accompany this form) 
 
Invitation paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide to take part in this study it 
is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether 
or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the role of the middle manager in patient safety and 
quality of care. This study will also form part of a PhD study. 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you are a middle manager at one of two chosen trusts to take part in 
this study. There will be a total of 40 middle managers interviewed across both trusts. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you 
are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
If you decide to take part in this study you will be asked questions on the theme of the role of the 
middle manager for quality and safety for between 45-60 minutes.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
We do not anticipate any disadvantages or risks as a result of participating in this study.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We will be analysing and feeding back information concerning the perceptions of you and your 
colleagues on managerial activities relevant to safety and quality, what managers roles should be 
and what equipment/information are believed to be required. This will provide a sharing of practices 
across specialities and trusts involved in this research. 
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What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements.  If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a 
legal action.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of 
the way you have been treated during the course of this study then you should immediately inform 
the Investigator (Anam Parand at a.parand@imperial.ac.uk).  The normal National Health Service 
complaint complaints mechanisms are also available to you.  If you are still not satisfied with the 
response, you may contact the Imperial AHSC Joint Research Office.   
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Information that is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. Anything you say will be anonymous when reported. The data will be kept securely. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will be written up as a research report and it may be published in a 
research journal. You will not be personally identifiable in any report/publication. 
  
Who is organising the research? 
The study is funded by the Health Foundation and organised by the Clinical Safety Research Unit 
within the Department of Surgery & Cancer based at St Mary’s Hospital, Imperial College London.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The North London Research Ethics Committee 2 has approved this study.  
 
Contact for Further Information 
If you would like further information about this study please contact Miss Anam Parand on 
a.parand@imperial.ac.uk or 020 7594 9726. 
 
You will be given a copy of the research information sheet and a signed consent form to keep. 
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Appendix 10 Interview consent form for middle manager interviews  
Version 1-0 
Department of Surgery and Cancer 
Division of Surgery 
Imperial College London 
Room 503, 5th Floor 
Wright Fleming Building, St Mary’s Campus 
Norfolk Place, Paddington, London W2 1NY 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 9726   Fax: +44 (0) 020 7594 3127    
 
a.parand@imperial.ac.uk 
www.imperial.ac.uk 
Anam Parand 
 Research Psychologist 
 
Research Interview Consent Form 
Role of acute care managers in patient safety: The Role of the Middle Manager 
(Research Interview Information Sheet 1-0 must accompany this form) 
 
Principle Investigator: Anam Parand 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the research information sheet 
dated 14.07.10 version 1-0 for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions which have been answered fully. 
 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my legal 
rights being affected.  
 
 
3. I understand that sections of my research notes maybe looked at by 
responsible individuals from Imperial College, the Trust or from 
regulatory authorities where it is relevant to my taking part in this 
research. I give permission to these individuals to access my records 
that are relevant to this research. 
 
 
4. I understand that there are no compensation arrangements. 
 
 
5. I give consent for this interview to be recorded and later transcribed.  
The transcript will then be de-identified for the purposes of analysis.  
No personally identifiable information will be reported from this 
study.  Findings will be based on the collective contributions of 
participants, which may include anonymous representative quotes 
taken from the interviews. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
 
 
       ________________________         __________________________               ______________ 
        Name of Participant                          Signature                                                          Date 
  
 
       ________________________         __________________________               ______________ 
        Name of Person taking consent      Signature                                                          Date 
 
 
       ________________________         __________________________               ______________ 
        Name of Principle Investigator        Signature                                                          Date 
Please initial box 
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Appendix 11 Interview topic guide for middle manager interviews 
STANDARDISED INFORMATION: 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. Please read the information sheet and sign the consent form. This 
interview is for me to get an understanding of the role, time and knowledge of middle management.  The interview will last 
for approximately half an hour.  With your permission, we would like to record the interview.  The information you provide 
will be treated confidentially.  We will not report any personally identifiable information, without your consent.   
DEMOGRAPHICS  
Name: 
Job Title & Tenure:  
Background: 
RESPONSIBILITIES & ROUTINE 
1. Can you please talk me through a typical week at work? 
2. Can you please describe your main responsibilities and accountabilities? 
 How is your performance measured and reviewed? 
 What meetings do you attend? 
3. What do you spend most of your time on at work? 
 Is there anything that you believe you should be spending less or more time on? 
 How much time do you spend on safety and quality matters?  
 How does this compare with time spent on other issues? 
 Who do you spend your time with on safety and quality matters? Do you assign any tasks relating to this? 
4. What does this time comprise of in terms of types of tasks/activities? 
IMPACT ON CARE & Q&S 
5. How do you think your work impacts on patient care? 
6. How do you think your work impacts on quality and safety? 
PERCEPTION OF Q&S 
6. What does quality of care mean to you? 
7. What does patient safety mean to you? 
Q&S TARGETS/PRIORITIES  
9. Can you please list your performance targets?  
Which of these, if any, relate to quality & safety? 
10. What are your highest priorities?  
Where is quality & safety on the priority list compared with other priorities? 
Are you happy with these priorities, are they in line with your self-directed goals? 
How do they compare with other goals? 
11. Can you describe any conflict or accordance between targets?  
12. What do you think about the goals for quality and safety? 
Are they achievable?  
What motivates you to achieve these targets? External motivators? 
Are you rewarded or penalised when achieving/not achieving these targets? Are such rewards available in your 
organisation? 
Key: 
 = prompts 
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12. What differences, if any, are there in your objectives and responsibilities for quality and safety compared with those of 
managers above and below you? 
BARRIERS & FACILITATORS OF Q&S 
13. What makes your job easier or more difficult when dealing with quality and safety matters? 
How do you overcome these barriers? 
HOW INFLUENCE & CHANGE  
14. How do you influence others and bring about change?  
How do you get those around you to listen to your suggestions? 
What persuasive techniques would you use, if any? How do you get leverage? 
How do you try to instil a sense of purpose for Q&S in others? 
Could you influence people by helping to get them ahead or get them in trouble?  
QSI INITIATIVES 
14. How, if at all, have you been involved in a safety/quality improvement initiative? 
What are your opinions about this involvement? Was this voluntary or mandatory? 
Q&S KNOWLEDGE & RESEARCH TRANSLATION 
15. How do you learn about patient safety and quality? 
Where would you get this information from? 
What training have you had in how to manage quality and safety issues? 
Who has access and can distribute quality & safety related information? 
16. What do you think of your level of knowledge on quality and safety? Would others agree? 
16. Tell me about your use of research to help you in your work? 
What kinds of evidence do you use, if any, to justify what you do as a manager? 
COMPETENCIES FOR Q&S 
17. Can you list competencies that middle managers require to carry out their part in quality and safety effectively? 
18. Thinking of the training and competencies you hold, do you feel satisfied in your capability and tools to carry out your 
part in quality & safety effectively? 
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND  
18. In what way has your professional background provided you with the capability to deal with quality and safety issues?  
19. In what way has your professional background impeded your capability to deal with quality and safety issues? 
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Appendix 12 Theory based survey items  
 
Theory Aim Related Survey Section/ Items used Amendments 
1. Mintzberg’s (1973) 
managerial roles 
To find out what roles 
middle  managers engage 
in most in quality and 
safety work  
3 survey items per work role construct in section C Na 
2.French & Raven (1959) 
5 Basis of Power 
 
To find out what power 
middle  managers’ 
perceive to hold in quality 
and safety work 
3 survey items per power base construct in section D 
Items were based on French & Raven and Yukl’s[71] suggested power roles, but 
‘persuasiveness’ and ‘charisma’ were removed, as recommended by Raven et al. 
However, the different types of legitimate power that Raven et al suggested 
were not added, as this was considered too much detail for the remit of this 
survey 
3.Safety 
attitudes 
and actions 
 
 
3a) 
HSOPSC 
items 
 
To find correlations 
between work roles/ 
power bases and 
managerial attitudes  to 
safety  
2 validated sub scales were taken from the AHRQ Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPC). These consisted 
of  3 items on ‘management support for patient safety’ & 
4 items on ‘manager expectations & actions promoting 
safety’  
The term ‘hospital management’ was changed to ‘I/my’. Appendix 13 provides 
the original and actual items for this survey 
 
 
3b) SAQ 
items 
 
2 items from a validated sub scale were taken from 
Sexton’s SAQ (Safety Attitudes Questionnaire)  
One item was dropped as it was considered too prone to social desirability bias. 
Other questions were excluded from the SAQ because they were considered too 
generic (e.g.’ Hospital management is doing a good job’) with little focus on 
patient safety and versions of the survey were specific to a certain setting, such 
as ICU or operating theatre 
 
Other change were in wording to amend from third person (hospital 
management) to first person (I/my) and to make the question more relevant to 
patient safety, and to slightly amend one item’s wording based on the pilot 
survey. Appendix 13 provides the original and actual items for this survey 
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Appendix 13 Original and modified items for safety attitudes section in survey 
 
Questionnaire Topic of Assessment Original scale items Middle manager survey scale items 
HSOPSC ‘Hospital Management Support 
for Patient Safety’. 
 
Hospital management provides a work 
climate that promotes patient safety. 
I provide a work climate that promotes 
patient safety 
HSOPSC ‘Hospital Management Support 
for Patient Safety’. 
 
The actions of hospital management 
show that patient safety is a top 
priority. 
My actions always show that patient 
safety is a top priority 
HSOPSC ‘Hospital Management Support 
for Patient Safety’. 
 
Hospital management seems interested 
in patient safety only after an adverse 
event happens.  
I often get involved in patient safety only 
after an incident happens 
HSOPSC ‘Manager Expectations & 
Actions Promoting Safety’ 
My supervisor/manager provides 
positive feedback when he/she sees a 
job done according to established 
patient safety procedures 
I praise and reward when I see a job 
done according to established patient 
safety procedures 
HSOPSC ‘Manager Expectations & 
Actions Promoting Safety’ 
Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work 
faster, even if it means taking shortcuts 
Whenever pressure builds up, I want 
staff to make sure the work gets done, 
even if it means taking shortcuts [reverse 
scoring] 
HSOPSC ‘Manager Expectations & 
Actions Promoting Safety’ 
My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety 
I seriously consider staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety 
HSOPSC ‘Manager Expectations & 
Actions Promoting Safety’ 
My supervisor/manager overlooks 
patient safety problems that happen 
repeatedly  
I know there are patient safety problems 
that haven’t been dealt with  
SAQ Managers’ safety attitudes Management supports my daily efforts I support the daily efforts of staff to help 
maintain safety standards for patients 
SAQ Managers’ safety attitudes Management doesn’t knowingly 
compromise patient safety 
I do not knowingly compromise the 
safety of patients 
OWN Impact na The way I undertake my work sometimes 
has an adverse impact on quality and 
patient safety  
OWN Targets na There have been situations where I have 
compromised patient safety to make 
sure other targets were met  
OWN Budget na Safety has overridden financial 
constraints on a number of occasions 
OWN Line  
management 
na My line manager provides a work 
climate that allows me to promote 
patient safety 
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Appendix 14 Hardcopy version of middle manager self-report survey of their 
Q&S work 
 
 
 
 
The Role of the Hospital Manager  
in Quality of Care & Patient Safety 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. This survey is funded by The Health Foundation and overseen 
by Prof Charles Vincent at Imperial College and Prof Sue Dopson at Oxford University.  
 
The questions explore your perceptions of your role and influence in quality and safety within your 
job as a manager, in order for us to better understand what is required for managers on this topic.  
 
It should take around 10 minutes to complete. Once you fully complete this survey, you will be 
invited to be entered into a draw to win £100 Amazon vouchers. 
 
Responses are confidential and all data will be recorded and reported anonymously. I ask for your 
name so that I am aware of who has completed the survey.  
 
 
Section A: Demographics  
        
 
A01. Surname 
 
 
A02. First Name 
 
 
A03. Date 
 
    
 
A04. Gender 
□ Male □ Female   
 
A05 Age 
□ 18-30 □ 31-40 □ 41-50 □ 51-70 
 
 
 
 
A06. Nationality 
□ British □ Other (please specify) _______________________________________________ 
A07. Qualifications (please tick your highest qualification only) 
□ No degree 
□ Undergraduate 
(e.g.BSc/BA/MBBS) 
 
□ Postgraduate  
(e.g. MSc/MA/MBA) 
□ GMTS 
 
□ Professional qualification (please 
specify) 
 
____________________________________ 
 
A10. Your NHS Trust Speciality(e.g. surgery or general medicine) 
  
A11. Job title (e.g. general manager, service delivery manager) 
 
A12. How long have you worked in your current position? 
□ 0-11 months   □ 3-5 years  □ 10-20 years  
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Section B: Your time, actions and research in Quality & Safety 
This section asks questions about where you learn about quality of care and patient safety and your 
actions and time spent on quality and safety. 
 
B01. 
Within the last year, how often have you accessed information on quality and safety in the 
following places? 
 not at all quarterly monthly  weekly daily 
a) Journals      
b) Magazines      
c) Websites      
d) Conferences      
e) Workshops      
f) Library      
g) Colleagues      
h) Other      
If other, please specify:  
 
B02. For each statement, please rate the extent of your agreement or disagreement 
 Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Agree 
strongly 
a) I often get involved in patient safety only after an 
incident happens. (reverse scoring) [HSOPSC Mgt support for PS] 
     
b) My actions always show that patient safety is a top 
priority [HSOPSC Mgt support for PS] 
     
c) I provide a work climate that promotes patient safety 
[HSOPSC Mgt support for PS]      
d) I praise and reward when I see a job done according 
to established patient safety procedures [HSOPSC mger 
expectations & actions promoting safety] 
     
e) Whenever pressure builds up, I want staff to make 
sure the work gets done, even if it means taking 
shortcuts (reverse scoring) [HSOPSC mger expectations & actions promoting safety] 
     
f) I seriously consider staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety  [HSOPSC mger expectations & actions promoting safety] 
     
g) I know there are patient safety problems that haven’t 
been dealt with (reverse scoring) [HSOPSC mger expectations & actions promoting 
safety] 
     
h) I support the daily efforts of staff to help maintain 
safety standards for patients [SAQ] 
     
i) I do not knowingly compromise the safety of patients 
[SAQ]        
j) The way I undertake my work sometimes has an 
adverse impact on quality and patient safety (reverse scoring) 
[Own question on impact] 
     
k) There have been situations where I have 
compromised patient safety to make sure other targets 
were met (reverse scoring) [Own question targets] 
     
l) Safety has overridden financial constraints on a 
number of occasions [Own question budget] 
     
m) My line manager provides a work climate that allows 
me to promote patient safety [Own question management] 
     
 
  
□ 1-2 years    □ 6-9 years □ 21 or more years  
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B03. What proportion of your total time do you think is spent on quality & safety work? 
□ 0-10% □ 11-25% □ 26-50%   □ 51-90% □ 91-100% 
 
B04. What proportion of your total time do you think was spent on quality & safety work two years ago? 
□ 0-10% □ 11-25% □ 26-50%   □ 51-90% □ 91-100% □ NA 
 
B05. 
What proportion of your total time do you think you will spend on quality & safety work in two 
years time? 
□ 0-10% □ 11-25% □ 26-50%   □ 51-90% □ 91-100% 
 
B05. What proportion of your total time do you think is spent on quality & safety work? 
 0-10% 11-25% 26-50% 51-90% 91-100% 
Currently □ □ □ □ □ 
2 years ago □ □ □ □ □ 
In 2 years 
time □ □ □ □ □ 
  
323 
 
Section C: Your Work Roles in Quality & Safety 
This section asks questions that draw out the way in which you function in regards to quality of care 
and patient safety. 
 
C01.  
For each statement, please rate the extent to which you carry out each function throughout the year in your 
managerial position. 
 Not at all quarterly monthly weekly daily 
1) I take corrective action when I face important, unexpected 
patient safety crises (disturbance handler) 
 
 
   
2) I ensure staff are updated with  information relevant to them to 
deal appropriately with patients’ safety (disseminator) 
 
 
   
3) I investigate adverse incidents (monitor)      
4) I take corrective action when unexpected work pressure in my 
department(s) is too great to ignore (disturbance handler)  
 
   
5) I engage staff in quality improvement activities (leader)      
5) I approve purchases to maintain quality and safety within my 
department(s) (resource allocator)  
 
   
6) I interact with colleagues to develop professional activities and 
duties related to patient safety (leader) 
     
7) I negotiate with other staff on matters that affect patient safety 
and quality (negotiator) 
     
8) I maintain a network of contacts and information sources outside 
the department that help with quality and safety (liaison) 
     
9) I speak to individuals outside my hospital about quality & safety 
(spokesperson) 
     
10) I act as an organisational representative and escort external 
quality safety assessors (figurehead) 
     
11) I perform routine duties such as meeting guests that inspect or 
help with quality and safety issues (figurehead) 
     
12) I research to learn about best quality and patient safety 
practices (monitor) 
     
13) I share information received from patients on adverse incidents 
or complaints with the appropriate individuals (disseminator) 
     
14) I attend meetings on quality & safety performance with other 
departmental managers (liaison) 
     
15) I  negotiate with those involved to come to an agreement on a 
patient safety issue (negotiator) 
     
16) I share information on quality targets to people outside my 
hospital (spokesperson) 
     
17) I relay quality and safety-related information between my 
department(s) and external bodies (liaison) 
     
18) I participate in a variety of  external quality and safety events 
on behalf of my department (figurehead) 
     
19) I design and improve service processes (e.g. changing steps in a 
care pathway) (entrepreneur) 
     
20) I encourage teamwork on quality and safety improvement (leader)      
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21) I write standard operating procedures to improve patient safety 
or quality of care (entrepreneur) 
     
22) I monitor quality and safety targets, e.g. waiting time targets 
(monitor) 
     
23) I take corrective action to manage adverse 
situations/operational breakdowns (disturbance handler) 
     
24) I manage capacity issues (e.g. booking or cancelling beds, 
clinics, theatres, staff) (resource allocator) 
     
25) I represent quality and safety achievements to outside groups 
(spokesperson) 
     
26) I procure equipment to improve the quality of procedures or 
improve safety (resource allocator) 
     
27) I share accumulated figures on quality and safety with staff 
(disseminator) 
     
28) I resolve patient safety-related problems that develop with 
other units (negotiator) 
     
29) I scan the internal and external environment looking for 
innovations to be implemented to improve my service (entrepreneur) 
     
 
Section D: Your Influence Style in Quality & Safety                                                                            
This section asks questions that draw out the way in which your position and personal characteristics 
allow you to influence others to bring about change in quality and patient safety.  The term ‘others’ 
refers to other staff such as doctors and nurses, not admin employees. 
 
D01.  
For each statement, please rate the extent to which you carry out each function throughout the year in your 
managerial position. 
 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Agree 
strongly 
1) I have the authority to give others tasks or assignments on patient 
safety [Y][legitimate] 
 
    
2) I could get others into trouble by complaining to higher 
management if they do not adhere to best practices. [Y] [coercive] 
 
  
 
 
3) I can do things to help others to get ahead in my organisation in 
order to engage them in quality improvement [Y] [reward] 
 
  
 
 
4) I have information that others need to do their work effectively and 
safely [Y] [information power] 
 
  
 
 
5) I have the expertise to make good decisions about whether others’ 
work is safe or not [Y] [expert power] 
     
6) I have the ability to use facts and logic to present a case to make 
changes to improve quality & safety [Y][information] 
     
7) I have an enthusiastic and optimistic attitude that makes people 
more likely to take my recommended actions on quality [Y] [charisma r 
referent] 
     
8) I can tell others what to do on quality and safety solely because of 
my position within the organisation [R][legitimate] 
     
9) I could give undesirable assignments to those that resist service 
improvement [R][coercive] 
     
10) I could help others to get a promotion if they showed that they 
prioritised quality of care [R][reward] 
     
11) I offer information on quality improvement that enables others to 
understand it [R][information power] 
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12) I probably know more about patient safety than the doctors and 
nurses do [R][expert power] 
     
13) I am respected and thought highly of by others  [R][referent power]       
14) I have the right to request that others do their work in a particular 
way that will maintain standards [R][legitimate] 
     
15) I could make things unpleasant for those that do not adhere to 
safety practices [R][coercive] 
     
16) I could help others receive special benefits for taking part in 
quality improvement [R][reward] 
     
17) I offer direction on patient safety that is trusted by others [R][expert 
power] 
     
18) I am looked upon as someone that others can work with on safety 
and quality issues [R][referent power] 
     
 
D02. 
If you wish, please provide any further comments below. Or, if you prefer, contact the key researcher at 
Anam Parand: a.parand@imperial.ac.uk  / 020 7594 9726.  
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time! 
 
NB. Please note that the formatting of this survey appears within this document slightly differently to that of the original   
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Appendix 15 Survey recruitment email of middle manager respondents 
 
Dear [Full Name] 
 
You have been identified as a key person within management at Imperial College Healthcare NHS 
Trust to take part in our research survey exploring perceptions of your role and influence in quality 
and safety within your job. We plan to use this data to develop workshops to help support managers 
at your position. We are happy to provide collective feedback in a report to those that have 
completed the survey to help you plan your own work with quality & safety.  
 
This survey is funded by The Health Foundation and overseen by Professor Charles Vincent at 
Imperial College London and Professor Sue Dopson at Oxford University. The research is led by 
Anam Parand, Research Psychologist at Imperial College and supported by Jill Pellett, Associate 
Director, Patient Safety, South Central Strategic Health Authority.  
 
It should only take 10-15 minutes to complete. Once you fully complete this survey, you will be 
invited to enter a draw to win a £100 Amazon voucher. 
 
Responses are confidential and all data will be recorded and reported anonymously.  
 
The link for the online survey is below.  
 
www.surveymonkey.com/s/qualityandmiddlemanagement 
 
If clicking on the link does not work, please copy and paste into your web browser. 
 
Please tell us if you prefer a hardcopy version of the survey with a self addressed envelope. 
 
Your earliest response would be much appreciated. The deadline is Sunday 31
st
 July 2011. 
 
Thank you for your time 
 
Best wishes 
 
Anam 
 
Anam Parand 
Research Psychologist 
Centre for Patient Safety & Service Quality Division of Surgery,  
Imperial College London 503, 5
th
 Floor Wright Fleming Building, Paddington W2 1PG 
 
Tel. +44 (0)20 7594 9726  
a.parand@imperial.ac.uk 
 
Jill Pellett 
Associate Director, Patient Safety, South Central Strategic Health Authority  
1st Floor, Rivergate House Newbury Business Park  
Newbury Berkshire RG14 2PZ 
 
Tel: 01635 275668 
jill.pellett@southcentral.nhs.uK  
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Appendix 16 Cronbach’s alpha for middle manager work roles, power bases & 
safety attitudes/actions for self-report survey 
 
 
Construct measured Number of items Cronbach’s alpha 
Roles   
Disturbance handler 3 .768 
Disseminator 3 .780 
Monitor 3 .314 
Leader 3 .742 
Resource allocator 3 .699 
Negotiator 3 .588 
Liaison 3 .658 
Spokesperson 3 .698 
Figurehead 3 .744 
Entrepreneur 3 .691 
Power Bases   
Legitimate 3 .295 
Coercive 3 .619 
Reward 3 .235 
Information 3 .619 
Expert 3 .668 
Referent 3 .663 
Safety attitudes/actions 12 .555 
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Appendix 17 Normal histogram and Q-Q plot showing the safety 
attitudes/actions outcome measure distribution for the self report survey  
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Appendix 18 Descriptives of managers’ self-reported work activities  
 
 
Frequency (Valid  percentage) 
 
Q&S work activity Never 
Once/ 
Twice 
3-4 
times/yr 
Monthly Weekly Daily Missing 
I encourage teamwork on quality and safety improvement  0(0.0%) 5(5.3%) 8(8.4%) 33(34.7%) 27(28.4%) 22(23.2%) 5 
I monitor quality and safety targets (e.g. waiting time targets)  2(2.1%) 4(4.2%) 2(2.1%) 19(20.0%) 37(38.9%) 31(32.6%) 5 
I take corrective action to manage adverse situations/operational breakdowns  0(0.0%) 7(7.4%) 13(13.7%) 17(17.9%) 31(32.6%) 27(28.4%) 5 
I assign staff to address capacity issues that may compromise quality or safety  5(5.3%) 7(7.4%) 9(9.6%) (16(17.0%) 28(29.8%) 29(30.9%) 6 
I take corrective action when I face important, unexpected patient safety crises  1(1.0%) 17(17.5%) 17(17.5%) 22(22.7%) 24(24.7%) 16(16%) 3 
I ensure staff are updated with  information relevant to them to deal appropriately with patients' safety  2(2.1%) 5(5.2%) 11(11.5%) 32(33.3%) 31(32.3%) 15(15.6%) 4 
I investigate adverse incidents  0(0.0%) 13(13.4%) 13(13.4%) 33(34%) 28(28.9%) 10(10.3%) 3 
I take action when unexpected work pressure in my department(s) is too great to ignore 1(1.1%) 12(12.6%) 13(13.7%) 28(29.5%) 20(21.1%) 21(22.1%) 5 
I engage staff in quality improvement activities  3(3.2%) 3(3.2%) 15(15.8%) 31(32.6%) 28(29.5%) 15(15.8%) 5 
I determine where financial resources are best applied to maintain quality and safety within my department(s)  5(5.2%) 6(6.2%) 15(15.5%) 30(30.9%) 27(27.8%) 14(14.4%) 3 
I interact with colleagues to develop professional activities and duties related to patient safety  1(1.0%) 9(9.4%) 8(8.3%) 35(36.5%) 24(25%) 19(19.8%) 4 
I negotiate with others outside my department(s) (e.g. suppliers, estates) in order to achieve a good standard of quality 
and safety within my department(s)  
4(4.2%) 3(3.2%) 24(25.3%) 36(37.9%) 21(22.1%) 7(7.4%) 5 
I maintain a network of contacts and information sources outside the department that help with quality and safety  4(4.2%) 8(8.4%) 20(21.1%) 29(30.5%) 23(24.2%) 11(11.6) 5 
I attend meetings with other departmental managers to exchange information and requirements on quality and safety  6(6.5%) 6(6.5%) 17(18.3%) 47(50.5%) 14(15.1) 3(3.2%) 7 
I  negotiate with those involved to come to an agreement on a patient safety issue  3(3.2%) 10(10.6%) 22(23.4%) 31(33.0%) 21(22.3%) 7(7.4%) 6 
I design and improve service processes (e.g. changing steps in a care pathway)  4(4.3%) 17(18.1%) 22(23.4%) 28(29.8%) 14(14.9%) 9(9.6%) 6 
I share figures on quality key indicators with staff  1(1.1%) 2(2.2%) 8(8.6%) 42(45.2%) 32(34.4%) 8(8.6%) 7 
I share information received from patients on adverse incidents or complaints with the appropriate individuals  0(0.0%) 4(4.2%) 15(15.8%) 39(41.1%) 27(28.4%) 10(10.5%) 5 
I speak to individuals outside my hospital about quality & safety  11(11.6%) 20(21.1%) 32(33.7%) 24(25.3%) 8(8.4%) 0(0.0%) 5 
I research quality and patient safety best practices  18(19.4%) 26(28.0%) 26(28.0%) 18(19.4%) 5(5.4%) 0(0.0%) 7 
I share information on quality targets to people outside my hospital  27(28.4%) 20(21.1%) 28(29.5%) 17(17.9%) 3(3.2%) 0(0.0%) 5 
I relay quality and safety-related information between my department(s) and external bodies  20(21.5%) 18(19.4%) 32(34.4%) 16(17.2%) 7(7.5%) 0(0.0%) 7 
I write standard operating procedures to improve patient safety or quality of care  13(14.0%) 26(28.0%) 32(34.4%) 17(18.3%) 4(4.2%) 1(1.1%) 7 
I pass on information on quality and safety achievements to outside groups  20(21.5%) 22(23.7%) 24(25.8%) 19(20.4%) 7(7.5%) 1(1.1%) 7 
I procure equipment to improve the quality of procedures or improve safety  10(10.9%) 17(18.5%) 35(38.0%) 16(17.4%) 10(10.9%) 4(4.3%) 8 
I resolve patient safety-related problems that develop with other units  14(15.1%) 11(11.8%) 27(29.0%) 22(23.7%) 15(16.1%) 4(4.3%) 7 
I initiate and write business cases for innovations to improve my service  7(7.4%) 30(31.6%) 27(28.4%) 20(21.1%) 9(9.5%) 2(2.1%) 5 
I act as an organisational representative by greeting or escorting external quality safety assessors  37(39.4%) 28(29.8% 24(25.5%) 3(3.2%) 1(1.1%) 1(1.1%) 6 
I perform symbolic duties by representing my department(s) at quality and safety events  31(33.0%) 29(30.9%) 21(22.3%) 13(13.8%) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%) 6 
I act as a figurehead by attending external quality and safety events on behalf of my department  37(39.8%) 22(23.7%) 16(17.2%) 13(14%) 2(2.2%) 3(3.2%) 7 
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Appendix 19 Spearman’s rho correlations for self-reported safety 
attitudes/actions 
 
Safety attitudes/action aggregated score 
 
Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N 
Power bases (aggregated scores) 
   
Legitimate .068 .527 88 
Coercive -.371** .000 88 
Reward -.291** .006 87 
Information .220* .038 89 
Expert -.014 .901 87 
Referent .250* .019 88 
Roles (aggregated scores) 
   
Disturbance handler 
.057 .591 90 
Disseminator 
.276** .008 90 
Monitor 
.151 .156 90 
Leader 
.270* .010 90 
Resource Allocator 
.047 .662 89 
Negotiator 
.076 .474 90 
Liaison 
.088 .413 89 
Spokesperson 
.102 .336 91 
Figurehead 
-.031 .774 90 
Entrepreneur 
.099 .351 90 
Time spent currently 
.178 .081 97 
Learning  -.124 .293 74 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 20 Hardcopy version of clinical staff survey of middle managers’ Q&S 
work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Role of the Hospital Middle Manager in Quality of Care & Patient 
Safety 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. This survey is funded by The Health Foundation and overseen by 
Professor Charles Vincent at Imperial College London and Professor Sue Dopson at Oxford University. The 
research is led by Anam Parand, a Research Psychologist at Imperial College.  
 
The questions explore your perceptions of middle managerial actions and influences in quality and safety 
within your clinical area. By “middle manager”, we mean a manager that has managers underneath them and 
report to managers above them, such as general managers, service managers, service delivery managers.    
 
It should only take 10 minutes to complete. Responses are confidential and all data will be recorded and 
reported anonymously.  
 
 
Section A: Demographics           
        
 
A01.  Your initials A02. Gender A03. Age 
 □ male □ female □ 18-30 □ 31-40 □ 41-50 □ 51-70 
 
    
 
A04.  Nationality 
□ British □ Other (please specify) _______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
   
A05. Your NHS Trust A06. Job title (e.g. Consultant) 
  
A07. How long have you worked in your current position? 
□ 0-11 months   
□ 1-2 years    
□ 3-5 years  
□ 6-9 years 
□ 10-20 years  
□ 21 or more years  
A08. IMPORTANT: Please think of a typical middle manager in your clinical area and answer all questions with this 
person in mind 
 
Please write this manager’s job title (e.g. service manager) __________________________________ 
 
NB. As stated, by “middle manager”, we mean a manager that has managers underneath them and report to 
managers above them. Examples of middle managers are: operational managers, general managers, service 
managers, service delivery managers, etc.  
 
NOT a manager on the Hospital Board and NOT a manager that manages issues or staff only, (e.g. not a bed 
manager/ complaints manager or consultant) 
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Section B: Your manager’s time and actions in Quality & Safety 
 
This section asks questions about your manager’s actions and time spent on quality and safety. 
(NB: Quality is defined as safe, effective, patient-centred, timely efficient and equitable care. When we refer to 'safety', we are referring to 
patient safety) 
 
B01. What proportion of your manager’s total time do you think is spent on quality & safety work? 
0-10% 11-25% 26-50% 51-90% 91-100% 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
B02. This question asks about your manager’s safety attitudes and actions. For each statement, please rate the extent of your 
agreement or disagreement 
 Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree  
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree 
Agree 
strongly 
My manager often gets involved in patient safety only after an incident 
happens. 
     
My manager’s actions always show that patient safety is a top priority      
My manager provides a work climate that promotes patient safety      
My manager praises and rewards when s/he sees a job done according to 
established patient safety procedures 
     
Whenever pressure builds up, my manager sometimes understands staff 
taking shortcuts to make sure the work gets done 
     
My manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient 
safety 
     
My manager knows there are patient safety problems that haven’t been 
dealt with 
     
My manager supports the daily efforts of staff to help maintain safety 
standards for patients 
     
My manager does not knowingly compromise the safety of patients      
The way my manager undertakes his/her work sometimes has an adverse 
impact on quality and patient safety 
     
There have been situations where my manager has felt forced to 
compromise patient safety to make sure other targets were met 
     
Due to my manager’s decisions, safety has overridden financial constraints 
on a number of occasions  
     
 
Section C: Your Manager’s Influence Style in Quality & Safety 
 
This section asks questions that draw out the way in which your manager’s position and personal characteristics would 
allow them to influence others to bring about change in quality and patient safety.  The term ‘others’ refers to other staff 
such as doctors and nurses, not admin employees. 
 
C01.  For each statement, please rate the extent to which your manager has certain influences in their managerial position. 
 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Agree 
strongly 
My manager has the authority to give others tasks on patient safety      
My manager could get others into trouble by complaining to higher management 
if they do not adhere to best practices. 
     
My manager can help others to get ahead in my organisation in order to engage 
them in quality improvement 
     
My manager has information that others need to do their work effectively and 
safely 
     
My manager has the expertise to make good decisions about whether others’ 
work is safe for patients or not 
     
My manager has the ability to use facts and logic to present a case to make 
changes that improve quality & safety 
     
My manager has an enthusiastic and optimistic attitude that makes people more 
likely to take his/her recommended actions on quality 
     
My manager can tell others what to do on quality and safety solely because of 
his/her position within the organisation 
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My manager could give undesirable assignments to those that resist service 
improvement 
     
My manager could help others to get a promotion if they showed that they 
prioritised quality of care 
     
My manager can offer information on quality improvement that enables others to 
understand it 
     
My manager probably knows more about overall quality of care and patient safety 
issues than the doctors and nurses do 
     
My manager is respected and thought highly of by others      
My manager can request that others do their work in a particular way that will 
maintain standards 
     
My manager could make things difficult for those that do not adhere to safety 
practices 
     
My manager could help others receive special benefits for taking part in quality 
improvement 
     
My manager could offer direction on patient safety that is trusted by others      
My manager is looked upon as someone that others can work with on safety and 
quality issues 
     
 
 
Section D: Your Manager’s Roles in Quality & Safety 
 
This final section asks questions that draw out the way in which your manager functions in regards to quality 
and patient safety. 
 
D01.  For each statement, please rate the extent to which you consider your manager to carry out each function throughout the 
year in his/her managerial position. 
 
never 
once or 
twice 
3-4 
times 
/year 
monthly weekly daily 
don’t 
know 
My manager takes corrective action when s/he faces important, unexpected 
patient safety crises  
       
My manager ensures staff are updated with information relevant to them to 
deal appropriately with patients’ safety 
       
My manager investigates adverse incidents        
My manager takes action when unexpected work pressure in his/her 
department(s) is too great to ignore 
 
  
  
 
 
My manager engages staff in quality improvement activities        
My manager determines where financial resources are best applied to 
maintain quality and safety within his/her department(s) 
       
My manager interacts with colleagues to develop professional activities and 
duties related to patient safety 
       
My manager negotiates with others outside his/her department(s) 
(e.g.suppliers, estates) in order to achieve a good standard of quality and 
safety within the department(s) 
       
My manager maintains a network of contacts and information sources outside 
the department that help with quality and safety 
       
My manager speaks to individuals outside my hospital about quality & safety        
My manager acts as an organisational representative by greeting or escorting 
external quality safety assessors 
       
My manager performs symbolic duties by representing his/her department(s) 
at quality and safety events 
       
My manager researches quality and patient safety best practices        
My manager shares information received from patients on adverse incidents 
or complaints with the appropriate individuals 
       
My manager attends meetings with other departmental managers to 
exchange information and requirements on quality and safety 
       
My manager negotiates with those involved to come to an agreement on a 
patient safety issue 
       
My manager shares information on quality targets to people outside the 
hospital 
       
My manager relays quality and safety-related information between his/her 
department(s) and external bodies 
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My manager act as a figurehead by attending external quality and safety 
events on behalf of his/her department(s) 
       
My manager designs and improves service processes (e.g. changing steps in a 
care pathway) 
       
My manager encourages teamwork on quality and safety improvement        
My manager writes standard operating procedures to improve patient safety 
or quality of care 
       
My manager monitors quality and safety targets (e.g. waiting time targets)        
My manager takes corrective action to manage adverse situations/operational 
breakdowns 
       
My manager assigns staff to address capacity issues that may compromise 
quality or safety 
       
My manager passes on information on quality and safety achievements to 
outside groups 
       
My manager procures equipment to improve the quality of procedures or 
improve safety 
       
My manager shares figures on quality key indicators with staff        
My manager resolves patient safety-related problems that develop with other 
units 
       
My manager initiates and writes business cases for innovations to improve 
his/her service  
       
 
If you wish, please provide any further comments below. Or contact the key researcher Anam Parand at: a.parand@imperial.ac.uk / 020 7594 9726. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time! Please return via internal post to A.Parand, 503, 5
th
 Floor, Med School, St. Mary’s 
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Appendix 21 Survey recruitment email to clinical staff 
 
Dear [name], 
 
You have been identified as a clinical staff member at [name] NHS Trust to take part in our short 
research survey exploring Imperial NHS Trust clinicians’ perceptions of their middle manager’s role 
and influence in quality and patient safety. We have already asked these survey questions of almost 
100 middle managers and now we would like to receive the clinical staff perspective to compare. 
Clinicians’ views will provide us with a balanced report of what middle managers do in quality and 
safety. Questions are on managerial time, actions, role and influence style in quality and safety. 
  
We will provide a report of the collective findings. 
 
It should only take 10 minutes to complete. Responses are anonymous and confidential.  
 
The link for the online survey is below.  
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ClinicalStaffViews 
 
If clicking on the link does not work, please copy and paste into your web browser.  
  
Alternatively if preferred, I can provide a hardcopy version of the survey, via email or in person.  
  
 
Thank you for your time 
 
Best wishes 
 
Anam 
 
Anam Parand 
Research Psychologist 
Centre for Patient Safety & Service Quality Division of Surgery,  
Imperial College London 503, 5
th
 Floor Wright Fleming Building, Paddington W2 1PG 
 
Tel. +44 (0)20 7594 9726  
a.parand@imperial.ac.uk 
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Appendix 22 Cronbach’s alpha for work roles, power bases & safety 
attitudes/actions for clinical staff perceptions survey 
 
 
Construct measured Number of items Cronbach’s alpha 
Roles   
Disturbance handler 3 .727 
Disseminator 3 .733 
Monitor 3 .353 
Leader 3 .871 
Resource allocator 3 .684 
Negotiator 3 .810 
Liaison 3 .826 
Spokesperson 3 .929 
Figurehead 3 .595 
Entrepreneur 3 .729 
Power Bases   
Legitimate 3 .640 
Coercive 3 .596 
Reward 3 .754 
Information 3 .614 
Expert 3 .747 
Referent 3 .839 
Safety attitudes/actions 12 .743 
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Appendix 23 Normal histogram and Q-Q plot showing aggregated safety 
attitudes/actions outcome measure distribution for staff survey 
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Appendix 24 Descriptives of managers’ work activities reported by staff 
 
Frequency (Valid  percentage) 
 
Q&S work activity Never 
Once/ 
Twice 
3-4 
times/yr 
Monthly Weekly Daily 
Missing  
(Don’t know) 
My manager ensures staff are updated with information relevant to them to deal appropriately with 
patients’ safety 
2(4.3%) 8(17.0%) 7(14.9%) 6(12.8%) 14(29.8%) 10(21.3%) 5 (8) 
My manager negotiates with others outside his/her department(s) (e.g. suppliers, estates) in order to 
achieve a good standard of quality and safety within the department(s) 
4(9.5%) 7(11.7%) 2(3.3%) 7(11.7%) 18(30.0%) 4(6.7%) 5 (13) 
My manager maintains a network of contacts and information sources outside the department that help 
with quality and safety 
2(3.3%) 3(5.0%) 5(8.3%) 7(11.7%) 9(15.0%) 11(18.3%) 5 (18) 
My manager monitors quality and safety targets (e.g. waiting time targets) 3(6.5%) 1(2.2%) 2(4.3%) 17(37.0%) 14(30.4%) 9(19.6%) 6 (8) 
My manager takes corrective action when s/he faces important, unexpected patient safety crises 1(2.5%) 6(15.0%) 7(17.5%) 9(22.5%) 9(22.5%) 8(20.0%) 5 (15) 
My manager takes action when unexpected work pressure in his/her department(s) is too great to ignore 5(10.9%) 8(17.4%) 6(13.0%) 8(19.6%) 8(19.6%) 8(19.6%) 5 (9) 
My manager engages staff in quality improvement activities 3(6.4%) 8(17.0%) 9(19.1%) 16(34.0%) 6(10.0%) 5(10.6%) 5 (8) 
My manager determines where financial resources are best applied to maintain quality and safety within 
his/her department(s) 
4(9.5%) 8(19.0%) 3(7.1%) 7(11.7%) 10(16.7%) 10(16.7%) 5 (13) 
My manager interacts with colleagues to develop professional activities and duties related to patient safety 2(4.2%) 10(20.8%) 4(8.3%) 11(22.9%) 11(22.9%) 10(20.8%) 6 (6) 
My manager speaks to individuals outside my hospital about quality & safety 2(7.7%) 5(19.2%) 4(15.4%) 9(34.6%) 4(15.4%) 2(7.7%) 5 (29) 
My manager shares information received from patients on adverse incidents or complaints with the 
appropriate individuals 
3(7.3%) 7(17.1%) 2(4.9%) 22(53.7%) 4(6.7%) 3(7.3%) 7 (12) 
My manager negotiates with those involved to come to an agreement on a patient safety issue 4(10.5%) 4(10.5%) 6(15.8%) 15(39.50%) 6(15.80%) 3(7.9%) 6 (16) 
My manager relays quality and safety-related information between his/her department(s) and external 
bodies 
2(6.1%) 6(18.2%) 7(21.2%) 11(33.3%) 5(15.2%) 2(6.1%) 6 (21) 
My manager encourages teamwork on quality and safety improvement 6(14.3%) 7(16.7%) 7(16.7%) 9(21.4%) 3(7.1%) 10(23.8%) 7 (11) 
My manager investigates adverse incidents 0(0.0%) 4(9.5%) 7(11.7%) 13(21.7%) 8(13.3%) 10(16.7%) 6 (12) 
My manager attends meetings with other departmental managers to exchange information and 
requirements on quality & safety 
0(0.0%) 4(10.3%) 5(12.8%) 19(48.7%) 8(20.5%) 3(7.7%) 5 (16) 
My manager takes corrective action to manage adverse situations/operational breakdowns 2(4.7%) 5(11.6%) 2(4.7%) 14(32.6%) 8(18.6%) 12(27.9%) 7 (10) 
My manager assigns staff to address capacity issues that may compromise quality or safety 2(5.0%) 5(12.5%) 6(15.0%) 9(22.5%) 7(11.7%) 11(18.3%) 6 (14)* 
My manager shares figures on quality key indicators with staff 1(2.1%) 3(6.4%) 13(27.7%) 18(38.3%) 8(17.0%) 4(6.7%) 6 (7) 
My manager resolves patient safety-related problems that develop with other units 5(12.5%) 4(10.0%) 9(22.5%) 12(30.0%) 6(15.0%) 4(10.0%) 6 (14) 
My manager performs symbolic duties by representing his/her department(s) at quality and safety events 2(5.6%) 6(16.7%) 10(27.8%) 11(30.6%) 4(11.1%) 3(8.3%) 5 (19) 
My manager acts as an organisational representative by greeting or escorting external quality safety 
assessors 
5(17.2%) 6(20.7%) 11(37.9%) 3(10.3%) 1(1.7%) 3(5.0%) 5 (26) 
My manager researches quality and patient safety best practices 5(15.2%) 5(15.2%) 7(21.2%) 9(27.3%) 3(9.1%) 4(12.1%) 5 (22) 
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My manager shares information on quality targets to people outside the hospital 4(14.8%) 6(22.2%) 6(22.2%) 7(25.9%) 3(11.1%) 1(3.7%) 6 (27) 
My manager procures equipment to improve the quality of procedures or improve safety 3(7.7%) 12(30.8%) 11(28.2%) 7(17.9%) 3(5.0%) 3(5.0%) 7 (14) 
My manager act as a figurehead by attending external quality and safety events on behalf of his/her 
department(s) 
3(10.3%) 7(24.1%) 6(20.7%) 12(41.4%) 1(3.4%) 0(0.0%) 6 (25) 
My manager designs and improves service processes (e.g. changing steps in a care pathway) 6(15.0%) 8(20.0%) 15(37.5%) 10(25.0%) 1(2.5%) 0(0.0%) 6 (14) 
My manager passes on information on quality and safety achievements to outside groups 3(14.3%) 1(4.8%) 8(38.1%) 5(23.8%) 4(19.0%) 0(0.0%) 6 (33) 
My manager initiates and writes business cases for innovations to improve his/her service 4(11.1%) 12(33.3%) 11(30.6%) 6(16.7%) 3(8.3%) 0(0.0%) 6 (18) 
My manager writes standard operating procedures to improve patient safety or quality of care 9(24.3%) 17(45.9%) 3(8.1%) 7(18.9%) 0(0.0%) 1(2.7%) 6 (17) 
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Appendix 25 Spearman’s rho correlations for safety attitudes/actions from 
clinical staff survey 
 
 
Safety attitudes/action aggregated score 
 
Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N 
Power bases (aggregated scores) 
   
Legitimate .410** .002 57 
Coercive -.184 .170 57 
Reward .193 .151 57 
Information .682** .000 57 
Expert .585** .000 56 
Referent .755** .000 56 
Roles (aggregated scores) 
   
Disturbance handler .409* .016 34 
Disseminator .600** .000 38 
Monitor .345 .062 30 
Leader .774** .000 39 
Resource Allocator .561** .002 28 
Negotiator .341 .065 30 
Liaison .337 .092 26 
Spokesperson .576* .016 17 
Figurehead .484* .019 23 
Entrepreneur .587** .001 30 
Time spent currently .435* .001 56 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 26 Quality and safety management workshop programme 
 
 
 
Quality, Safety and Efficiency Improvement Workshop 
For Clinical and Non-Clinical Managers 
 
Date: TBC                          Time: 9.00– 16.00            Venue TBC 
 
Purpose:  
To develop an understanding of: 
 ‘Managing Quality and Safety’ - what it means and how to access knowledge and skills 
 The role of the Manager in leading quality and safety improvement 
 How to maximise participation in improvement projects and encourage innovation 
 
9.00 Coffee & Introductions 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire  
 
9.30 Context for Quality & Safety 
The Quality and Safety Imperative 
National Aspirations 
ICHT – Strategic Priorities                                                 
 
10.15 
 
Exploring current reality   
Perceptions and challenges   - (What does Q & S mean to you?)                                                
What does the evidence say?         -   (Recent findings in the NHS) 
The challenge of Improving Quality, Safety & Efficiency in Healthcare 
 
11.00 
 
Coffee 
 
11.15 
 
Competencies for Managing Quality, Safety and Efficiency 
 Feedback from Systematic Review 
 Behaviours and skills for Managers (Competency 10) 
 Building capability of the team 
 Learning about Quality, Safety and Efficiency best practice 
 
12.00  Generating and accessing knowledge for Quality & Safety                                    
 Finding and analysing quality and safety data 
 What to measure and how 
 
12.30 Lunch 
 
13.15 Exploring opportunities for Improving Quality and Safety 
 Personal improvement opportunities 
 The  PDSA Cycle – Plan do study act 
 Some tools & techniques for getting started 
